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ABSTRACT 
This research is concerned with the role of incumbent electric utility companies in the 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies (RETs). The process of technology diffusion is 
studied from a co-evolutionary perspective, analysing not only the development of 
technological artefacts as such, but their interactions with supporting institutions and 
organizations. The specific focus of this research is on the different strategies of incumbent 
utilities to cope with the introduction of RETs and associated institutional and policy changes. 
This thesis aims to make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the 
literature. Firstly, on a theoretical level, it extends the existing `systems of innovation' 
framework by explicitly including the notion of corporate strategy. This addresses recent 
contributions in the innovation systems literature that criticized these approaches for neglecting 
individual agency, overly relying on structuralist and functionalist explanations of individual 
behaviour, providing a quasi-deterministic narrative for systems dynamics. 
Secondly, on the empirical side, it applies this extended analytical framework to 
generate new insights into the behaviour of incumbent utility companies in the context of the 
introduction of RETs. Using a case study approach based on desk-based research and a series of 
semi-structured interviews, it compares the systemic environment in the electricity industry in 
three countries - the UK, Germany and Spain. It analyses the strategies of the incumbent firms 
and their dynamic interactions over time with the institutional and policy environment in 
shaping the particular diffusion path of RETs, both on a firm- and an industry-level. 
While Spain combines high levels of wind power diffusion at the country level with 
high levels of involvement of the incumbent utilities, Germany exhibits high-levels of wind 
power diffusion with only marginal involvement of the incumbent utilities. Finally, the UK 
shows low levels of wind power diffusion, with a high level of involvement of the utilities. This 
is explained by the differential interaction of company strategy and institutional change in each 
of these countries, which affected the co-evolutionary pathway of wind power. 
In conclusion, the thesis provides some recommendations for policy-making from the 
case studies and argues for the integration of individual agency into systemic innovation 
approaches. 
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1. Introduction 
In early 1998, the head of policy for one of Germany's largest electric 
utility companies commented on the country's emerging wind power sector "we 
will do everything possible to stop it" (Windpower Monthly 1998). At the same 
time, National Wind Power, the wind development company owned by the UK's 
largest utility company, National Power, consolidated its position as the country's 
largest wind energy company, managing one third of the UK's installed capacity. 
Meanwhile, Iberdrola, Spain's second largest electric utility company, announced 
its largest ever investment programme for wind power totalling almost ¬l bn over 
three years. 
As these brief examples suggest, utility companies in different parts of 
Europe have historically taken very different approaches when developing their 
wind power strategy. While some companies saw this technology as a threat to 
their existing business, others have actively embraced it, albeit for differing 
reasons. It is the aim of this study to shed more light on these different 
developments and to explore the reasons behind them. There is both an empirical 
and a theoretical motivation for this topic. Empirically, as introduced above, this 
thesis is concerned with the role of incumbent electric utility companies in the 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies, with a particular focus on wind 
power. Theoretically, the aim is to fill a gap in existing systemic innovation 
approaches by considering specifically the scope for differential individual agency 
within wider systemic changes. Both motivations will be explained in sections 1.1 
and 1.2 of this introduction. Subsequently, the aims and objectives for this thesis 
will be outlined in section 1.3. Section 1.4 gives an overview of the methodology 
and intended outcomes of the research before section 1.5 provides a chapter 
outline. Finally, section 1.6 concludes the chapter. 
1.1. Empirical Motivation 
Contributions both in the academic literature and in policy documents 
have argued for an energy system transformation to ensure its long-run 
sustainability. This concerns at least two issues: Climate change and security of 
energy supply. 
Regarding the former, the United Kingdom (UK) Treasury Stern Review 
of the economics of climate change (Stern 2006) has argued that the benefits of 
acting early to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, for example through new 
technologies and efficiency measures, outweigh the likely future costs of inaction. 
Similarly, the International Energy Agency's (IEA) World Energy Outlook (IEA 
2007) predicts an unsustainable increase of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in its 
business-as-usual scenario, which continues to be dominated by coal, natural gas 
and oil. Resource assessments have suggested that technically and economically 
available renewable energy resources are plentiful enough to serve the entire 
energy needs of the global human population (Scheer 2002; WBGU 2004). 
With regard to energy supply security, a Green Paper of the European 
Union (EU) Commission points out that more than 70% of all energy needs might 
have to be imported into the EU by 2030 (European Commission 2002). By 1999, 
over two thirds of the EU's natural gas imports came from just two countries - 
Russia and Algeria (European Commission 2002). In this context, renewable 
energies are considered as a domestic supply source that could mitigate fuel 
import dependency (DTI 2007: 143 ff). 
Governments have responded to this situation with a variety of policy 
initiatives. The EU issued a 2001 directive on renewable energy, with targets for 
an increased electricity production from renewable sources in each member 
country (European Commission 2001). This policy was recently updated with a 
new proposed directive that re-emphasised the need for an increasing contribution 
of renewable energy sources to total energy demand and included specific 
objectives for biofuels and renewable energy for heat generation (European 
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Commission 2008). The UK government's own 2007 Energy White Paper (DTI 
2007) proposes an increase in the electricity supply from renewable energy 
sources to 20% in 2020. Similar initiatives have been initiated in other European 
countries, such as the German Renewable Energy Act (as updated in 2004) or the 
Spanish Plan on Renewable Energy (2004) (Reiche 2005). 
Renewable energy technologies (RETs) are characterized as being 
structurally `disruptive' and radical (Tsoutsos & Stamboulis 2005; Foxon et al. 
2005) to conventional generation technologies, which makes the task of RET 
deployment a matter that goes beyond simple `technology substitution'. Rather, 
they pose challenges to the established electricity system as a whole at various 
levels, from organizational structures, market institutions to grid operations 
(Markard & Truffer 2006). 
In this context, the role of incumbent utility companies, which own large 
parts of the electricity supply structure in many European countries (European 
Commission 2005a), is of critical importance. In recent policy discussions, the 
market power of incumbents in European electricity markets is seen as a 
roadblock to further competition'. Specifically, new market entry can only be 
fostered by technology competition between different new electricity generation 
options. This is seen as inhibited by "structural barriers in the market" (European 
Commission 2005a). 
Although RETs have been the fastest growing electricity generation 
technologies in recent years (Justus 2006), their development and diffusion has 
often been seen as hindered by incumbent operators in European electricity 
markets (Johnson & Jacobsson 2001; Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). This follows a 
precedent from more established technologies such as nuclear power and 
combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT), which faced strong initial resistance from 
incumbent electric utility companies (Markard & Truffer 2006). 
' For example, the EC's 2005 investigation into the current failings of European electricity markets 
stated that "... a high level of concentration persists [... ], which creates scope for market power for 
incumbent operators", and further that `vertical foreclosure' in many markets between generation 
and retail reduces liquidity (European Commission 2005a). 
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The dominant market position of incumbent electric utilities. coupled «ith 
the appreciation of RETs as fundamentally 'disruptive', underlines the tension 
between these companies' objectives and new technological developments. 
Consequently, the question of the strategic approach of incumbent utilities to the 
adoption of RETs acquires a central role. Given their vertical integration along the 
whole electricity supply chain, these companies manifest a potentially formidable 
force that could block the diffusion of RETs into the wider market, yet, given their 
resources and reach, they could equally be one of the central driving forces for 
RET penetration. 
Empirical observations on the behaviour of incumbent utility companies in 
Europe provide a mixed picture. In some countries, they have actively attempted 
to block the introduction of new RETs, while in other countries they are among 
the leading investors in this area. Utilities in Germany have had little involvement 
in wind farm installations, while their Spanish counterparts are involved in the 
operation of more than half of all domestic wind farms. 
In summary, the diffusion of renewable energy plays a key role in current 
discussions on climate change and future energy supply security and 
sustainability. Given this empirical interest in the diffusion of RETs and 
especially in the role of incumbents in that context, a first task in this thesis was to 
identify an analytical framework through which this field could be analysed. 
1.2. Theoretical Motivation 
Large, vertically integrated utility companies have been inextricably 
linked with the historical evolution of the electricity system (Hughes 1987). Their 
organizational structures and technologies employed mirrored developments at the 
electricity systems level. Yet, incumbent firms have adapted to new technologies 
and societal requirements and it seems impossible to distinguish a priori, in the 
words of the Economist, between those that aim "to block the new technology in 
the hope that it will simply go away, and those who are moving to embrace it even 
though it undermines their existing businesses" (Economist 2005). 
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The analysis of such responses has been the subject of at least two separate 
streams of the academic literature. From a company perspective, the strategic 
management literature has attempted to provide a bottom-up picture of individual 
companies' behaviour with regard to technological change. Companies aim to 
develop unique capabilities that provide them with sustainable competitive 
advantages (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997). These capabilities are the result of 
firm-specific combinations of resources, including both tangible assets, such as 
machines and raw materials, and intangible assets, such as knowledge and brand 
images (Burgelman, Christensen, & Wheelwright 2004; Grant 2005). New 
technologies tend to be embraced where they enhance or complement existing 
competencies, while competence destroying technologies tend to be resisted 
(Tushman & Anderson 1986). However, it has recently been pointed out that even 
when incumbent firms master a new technology, what is most difficult for them is 
to formulate an appropriate strategy and find the best markets to utilize this new 
technology (Christensen & Rosenbloom 1995; Rosenbloom & Christensen 1998). 
One option for companies that aim to block the introduction of a new 
technology is to influence the institutional environment by lobbying for preferable 
types of regulation and market designs (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler 2004). This is 
especially important in highly regulated markets that are subject to strong 
regulatory and government influence, such as the electricity industry. For 
example, Frankenberger showed how the German utility company `E. ON' 
actively tried to shape the emerging EU emissions trading scheme to suit its own 
capabilities (Frankenberger 2006). 
Yet, this literature has not gone beyond narrowly defined domains, 
examining individual actors and assuming static decision environments (Madhok 
2002). Moreover, if strategy is understood as the process that guides decision- 
making over the allocation of a fixed amount of resources in a given time period, 
this literature is primarily concerned with the short-term positioning of companies 
in an industry (Porter 1980), putting less emphasis on long-term transitions at the 
systems level. 
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Conversely, there is a growing literature that analyses technological 
change as a system-wide process, transcending changes in technological artefacts 
alone. Recent examples have been the work on `carbon lock-in', `socio-technical 
regimes', `technological transitions' and `technological innovation systems' . 
While details differ between these approaches, they broadly consider 
technological change not just in terms of developments of physical technologies 
but as a process interacting with changes in wider socio-economic structures such 
as the market environment and consumer preferences. Hence, this class of 
approaches to innovation studies can be called `systemic studies of innovation' 
(Edquist 1997a). 
Thus, for example, Unruh has aimed to explain the widespread reliance on 
fossil-fuels in western economies as the outcome of a complex interaction of 
company activity, government regulation, cultural interpretation of technology by 
consumers and research agendas by scientists (Unruh 2000; Unruh 2002). In a 
similar vein, Geels interprets the changeover from the sailing ship to the 
steamboat in the 18th and 19th century in terms of emergence of new markets, 
which themselves have been created by consumer preferences and government 
regulation, and the entrepreneurial activity and technological developments of 
individual actors (Geels 2002). 
Hence, the systemic innovation literature has attempted to capture a 
multitude of relationships and variables, while at the same time keeping a long- 
term view on technological innovations and their socio-economic context. 
However, the aim for comprehensiveness has been increasingly traded-off against 
a lack of explanatory power to understand individual responses of companies vis- 
ä-vis systemic changes. Often, the actions of these actors have been explained in 
terms of the structural and functional position, for example of a company, within 
the wider system. Hence, Smith et al. ( 2005: 1492) highlight the "... tendency to 
treat regime transformation as a monolithic process dominated by rational action 
and neglecting important differences in context". 
As previously outlined, incumbents have typically been characterised as 
being `locked-in' to existing systems, attempting to block radical institutional 
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changes and the introduction of innovative technologies, since these are seen as 
threatening their established position within the system (Hughes 1987; Jacobsson 
& Bergek 2004). Yet, empirical observations from the electricity industry across 
Europe show that incumbents exhibit a variety of responses between countries and 
even within one country. This thesis argues that this cannot be explained by 
systemic changes alone but needs to be complemented by a deeper understanding 
of decision-making at the firm-level. Consequently, this thesis will develop and 
apply an analytical framework that combines relevant elements from both the 
strategic management and systemic innovation literature. 
Hence, the juxtaposition of both literatures seeks to highlight the potential 
complementarity of these two approaches. The strategic management literature 
provides a conceptual model of individual agency at the firm-level that can 
buttress the systemic analysis of structural changes over longer time-scales. The 
research presented in this thesis seeks to combine the strengths of both approaches 
to garner a theoretically and empirically richer understanding of company 
behaviour vis-ä-vis systemic changes, using the European electricity industry as a 
case study. A better understanding of incumbents' strategies in this context could 
help improve policy-making and contribute to the discussions on the incumbents' 
role in the ongoing transformation in the industry. 
1.3. Research Questions, Aims and Objectives 
The above sections set out the empirical and theoretical motivation for the 
research pursued. Both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, the 
research seeks to analyse the role of incumbent utility companies in the diffusion 
of renewable energy technologies. Technology is conceptualised here following 
the systemic innovation literature as the outcome of an interactive social process, 
while the individual company responses are considered in the context of insights 
from the strategic-management literature. 
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Consequently, the overarching research questions of this thesis are: 
What are the main factors influencing incumbent companies' strategy 
when changes occur at the systemic level in the electricity industry? 
To what extent do corporate strategy and the electricity system interact 
and influence each others' evolution? 
This section sets out the specific aims and objectives for the research to 
answer these questions. 
The first aim of this thesis is to develop an analytical 
, 
framework that 
explicitly examines individual agency within the systemic analysis of innovation in 
the context of the electricity industry. The specific objectives for this aim include: 
9A critical, comparative review of the strategic management and 
systemic innovation literature to identify key gaps for research. 
9 The identification of key components for an extended analytical 
framework that incorporates the notion of corporate strategy within 
systemic innovation analysis. 
9 The development of an analytical framework that captures 
innovation dynamics both at the systems and the individual level as 
well as dynamics between both levels. 
The second aim is primarily empirical. Having established an analytical 
framework, the second aim is to apply and test this framework by assessing 
empirically the individual strategies to integrate wind power among selected 
incumbent utility companies in three European countries - the UK, Germany and 
Spain. The objectives for this aim include: 
" To develop a research setting in which the dimensions of the 
analytical framework can be applied. 
9 To test empirically the interaction between systemic changes and 
corporate strategy of incumbent firms. 
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The final two aims in this thesis are to enhance the empirical 
understanding of wind power diffusion in the three countries presented and to 
embed the findings from the case studies in the initial theoretical framework. 
Thus, the third aim is to discuss what contributed to the incumbents' 
strategies to adopt or resist the introduction of wind power. The objectives here 
include: 
9 To identify common patterns among the leading and lagging 
countries. 
0 To analyse the main factors that led to the adoption of pro-active 
strategies among incumbents. 
" To specifically examine the role of government policy and its 
success in contributing to pro-active incumbents' behaviour. 
Lastly, on a general theoretical level, the aim is to assess the extent to 
which the analytical framework deployed in this research complements and 
extends existing approaches in the `systemic innovation' literature. The objectives 
here include: 
" An examination of the role of functions in systemic innovation 
research 
0A discussion of the relationship of the research presented in this 
thesis with wider systemic innovation frameworks 
1.4. Methodology, Novelty and Outcomes 
The research presented in this thesis is based on two main methodological 
approaches. Firstly, a comprehensive critical literature review was conducted to 
cover the main theoretical and empirical aspects of this research. This included 
academic journals and books, news reports and industry literature. This is 
reflected in chapters 2 and 3, which present the results of the academic literature 
review and develop the analytical framework, and in chapter 4, where the 
respective country policy environments and markets are presented. 
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Secondly, a case study approach was used, based on semi-structured 
interviews among the key companies in three countries, to complement and 
develop the insights from the literature review. The interviews were conducted 
with large electric utility companies in the UK, Germany and Spain. The aim of 
the case studies was to examine in-depth the factors underlying the strategy 
exhibited by the companies and their evolution over time. 
The resulting research aims to make three novel contributions to the 
literature. Firstly, it presents a novel analytical framework to analyse the 
interaction between firm-level activity and system-level developments by 
focusing on the co-evolution of corporate strategy and institutional variables such 
as market design and government policy. Previous research has primarily focused 
on one or the other dimension, but few analyses have sought to combine these 
dimensions in a single interdisciplinary approach (Murmann 2003). 
Secondly, the thesis will provide novel accounts of the development of 
renewable energy in three countries. These accounts provide an empirically 
deeper analysis than previously found in the literature. New empirical and 
theoretical insights are obtained by providing detailed and contextualised accounts 
of the evolution of both the electricity and renewable energy markets in each of 
the three countries and the concomitant strategic approach of the affected utility 
companies. Previous work, such as that of Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) provided 
a systemic perspective on the introduction of renewable energy in Germany, but 
focused on the development of policy without considering the specific strategic 
context for the German utility companies. Conversely, Mitchell examined the 
progress of renewable energy technology in the UK under two different policy 
regimes, but did not consider the specific motivations of incumbent utilities for or 
against investment in these technologies (Mitchell 2000; Mitchell & Connor 
2004). This research aims to fill this gap. 
Thirdly, the analysis allows for novel recommendations both for policy- 
makers and researchers in this area. Insights from the case studies highlight how 
policy-makers can engage incumbent utility companies in new technologies when 
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policy provides a perspective for strategic investments into new capabilities for 
the affected firms. However, it is suggested that this is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for companies' action - companies still have to engage with 
the policy environment and develop specific approaches to acquire new 
capabilities. The research will show that where policies opened the opportunity 
for strategic investments and companies consequently engaged in innovative 
activity, virtuous circles of new capability development and technological 
innovation and integration into existing markets could be witnessed. This is also 
important for researchers using systemic innovation approaches. It is argued that 
previous work focusing on the `functions' of innovation systems needs to take 
into account the context-specific reasons for certain functions to perform well or 
not. 
1.5. Chapter Outline 
This final section details the chapter structure and highlights where the 
above aims and objectives will be pursued. 
Chapter 2- Critical Literature Review 
This chapter pursues the first aim of this thesis in investigating the key 
literatures in order to help develop an analytical framework for this research. It 
will relate the above research questions to different streams in the innovation 
literature, especially in the strategic management and systemic-studies-of- 
innovation field. Building on these literatures, it will propose avenues to extend 
the current systemic innovation studies framework to address the research 
questions with a novel approach. 
Chapter 3- Analytical Framework and Methodology 
This chapter will bring together the discussion from the previous literature 
review and consequently develops an analytical framework to analyse the research 
questions. The focus of the analytical framework is to integrate a firm's 
development of corporate strategy with the systemic evolution of institutions and 
technology. In this way, it addresses the first aim of this thesis and provides the 
basis for the subsequent case studies. 
The final section of this chapter outlines the methodology used in the data 
collection process and the selection process for the three case study countries and 
respective companies. It thus spells out in detail the research setting in which the 
analytical framework was applied and sets the scene for the individual case 
studies in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4- The Interaction of utilities' strategies and systemic change 
in three countries 
This is a core chapter of this thesis. It will present the results from the case 
studies, presenting the data collected from the industry research and the 
interviews. Building on the analytical framework developed in the previous 
chapter, it will firstly provide data on the evolution of the electricity market and 
renewable energy policy environment in each country. Given this context, it will 
consequently discuss the strategy development of the incumbent utility companies 
in each country from the first introduction of specific wind power support policies 
up until 2005. The focus will be on corporate strategy with regard to investing 
into new technology and concomitant corporate political activities, and the 
interaction of these strategies with developments at the systems-level. In applying 
the analytical framework, this chapter addresses aim two of this thesis in 
generating novel insights into the role of incumbent utilities in the process of 
renewable energy diffusion. 
Chapter 5- Discussion of the Analytical Framework and Policy 
Implications of the Research 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the analysis from the three 
case-studies presented in the previous chapter. It will firstly analyse the patterns 
of strategy formulation at the firm-level and subsequent co-evolutionary processes 
between the companies and their systemic environment. Building on this 
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discussion, it will identify the key mechanisms that lead to such co-evolutionary 
developments between organizations, institutions and technologies. 
Consequently, the chapter will outline novel policy implications arising 
from these insights. This focuses both on the process of policy formulation and 
the key components that were successful in co-opting incumbent utilities into the 
policy process and engaging them into pro-active development cycles. 
Subsequently, implications for EU policy-making are discussed. This addresses 
the third aim of this thesis in discussing the main factors influencing incumbent 
utilities' strategy towards renewables and the role of policy within this. 
Chapter 6- The Applicability of the Analytical Framework within the 
wider `Systemic Innovation' Literature 
This chapter aims to broaden out the analysis to consider the novel 
contribution that the integration of corporate strategy can bring to systemic 
innovation research approaches. Here, the focus is especially on the role of 
`functions' of innovations systems, and the way in which integrating corporate 
strategy into such analysis extends the understanding of why some functions in a 
specific setting might perform badly or otherwise. Furthermore, the applicability 
of the analytical framework in other research settings and its relationship to the 
existing literature is discussed. 
Chapter 7- Conclusions 
This chapter draws together the results from the research presented in this 
thesis. It reviews the methodological approach and the applicability of the 
theoretical framework, as well as the main policy implications and theoretical 
contributions. It examines the strengths and limitations of the research and offers 
suggestions for further research. 
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1.6. Conclusion 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 have laid out the empirical and theoretical motivation 
for this research. Empirically, it is concerned with the role of incumbent electric 
utility companies in the diffusion of wind energy in three countries - the UK, 
Germany and Spain. Theoretically, the aim is to extend existing systemic 
innovation approaches by considering specifically the scope for differential 
individual agency within wider systemic changes. 
With this background, chapter 2 will now put the research into the context 
of the existing literature. It provides a critical review of three literatures pertaining 
to the present research topic: Firstly, the technology diffusion literature, secondly 
the strategic management literature and lastly the systemic innovation literature. 
Throughout the literature review, important gaps in each individual literature will 
be highlighted, which render each individual literature insufficient on its own for 
the planned research in this thesis. This provides the basis for developing a novel 
analytical framework in chapter 3. 
14 
2. Critical Literature Review: Innovation, 
systems, and strategic management 
As outlined in the introduction, this research focuses on the role of 
incumbent electric utility companies in the commercial adoption and diffusion of 
new RETs. This chapter puts the research into the context of the current literature 
pertaining to this topic. This critical literature review will focus on three selected 
key areas of the literature: Technology diffusion models, the strategic 
management literature and finally systemic innovation frameworks. 
The starting point for approaching this issue was to find an appropriate 
level of analysis that recognizes both technological development as well as 
differential organizational responses to these technologies within different 
national institutional contexts. 
Basic definitions often use the words `technological change' and 
`innovation' interchangeably when referring to the first market introduction of a 
new technology or process. The main distinction here is with the term `invention', 
which is primarily concerned with the discovery of new products or processes, 
without necessarily considering their market applications (Schumpeter 1934). 
In the Schumpeterian sense, innovations do not even have to be built on 
new discoveries but can be reconfigurations of existing products or processes in a 
novel way. Thus, the process of innovation makes use both of the existing stock of 
knowledge as well as recent discoveries (Schumpeter 1947). The crucial aspect of 
innovation for this thesis is what Schumpeter (1947: 153) coined "getting a new 
thing done", which emphasises the importance not only of developing a product 
or process but of successfully introducing it into the market. 
Building on this basic notion of innovation, Kemp and Rip put forward a 
more holistic conceptualisation of `technology' (Kemp & Rip 1998: 329ff). In 
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their view, merely focusing on technological artefacts is "black boxing" what is 
going on inside the process of technological change. While technologies can be 
seen as "tangible items", they are also embedded in specific skills, infrastructure 
and societal demands. Hence, technology can be seen as a "configuration that 
works", a specific combination of elements from different domains interacting to 
serve a specific purpose. Kemp and Rip (1998: 335) give the example of the 
introduction of the motorcar in Norway: "The motorcar is not an isolated artefact, 
but the label for part of our socio-technical landscape, made up of steel and 
plastic, concrete (the roads), law (traffic rules), and culture (the value and 
meaning of personal mobility). " Hence, the market introduction of the motorcar in 
Norway not only encompassed the physical artefact itself, but concomitant 
innovations in the area of law, infrastructure and cultural adaptation. 
What this classification of technology suggests is that innovation is far 
from a linear process of invention of new technologies and their subsequent 
application in the market but a circular and iterative development, depending on 
social and political as well as technological factors. Hence, in order to understand 
the innovation process, technological and societal change has to be considered in 
conjunction, as "technology is the outcome of institutional and societal processes 
and should not be regarded autonomous - that is, determined by a separate and 
distinct set of factors and rules" (Berkhout & Gouldson 2003: 232). 
The focus in this research is concerned with the role of incumbent utility 
companies in the diffusion of new renewable energy technologies. Hence, the 
research setting is in a field that has been characterised as `complex', 
`interconnected' and `slow-moving' with regard to technological change (Hughes 
1987). Following Rip and Kemp's (1998) definition of `technology', it is 
insufficient to solely focus on technological artefacts in this area, because 
technologies are embedded in economic and political institutions. They are 
continuously modulated and shaped by societal interactions at different levels 
(Berkhout & Gouldson 2003). It is precisely those interactions that determine the 
pathways of new technologies, in terms of who adopts them and in which markets 
they enter first. Hence, narrowing the unit of analysis to only one variable. 
`technology' for example, would foreclose much of the crucial processes in other 
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domains that influence the outcome of the technological diffusion process and 
would thus leave an empirically and theoretically unsatisfactory picture. Rather, 
the appropriate unit of analysis is the systemic interaction of these variables itself. 
Consequently, it was identified at an early stage in the literature review 
that the research had to go beyond narrow technological diffusion models. Given 
the interplay of institutional, organizational and technological factors, a richer 
theoretical framework was necessary that takes into account these 
interdependencies while recognizing the heterogeneous responses by individual 
companies. Consequently, two additional literatures were identified as critical to 
this research approach: Firstly, the literature concerned with companies' 
approaches to strategically managing technological change and secondly the 
systemic innovation literature investigating the co-evolution and interaction of 
different domains in the process of technological change. 
Consequently, this chapter will proceed as follows: Section 2.1 focuses on 
technology diffusion models, including path-dependency and technological- 
paradigm approaches. The strategic management literature and systemic 
innovation frameworks will be critically reviewed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 while 
section 2.4 summarises the discussion. In each of these sections, those aspects that 
contribute to answering the research question will be highlighted, but also the 
gaps in each individual approach will be pointed out. It will be argued that each 
literature on its own is insufficient to answer the research questions posed in this 
thesis. Consequently, building on the contributions that each literature makes, 
chapter 3 will develop an analytical framework that allows the specific analysis of 
the research questions of this thesis. 
The first section of this chapter will now consider the traditional analysis 
of technology diffusion patterns and the treatment associated phenomena of lock- 
in of certain `technological paradigms' in the literature (Dosi 1982). 
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2.1. Technological Diffusion, Increasing Returns to 
Scale and Technological Paradigms 
One of the most widely used concepts in studies of technological diffusion 
is that of the `S-curve' trajectory of product or process development (Foster 
1986). This captures the various stages of technological development that can be 
distinguished. Coupled to these development stages, various phases of associated 
diffusion patters can similarly be identified. 
The S-curve measures the improvements in product or process 
performance against the time or engineering effort invested into a particular 
technology (Foster 1986). According to Christensen (1992: 334), it is "... an 
inductively derived theory of the potential for technological improvement, which 
suggests that the magnitude of improvement in the performance of a product or 
process occurring in a given period of time or resulting from a given amount of 
engineering effort differs as technology becomes more mature. " 
In the initial stage of development, characterised by uncertainty, progress 
is slow and individual new technologies are filtered against other alternatives. 
However, as they become better understood and produced at larger scale, the rate 
of technological improvement increases. This in turn leads to a period of rapid up- 
scaling in product performance and design. In the final stage of development, 
diminishing returns to time and engineering efforts appear, as the technology 
matures, and ever greater endeavours are needed to add to a product's 
performance. This leads to a stabilisation of a product or process' performance 
characteristics at a high level. This pattern is depicted in Figure 1 (Christensen 
1992). 
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Product 
Performance 
Figure 1: The Technology S-Curve (Source: Christensen 1992) 
A similar way of illustrating the process of technological improvement is 
the use of experience curves, which plot the unit costs of a technology against its 
cumulative sales/installation (Grubb, Köhler, & Anderson 2002). Figure 2 below 
shows an example of experience curves for different energy technologies. While 
the S-curve and the experience curve of a technology are theoretically related, 
they actually stem from different research traditions (see (lEA 2000) and 
(Christensen 1997)). 
In both literatures, when technologies are introduced into the market, they 
often have several properties that make them less competitive against their 
established rivals. This explains the low initial take up of new technologies in the 
S-curve. However, once introduced into the market, new technologies benefit 
from refinements and extensions through learning-by-using and learning-by-doing 
opportunities (Dosi 1988), which enhance their position, for example with regards 
to unit costs, over time. 
This in turn improves the competitive position of innovations and spurs 
further sales, which in turn reinforces the scope for further cost reductions. This 
positive feedback cycle provides the rationale for the steeply climbing part of the 
S-curve where increasing adoption and cost reductions increasingly cement a 
technology's competitive position in the market. Similarly, experience curves 
typically show high rates of cost reductions per cumulative doubling of installed 
capacity when the total installed capacity is still low. Subsequently, as total 
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Time or engineering Effort 
installed capacity increases, the cost reductions per each doubling of capacity 
become smaller as technologies enter diminishing returns and scale economies are 
spread over an ever larger number of units. Eventually, the scope for further cost 
reductions declines. 
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Figure 2: Development of Experience curves; Source: Grubb et al., 2002 
These stylized models of technological development have led to the 
characterisation of `technology life cycles' of "childhood, adolescence and 
maturity" (Grubler 1998: 51). Quite literally, technologies are assumed to have a 
lifespan in which they are used and adopted before eventually being superseded 
by new technologies (see Figure 3 below for a schematic representation). In this 
respect, replacing "product performance" with "market share" on the y-axis in 
figure 1 above would yield an S-curve outlining the market penetration of a single 
technology over time. 
The terminology of life-cycles is also appropriate when considering the 
time scales involved in the diffusion of new technologies into the market place 
(Tushman & Anderson 1986; Grubler 1998). Grubler (1998: 58ff) provides 
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examples from a range of industries where innovations typically required several 
decades before replacing existing technologies. 
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Figure 3: Technological life-cycles over time of subsequent technology `generations'; Source: 
Grubler 1998 
There are two important points in this respect that have a bearing on the 
research presented here. 
Firstly, it is noted that the concepts of `S-curves' and `experience curves' 
are inductively derived and as such do not have a comprehensive theoretical 
underpinning (Christensen 1992). While they are frequently used in technological 
forecasting both among companies and policy-makers2, they are based on 
historically derived observations without necessarily providing a detailed 
explanation for the causal mechanism that links the two variables. For example, 
Christensen (1992) shows how S-curve projections for the same technology can 
vary by as much as one order of magnitude between different firms in the same 
industry. In this sense they are useful research `heuristics' without necessarily 
providing a theoretically firm foundation for the research pursued in this thesis. 
2 For example, a recent report by Greenpeace International argued that wind energy could supply 
12% of global electricity demand by 2020. This claim was based on calculations in which past 
'experience curves' for wind energy were extrapolated into the future and adjusted at the authors' 
discretion (Greenpeace & EWEA 2005). 
21 
Secondly, however, a distinction is made in the literature between two 
types of innovation along the S-curve. In the early stages of a technology's 
development, performance criteria are typically still poorly understood and evolve 
as a product is adopted by different user classes. In this period, product 
innovations normally dominate, focusing on positioning a product in the market. 
Subsequently, as a technology matures, the focus of improvements shifts to 
incremental process innovations and cost reductions as the product becomes 
standardized and the market well defined (Abernathy & Utterback 1978). 
Since incumbents tend to be associated with established, mature 
technologies, this implies that they are much better at nurturing their established 
products and processes, achieving incremental performance improvements from 
their current portfolio, rather than creatively exploiting new market niches. This 
point will be returned to in section 2.2.2 when discussing the strategic options for 
a company. 
Yet, in some instances, incumbents' concern with existing technologies 
led to such dominance in the market that they were never replaced by a 
competitor. This phenomenon has been highlighted in the increasing-returns and 
lock-in literature, which shows how random variations in initial starting 
conditions can lead to situations in which alternative technologies are prevented 
from entering the market. This will be discussed in the next section. 
2.1.1. Path Dependency and Technological Lock-In 
`Path dependency' has been considered in the context of increasing returns 
properties of individual technologies (David 1985, Arthur 1989). It describes the 
diffusion path of a technology and argues that the future success of a technology 
is a function not only of its own historic adoption path but also of that of 
competing technologies. 
The basic idea behind this notion is that the selection of one technology 
creates positive feedback loops to its users which furthermore encourage the 
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usage and adoption of that particular technology. As the relative benefits of one 
technology compared with another increase over time, the costs of exploring 
alternative technological avenues rise and hence their attractiveness falls. 
"Companies may feel the need to pick the right horse" (Pierson 2000: 254) as the 
costs of exit - of switching to some previously plausible alternative - rise. " 
(Pierson 2000: 252) 
Arthur (1989) argues that small and essentially random variations in initial 
conditions can consequently lead to a situation where one technology becomes 
dominant and supplants all its competitors, without it necessarily being the most 
efficient long-run option. In a simulation model, he identified `tipping-points' 
after which one technology dominates all its competitors, due to the particular 
diffusion path adopted. He identified four sources for feedback loops through 
increasing returns: 
" Scale economies 
" learning effects 
" network economies and 
9 adaptive expectations. 
Scale economies result from the spreading of fixed costs over more units 
and the generally better utilisation of production capacity. Learning effects stem 
from the increased familiarity, adaptation, usage and interaction with a 
technology, which allow specialist skills and know-how to be developed. This 
again leads to lower production costs. Network externalities result from 
technologies that exhibit certain properties such that they become more valuable 
the more users they have. The telephone is an example, as its value increases the 
more users are connected to the same communication system. Lastly, increased 
familiarity with and improved quality of a technology reduces uncertainty and 
leads to adaptive expectations such that it will be increasingly be accepted and 
selected over other (initial) competitors. 
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In sum, these factors can "... drive the adoption process into developing a 
technology that has inferior long-run potential" (Arthur 1989: 117). This situation, 
commonly described as `lock-in' (Kline 2001; Unruh 2000), applies where a 
technology has gained such a dominant position that it systematically locks-out 
potential alternatives, even where the initial conditions under which the 
technology was originally developed no longer apply. The prevalence of the 
`QWERTY-keyboard' or light-water nuclear reactor technology have been cited 
in the literature as examples of such states3 (David 1985; Walker 2000). 
An important extension to path dependency has been its application to 
institutions (North 1990, Pierson 2000). Although the sources of institutional path 
dependency are primarily rooted in political economic arguments rather than 
economic-organizational behaviour, analogies can be drawn on all four counts 
mentioned above (Pierson 2000). Again, the fundamental argument turns on the 
incremental nature of change due to the high initial `set-up' costs of radical 
alternatives, and the cumulative learning that is embodied in existing institutions. 
The emergence of such dominant technologies has been characterised as 
`technological paradigms' in the literature. This approaches the phenomenon from 
a technological-economic perspective, examining the selective `problem solving 
activities' in science and industry, as well as their economic applications. Hence, 
a technological paradigm is defined as a "`model' and a "pattern" of solution of 
selected technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural 
sciences and on selected material technologies. " (Dosi 1982: 152) This employs an 
evolutionary perspective of technological development in assuming that it is 
impossible for researchers and industrial companies to constantly scan all 
conceivable opportunities and options for scientific and industrial endeavour. 
Rather, "... economic agents tend to react to (or anticipate) changes in relative 
prices and demand conditions by searching for new techniques and new products 
3 Liebowitz and Margolis have criticised such arguments from a classical economic perspective, 
contending that lock-in phenomena could ultimately be explained with rational behaviour 
(Liebowitz & Margolis 1995). However, they did not address the socio-technical dimension of 
lock-in arguments, which will be further pursued in this thesis. 
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within the boundaries defined by the nature of each technological paradigm" 
(Dosi & Orsenigo 1988: 16-17). 
The `technological paradigm' concept gives a first-order explanation of 
why technologies might come to dominate in an industry despite the large variety 
of technology designs available in principle and underpins the path dependency 
argument. Initially random differences in knowledge acquisition and design 
improvements in new technologies can have lasting ramifications along a 
technology's development path. Once scientific and engineering efforts converge 
on a select few applications rather than a wide field, alternative technological 
options are at an increasing disadvantage to the dominant search and research 
consensus. 
2.1.2. Discussion 
How does the above discussion relate to the research pursued in this 
thesis? Three issues will be highlighted. Firstly, technology diffusion models are 
useful research `heuristics' that allow a high degree of abstraction to focus on the 
dynamics of technology diffusion. Yet, as such they do not have a comprehensive 
theoretical underpinning, thus limiting their applicability in more complex 
research settings. 
Yet, secondly, they provide two particular insights about the role of 
incumbents in technology diffusion. Firstly, incumbents are associated with what 
was successful in the past. Furthermore, incumbents have typically benefited from 
significant cumulative learning opportunities that provided them with the basis for 
their dominant position today. Yet, given the emergence of `technological 
paradigms', their associated paths of investigation are selective and exclusive, 
discriminating against new and untried solutions that fall outside the dominant 
paradigm (Dosi 1982). 
Lastly, incumbents are seldom the source of radical new products or 
processes, which is reflected in their low involvement in product innovations as 
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compared to incremental process innovations (Abernathy & Utterback 
1978; Tushman & Anderson 1986). Engineering knowledge relevant to current 
`technological paradigms' is often heavily concentrated among incumbents and 
their network of supply companies, while more unproven and new technology 
designs are more widely distributed in an economy (Dosi 1988). 
In summary, while providing a rationale for particular patterns of 
technology diffusion, technology diffusion models are limited in explaining the 
causal mechanisms that underline such patterns. Hence, in order to better 
understand the sources of `stickiness' of established technologies among 
incumbents from a company perspective, the next section will explore in more 
detail the strategic management literature's contribution to organizational 
behaviour. There are three sub-sections: Firstly, on the organizational structure of 
corporations, secondly, on the strategic management of innovation, and lastly, on 
corporate political activity. 
2.2. Innovation in the 
Literature 
Strategic Management 
The previous section provided a top-down picture of different technology 
diffusion models and the role of incumbents within them. This section will now 
provide a bottom-up picture, building on the strategic management literature, of 
why incumbents tend to be associated with established technologies and 
associated dominant paradigms. The first section will focus on the decision- 
making process in the organizational context and particularly the phenomena of 
bounded rationality an organizational routines. Consequently, it will consider how 
companies can strategically develop their capabilities to respond to new 
technological threats, allowing incumbents to adapt to changing technological 
environments. Finally, the option to politically influence their market environment 
is discussed. 
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2.2.1. Organizational Structure 
One of the fundamental notions in conceptualising organisational contexts 
is the observation of `bounded rationality' (Simon 1955) in the work place. This 
implies that "rational actors are significantly constrained by limitations of 
information and calculation" (Cyert & March 1992: 214) and consequently 
underscores the problem of coping to work in an environment of resource 
constraints and uncertainties. Nelson and Winter build their concept of 
`organizational routines' as dominant forms of organizational behaviour on this 
initial observation by Simon (1955). Routines are "... any technical, procedural, 
organisational or strategic process or technique used by a firm as part of its 
normal business activities (Foxon 2003: 6). " 
These concepts are particular relevant to the analysis of incumbents for at 
least two reasons: Firstly, they provide a coherent and comprehensive alternative 
behavioural framework to the standard neoclassical narrative of organizations that 
identify, choose, and implement optimal alternatives. The behavioural 
assumptions underlying the concepts of `bounded rationality' and `organizational 
routines' stress solutions that simplify decision-making problems. Thus, the focus 
is on alternatives that satisfy certain minimum criteria, rather than trying to find 
the best imaginable solution. The importance of pragmatism and standard 
operating procedures is stressed for the everyday workings of a company (Cyert & 
March 1992: 214-215). 
Secondly, this implies that incumbents, with their historically grown 
routines, are particularly prone to suffer from organizational inertia in the 
face of 
radical technological change. Routines are embedded at the same time 
in a 
company's historic development and the present network 
it operates in. New 
technologies often arise outside an incumbent's traditional domain and would 
furthermore erode the value of sunk investment in its present assets, whether 
tangible such as machines and products, or intangible assets such as the 
employee's knowledge base, organizational structures and established 
relationships with suppliers (Cyert & March 
1992). 
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Both the notion of bounded rationality and of organisational routines is 
now explored in more detail. 
Bounded Rationality, Routines and Search Heuristics 
Simon (1955) explores the limits to the computational and predictive 
ability of the `economic man' and thus, the limits to `his' ability to behave in a 
`rational' manner. An economic agent typically faces several choices and 
constraints: A set of given alternatives, the properties of these alternatives and 
finally the preference-order of these options. If perfect rationality and well- 
behaved preferences were assumed, knowledge of all three aspects would be 
complete, and the economic agent would be able to make an optimal choice 
within these boundaries. Simon (1955) argues, however, that in reality an 
economic agent is constrained by at least three factors: His or her computational 
power to process information, time constraints to take decisions and finally 
imperfect foresight about different future states of the world. Consequently, an 
economic actor will have to take decisions only using a subset of information on 
the different attributes of the available options. 
Consequently, there will be some variables which are assumed as fixed or 
given. These can reside outside his or her control as is for example assumed in 
most short-run optimization problems of a firm. Simon argues, however, that 
"... some of the constraints that must be taken as givens in an optimization 
problem may be physiological and psychological limitations of the organism 
(biologically defined) itself. " (Simon 1955: 101) Hence, the key insight from 
Simon's work is that constrained optimization problems have to take into account 
the constraints inherent in the economic agent. There are limits to the `rationality' 
- at least in an absolute sense - with which an 
individual can be expected to 
operate. Given these inherent constraints, it can be expected that he or she will 
resort to some mode of operation which will only approximate `optimal' 
behaviour. Simon proposes the mode `satisficing' as a dominant strategy, whereby 
individuals merely aim to satisfy certain minimum criteria (threshold levels of 
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profitability, acceptability of action in a hierarchy) but will not necessarily look 
for an overall optimum. This behaviour has been described as searching for a local 
but not necessarily for a global maximum (Metcalfe & Boden 1992). 
In principle, there are two options to overcome this: Firstly, an avenue that 
Simon pursued in his subsequent work, is the idea to increase the capacities of 
what individuals and organizations can manage within given resource boundaries 
in order to maximise the amount of information on which decisions can be based 
(Simon 1978; Simon 1979). 
Nevertheless, even if it were possible to overcome significant 
computational constraints, individuals would still be working under time and 
resource constraints and with imperfect foresight of future states of the world. 
This is the starting point for what Lindblom labelled "disjointed incremental ism" 
in policy making (Lindblom 1979). Recognizing the inherent short-comings of 
any attempt to use synoptic analysis, Lindblom argues that policy-makers should 
not aspire to be unrealistically comprehensive but make it explicit that they only 
have limited resources which they will aim to use as thoughtfully as possible. As 
Lindblom put it (1979: 518): "An aspiration to synopsis does not help an analyst to 
choose manageable tasks, while an aspiration to develop improved strategies 
does. " 
While Lindblom focused on policy-making, Nelson and Winter (1982) 
developed a framework to apply the ideas of bounded rationality in the context of 
the private corporation. This led to the development of the concept of `routines' as 
a way of understanding organizational processes. 
Nelson and Winter's model starts with the recognition that the search for 
profitable new products and processes is routed 
in the local knowledge and 
operations of the firm4. Rather than constantly scanning all conceivable options 
4 This has led some commentators to argue that it is `tacit knowledge' rather than `bounded 
rationality' which provides the theoretical 
foundation for organizational routines (Foss 2003). Yet, 
this discussion has no bearing on the subsequent research presented 
in this thesis and will thus not 
be explored further. 
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available to the company, a narrow set of options is evaluated, based on the 
existing stock of knowledge and incremental improvements that could be added. 
Thus, the search for, selection and retention of new options is guided by the 
accumulated knowledge and resources located within the boundaries of the firm 
and its employees. Consequently, routines are set up so that employees can 
perform otherwise complex tasks and processes in a consistent manner over time 
and across different functional units of a firm (Christensen & Overdorf 2000). 
Two aspects of routines stand out: Firstly, routines are successful and 
widely used precisely because they have benefited from a lot of `learning-by- 
doing' in the past that has refined and improved their application. Because they 
are time-tested and have benefited companies previously, deviating from them 
creates risks and uncertainty. Secondly, individual routines are typically part of a 
wider set of complementary routines which focuses and guides their development. 
Thus individual routines benefit from the availability of complementary resources 
and processes which are well-known and tested in themselves. This again 
increases the risk of applying untried or "idiosyncratic routines" (Nelson 
2002: 268) because not only are new routines risky on their own, but also a whole 
new system of support networks and complementary skills might need to be built 
up. 
The term `search heuristics' has been used interchangeably with routines 
and encapsulates the essence of this approach: Search as the means by which 
companies progress and heuristics (stemming from the Greek `Eureka! ') as the 
methodology - discovery and invention through incremental approaches such as 
trial-and-error. In an analogy to Simon's `satisficing', routines are not guaranteed 
to be optimal in the sense of a global maximum but rather they deliver local 
maxima. Routines `satisfice' in the sense that they are good enough to enable a 
company to operate and make profit but they are not an exhaustive search that will 
in every instance seek an absolute optimal outcome, such as maximum profits. 
The impact of routines on the firm's mode of operation will now be 
illustrated. Christensen (Christensen 1997; Christensen & Overdorf 2000) gives an 
insight from a management perspective into why they might persist. In his 
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analysis, he uses the term `company values' to characterise the standards, rules or 
guiding principles by which employees classify whether an order, a customer or 
an idea for a new product is attractive or unattractive. Given the scarcity of 
resources, it is a tool to help prioritise in an environment of bounded rationality. 
Christensen and Overdorf (2000) give two examples to illustrate the 
impact of such routines on firm decisions: Firstly, companies frequently use 
targets for profit margins which companies require to invest in particular ventures. 
These are related to the overhead costs of a company. Typically, when selecting 
between different projects, managers are trained to reject any project which does 
not deliver the required return, i. e. which does not fit with the company's cost 
structure although under a different cost structure it might have been profitable. A 
second value relates to the size of a new venture relative to the original company. 
As share prices are the present discounted value of future earnings, managers are 
keen to maintain growth and more specifically, to maintain a constant rate of 
growth. Thus, while the threshold for small companies to grow at a constant rate 
is relatively low, a multi-billion dollar business needs to find new markets that 
match the company's size each year to maintain a constant growth rate. This tends 
to discourage large companies from entering small, emerging markets. This is not 
because large companies do not have the resources but because their routines 
discourage small projects. Thus, Christensen gives a micro-level view of how and 
why some of the processes are at work that evolutionary economists have been 
observing. 
Awerbuch (2000) similarly highlights the entrenched nature of routines at 
a macro-level of the electricity industry. He demonstrates how the most 
commonly used yardstick to compare different electricity generating technologies 
- the levelized unit costs 
(LUC) of a technology (measured for example in 
¬/MWh) - is biased towards "expense-intensive" 
(i. e. gas turbines) technologies 
and against those that are "capital-intensive" (i. e. wind turbines). 
Specifically, 
engineering-based models such as LUC ignore the value that 
flexibility and 
strategic and managerial options can offer in 
liberalized electricity markets. 
Furthermore, fuel price risks are ignored. Awerbuch argues that when LUC were 
first conceptualized, this approach was acceptable because technological choice 
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was broadly homogeneous (between oil- and coal-fired power stations) and 
markets stable, thus making the need for flexibility and options relatively 
unimportant. Yet, with market liberalization, different fuel prices and other risks 
today, utilities require more sophisticated tools to evaluate their options. 
Awerbuch argued that renewable energy technologies, though superficially more 
expensive, could often reduce overall risk-adjusted portfolio costs of utilities 
(Awerbuch 2000). Nevertheless, many publications and company and official 
reports still use LUC as a yardstick for comparison (See e. g. (IEA 2005d). 
Discussion 
The above examples highlight how certain `search heuristics' or `routines' 
tend to guide the search for new technological opportunities both at a company 
and an industry level. Neo-classical economists tend to stress that in real market 
situations learning opportunities and competition will ensure at least a close 
approximation to rational behaviours. Yet, when analysing innovation and the 
inherent uncertainty involved in such situations, these assumptions do not 
necessarily hold, especially with regard to the type of market environment and 
organizational interactions. In a complex environment, changing at the level of 
technologies, customer preferences and the nature of competition, firms are 
unlikely to have the information or possibly the computational power to discover 
or maintain optimal profit maximising solutions at all times. 
In this respect, the above discussion provides a company-internal 
argument for an incumbent's adherence to established `technological paradigms'. 
Dosi (1988) argues that the conditions in which technological change takes place 
are rather different from the idealised states of the world 
in neoclassical 
economics. He identifies five stylized facts borne out of the empirical 
literature: 
5 Friedman's ( 1953) `as if condition argues that as long as firms 
behave as if they were rational 
profit-maximisers, competition will ensure over time 
that only the most efficient techniques and 
technologies will prevail. However, this condition would 
break down where technological change 
constantly shifts the basis of competition over time. 
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0 "uncertainty" ... "the outcomes of innovative efforts can hardly be 
known ex ante. " 
0 "increasing reliance [... ] on advances in scientific knowledge" 
(which in itself is uncertain and complex) 
" "increasing complexity of research and innovative 
activity ... changing the nature of search activities" 
" "a significant amount of innovations and improvements are 
originated through `learning-by-doing' and `learning-by-using"' 
" "technological change is a cumulative activity [... ] depending on 
technological levels already achieved" 
For economic activity under these conditions, arguments about `bounded 
rationality' and `organizational routines' appear an adequate representation of 
firm behaviour. New technologies arise outside established (re-)search activities 
and uncertainty about their performance characteristics and market opportunities 
tends to tilt the playing-field towards established technologies. Where uncertainty 
prevails and knowledge is fragmented, evolutionary theory suggests inductive 
reasoning through knowledge interactions and trial-by-error as dominant 
organizational responses (Simon 1955; Arthur 1994). In the context of the 
incumbent firm, established search heuristics for new technologies might guide 
organizations towards technological change of established technologies6. To such 
an organization, radically new technologies might appear not only inferior per se 
but also inadequate to fit into the existing structures and hierarchies established in 
the company7. 
While this section was concerned with decision-making processes within 
organisational structures, the next section will look at the substance of such 
decisions, namely the strategies of firms and their technology policies. Building 
on the discussion so far, it will particularly be asked under which circumstances 
6 In the electricity industry, for example, the 
interest of incumbent utilities in incremental 
improvements in established coal power plants through `gasification' and `carbon capture and 
storage' technology is notable. 
Compare Christensen's (1997: 87ff) discussion of how incumbent integrated steel makers ignored 
the opportunities provided by new `mini-mill' steel-making 
technology, eventually losing almost 
half their market share between 1965 and 1995. 
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incumbents can avoid the problem of failing to identify new profitable 
opportunities and to escape established routines. 
2.2.2. Strategic Management and the Innovation 
Literature 
The fundamental question in the strategic management literature is how 
companies can secure a sustainable competitive advantage over their rivals in the 
market place (Porter 1980). In relation to the research presented here, the impact 
of new technologies on the competitive position of an incumbent company gains 
particular currency. In the following, the question of `what constitutes strategy' 
will firstly be explored, before this section turns to the question of what options 
companies have in strategically managing their existing, as well as new 
technologies. This will build on the resource based view of the firm (Penrose 
1959; Barney, Wright, & Ketchen 2001), utilizing the concept of `dynamic 
capabilities' as a key source of differentiating between companies. 
The Notion of Strategy in the Literature 
Strategy has been defined as "the determination of the basic long-term 
goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals. " (Chandler 
1962: 13) Yet, this traditional definition of strategy has been criticised as too 
narrow and inconsistent with empirical observations, since it implies that every 
commercial activity has been defined in advance (Mintzberg 1978; Mintzberg 
1987). 
Rather, it has been put forward that strategy can emerge as a pattern of 
activities without necessarily following a pre-defined plan. 
Thus, Mintzberg 
(1987) distinguishes between ` deliberate' and ` emergent' strategies. While an 
intended and realized strategy can be labelled 'deliberate', 
in an 'emergent' 
strategy, "patterns develop in the absence of 
intentions, or despite them... " 
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(Mintzberg 1987: 13). Hence, a realized strategy can emerge out of unintended and 
undirected actions that have coalesced over time to become the dominant pathway 
for a firm. 
In markets with fast-changing regulatory or technological conditions, 
companies can be expected not to tie their fortunes too closely to any one specific 
option in advance (Mintzberg 1987). In this context, strategy can be developed in 
hindsight based simply on what worked well and achieved success. Hence, an 
investment could have been made by chance, and a company only realises over 
time the value that it offers. In this respect, Mintzberg (1987: 13) offers the 
following quote from a business executive on such a fortuitous investment: 
"Gradually, the successful approaches merge into a pattern of action that becomes 
our strategy. We certainly did not have an overall strategy for this. " 
Yet, the essence of such developments, whether emergent or deliberate, is 
the `positioning' of the company with regard to the key determinants of industry 
competition. Porter uses a model of `five forces' within an industry to describe the 
major variables to be considered by the firm (Porter 1980). These are: 
" The bargaining power of customers 
" The bargaining power of suppliers 
" The threat of new entrants 
" The threat of substitute products 
" The level of competition in an industry 
According to Porter, the goal of company strategy should be to find 
positions that are defensible against competition, i. e. that are 
less vulnerable to 
one of the five forces, "drawing o n an understanding of their 
determinants" 
(Porter 1983: 3). In this context, technology becomes a strategic variable, which 
can bestow a competitive advantage upon a 
firm. 
An alternative strategy could be to change the rules of the market 
in such a 
way that it makes a current company position more 
defensible. Technology could 
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be one lever for such a strategy, but more common is company activity to lobby 
and influence government and regulatory authorities to set market rules in a 
particular way. Both approaches will be discussed in the subsequent sections. The 
next section will draw on the dynamic capabilities approach for framing the 
discussion of the strategic management of technology, before section 2.2.2.4 
discusses political activities of the firm. 
Capabilities as a key differentiator of the Firm 
One of the key aspects to finding a position of sustainable competitive 
advantage in an industry is the role of `dynamic capabilities'. In the resource- 
based view of the firm (Penrose 1959), these are defined as unique combinations 
of resources and competences, which are not easily transferable or imitable. Teece 
et al. define dynamic capabilities "as the firm's ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments" (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997: 516). 
Consequently, in this view, dynamic capabilities are considered the key 
strategic differentiator between companies. Given differences in the availability of 
tangible and intangible resources among companies, different capabilities and 
corresponding strategies are built to gain competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen 1997; Grant 2005). Hence, capabilities are based on unique, company- 
specific combinations of resources and competences which distinguish a firm 
relative to its competitors. Figure 4 summarizes the relationship between 
resources, capabilities and strategy. 
What Figure 4 underlines is that it is not the resources alone that make a 
firm productive or grant it a competitive advantage, but the specific combination 
of resources to create unique organizational skills (Grant 1995: 118). Going one 
step further, Porter argues that in the long-run competitive advantages can only be 
defended where companies can create a `fit' between several unique capabilities 
and a specific strategy that they underpin, in order to make a niche more 
sustainable (Porter 1996). 
36 
Resources 
Tangible Intangible Human 
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Knowledge & interaction 
Figure 4: The links among resources, capabilities and strategy (From Grant 2005: 139) 
In both cases, the key feature of capabilities is their uniqueness with 
respect to individual companies. As Teece et al. (1997: 514) put it: "From the 
resource-based perspective, firms are heterogeneous with respect to their 
resources/capabilities/endowments. Further, resource endowments are 'sticky': at 
least in the short run, firms are to some degree stuck with what they have and may 
have to live with what they lack. " Capabilities cannot easily be replicated in the 
market place, at least in the short run, because of their underlying complex 
organizational processes and the often tacit knowledge involved. Furthermore, 
where this relates to intangible assets such as brand names and reputation, they 
cannot be easily transferred from one firm to another. Even where it is possible to 
transfer such capabilities through market transaction, it is difficult for a company 
to extract any extra rent from them that has not already been priced into the assets 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997). 
Like routines, capabilities evolve over time in a path-dependent manner, 
thus leaving companies in different starting positions, for example when faced 
with new technological challenges. Yet, both concepts describe two distinct 
aspects of the same process of organizational development. Indeed, 
it can be 
argued that routines and capabilities have a symbiotic relationship. 
Routines are 
the process by which companies search for opportunities and evaluate their 
options according to their capabilities. 
At the same time, since search is local, 
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Organizational 
capabilities 
bounded by the tacit knowledge embodied in the company and its employees. 
capabilities form the platform from which search activities are initiated. 
This consequently links into the distinction made by Mintzberg 
(Mintzberg 1987) on the origins of strategy-making. Strategy can be a deliberate 
plan building on the existing set of capabilities and routines in a company. In an 
evolutionary perspective of strategy-making, this is carried out through the 
incremental learning experience with the actual execution of a strategic plan and 
the gradual adaptation of company capabilities and routines. Conversely, where 
strategies are emergent, capabilities are combined from resources hitherto seen as 
incompatible or unproductive. Yet, again, in an evolutionary perspective, the 
learning experience in the competitive environment provides companies with the 
opportunity to recognise new capabilities and to start formulating more deliberate 
strategies around them. This recognizes the incremental nature of change and 
information acquisition at the level of the firm, discussed in section 2.2.1. 
Teece et al. consider that "indeed, if control over scarce resource is the 
source of economic profits, then it follows that such issues as skill acquisition, the 
management of knowledge and know-how, and learning become fundamental 
strategic issues. " (Teece et al. 1997: 514). 
It is this learning experience that links capabilities and strategy over time. 
Strategy in this context is the link between the internal processes and capabilities 
of a firm and their application in the external environment. Feedback or 
`experience' with actually performing a strategy is informing routine processes 
and guides the decision to adapt capabilities. Thus, strategy provides ``a 
perspective that cuts across the boundary of the organization, matching capability 
(an aspect of the organizational context) with opportunity (an aspect of the 
environmental context). " (Rosenbloom 1978: 228) Hence, strategy can be 
considered the result of an organizational learning process, but also its key input 
over time. As Burgelman and Rosenbloom put it, "Capabilities give strategy its 
force; strategy enacted creates experience that modifies capabilities" (Burgelman 
& Rosenbloom 1989: 19). Figure 5 summarizes this relationship. 
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Figure 5: An Organizational learning framework of strategy-making (adapted from 
Burgelman and Rosenbloom 1989: 5) 
With this framework in mind, companies have in principle two routes 
through which to pursue their strategy. Firstly, they can explore opportunities to 
build capabilities and find niches in the market where they can capture a unique 
position. Alternatively, they can explore to what extent the market rules can be 
changed so that an existing set of capabilities becomes more profitable. Both 
options will be discussed in turn in the subsequent sections. 
The Strategic Management of Technology 
Having reviewed some of the basic concepts that seek to explain the 
internal context of the firm, it is now possible to examine in detail how a company 
can manage its technological capabilities in a strategic way. 
The idea on which the technology strategy literature builds suggests that 
the technology strategy of a firm has to fit into its broader strategic goals (Porter 
1983; Freeman and Soete 1997). Porter (1983: 9) captures this succinctly: 
"Competitive Strategy is an integrated set of policies in each functional activity of 
the firm that aims to create a sustainable competitive advantage. Technology 
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strategy is but one element of an overall competitive strategy and thus must be 
consistent with and reinforced by the actions of other functional departments. " 
What this view on technology strategy suggests is that the specific 
organizational context of the firm is as important to the firm's strategic decision 
as are the wider developments around a firm's boundaries. So, the decision 
whether to engage in the addition of specific technological capabilities or not has 
to be considered not just in the context of the market (i. e. specific government 
programmes and subsidies) but also in terms of a firm's existing capabilities and 
routines. Firms have developed a set of capabilities in the past and operate unique 
routines for refining and adding to this capability set. Thus, the decision for the 
direction of new capability additions and/or refinements is set in the context of the 
historic development of the firm so far, and resource constraints limit the scope of 
involvement in any one activity and mandate the setting of priorities in each time 
period considered. Recent research has stressed the idiosyncratic nature of the 
discovery of new strategic opportunities (Denrel, Fang, & Winter 2003) as well as 
the localised co-evolution of learning and dynamic capabilities (Zollo & Winter 
2002). 
As noted, when evaluating new technological options, a company's search 
will initially be guided by its existing set of capabilities and routines. This 
influences the perception of expected market sizes, future technological 
development and impact on the competitive environment of the firm (Christensen 
1997). Consequently, when evaluating technologies that require radically different 
capabilities, established companies are often observed not to capture the full scope 
of commercial opportunities, at least initially (Rosenbloom & Christensen 1998). 
A second argument for the failure of incumbents to align their strategies to 
new technologies lies in the nature of a particular innovation and whether 
it 
appears to sustain or disrupt established markets of the 
firm (Christensen 1997). 
In this distinction, the difference between the types of innovation is not found in 
the character of the technology itself, nor in its impact on the company's existing 
capabilities. Rather, the focal point may 
be the contribution an innovation can 
make to serve the needs of an incumbent's established customer 
base (its 'value 
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network' - Christensen 1997). Thus, `sustaining' innovations would add value to 
the business proposition presented to an incumbent's customers, while 
`disruptive' innovations would be outside the demands of this particular value 
network. In an empirical study of the disk drive industry, Christensen and 
Rosenbloom found that incumbents were leading innovators "as long as the 
technology addressed customers' needs within the value network in which the 
incumbents competed. " Conversely, "[new] entrants led in developing and 
adopting technologies which addressed user needs in different, emerging value 
networks. It is in these innovations, which disrupted established trajectories of 
technological progress in established markets, that attackers proved to have an 
advantage. " (Christensen & Rosenbloom 1995: 233) 
So, in general, the strategic management and innovation literature points to 
the tension between radical new technologies and the ability of incumbent 
companies to adopt them. Incumbents tend to be good at doing innovative activity 
that builds on their existing technology portfolio, either where new technologies 
build on the same capabilities assembled in a company, or where the resulting 
innovations serve the needs of an incumbent's established customers. 
Organizational capabilities are difficult to create and costly to adjust, a fact that 
tends to favour incremental or sustaining innovations over radical or disrupting 
ones (Nelson & Winter 1982; Tushman & Anderson 1986; Christensen 1997). 
Yet, companies that are aware of these limitations frequently decide to 
invest small amounts of resources to explore new technologies and develop 
associated capabilities outside their main business lines. This is consistent with 
the real options view of investments as developed by Dixit and Pindyck (Dixit & 
Pindyck 1995). This view builds on the basic idea that investment decisions have 
to be made under uncertainty or in conditions of bounded rationality and argues 
that by splitting investments into a series of small increments, a company can gain 
knowledge over time and thus make a more informed decision later on. On the 
one hand, this limits losses, should it become clear that an investment will not 
be 
profitable. But more importantly, it also allows a company to explore a wider 
range of potential opportunities that might not 
look profitable at the outset but 
require more information to make an informed 
decision. In this way, a company 
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can become involved in potentially `disruptive' innovations, which might not 
have appeared profitable at the outset. Consequently, research and development 
(R&D) investments based on such strategies have been labelled "admissions 
tickets into a knowledge community", allowing a company to gain knowledge and 
stay abreast of technological developments should they become more profitable in 
the future. Such `options' investments can be one source of an emergent company 
strategy. 
The crucial question for incumbents, however, is whether they can turn 
technological know-how into a marketable competitive product. Section 2.2.1 
discussed organizational mismatch as one source of failure to exploit new 
opportunities. The argument put forward now is that specific innovative activity is 
only carried out where technological development fits into the overall company 
strategy. Thus, Rosenbloom and Christensen (1998) qualify the observation about 
incumbents' ability to exploit new innovations in that the challenge lies less in 
understanding and developing new technologies per se but in changing and 
adapting strategy towards them. Consequently, the challenge is less to anticipate 
new technologies per se but to integrate them within the overall strategic aims of 
the firm (Porter 1983). Thus, newly acquired capabilities will be worthless where 
companies fail to build a strategy around them. 
This is underpinned in a recent report to the Pew Centre on Global Climate 
Change on the investment cycles of large industrial companies into new 
technologies (Lempert et al. 2002). Lempert et al. found that there was no specific 
recurrent cycle in the investment patterns of the firms surveyed in the study. 
Rather, decisions about upgrading company processes and investing into more 
efficient technologies were driven by the strategic context of the firm and the 
ability to leverage such investments in the context of its wider market approach. 
In another example of the interaction between technology and strategy. 
Porter provides a generic overview of the types of strategies that are available in a 
given market environment (Porter 1983). He proposes a 
distinction between a 
focus on cost-leadership or differentiation, either in the mass-market or 
in a 
focused segment of the market. Technology can play a role in positioning a 
firm 
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in each of these strategies, as outlined in Table 1. In each case, technology is used 
to underpin a specific strategic stance in the market. A mismatch between 
technology strategy and overall strategy can dilute the success of such 
management approaches. 
What this example suggests is that technology can play a central role in 
defining a company's strategic stance. The type of product or process 
development will be decided according to the strategic differentiation a company 
aims for. Where a company decides to focus on overall cost leadership, it will aim 
to develop products and processes that allow mass production and scale 
economies, while companies focusing on overall differentiation might be more 
interested in the specific attributes of its products and services in terms of quality 
and design (Porter 1983). 
Table 1: Technological Policies and Generic Competitive Strategies (from Porter 1983: 11) 
Generic Strategy 
Overall Cost Overall Focus- Focus- 
Leadership Differentiation Segment Cost Segment 
Leadership Differentiation 
Technological Policies 
Product Product Product Product Product design 
Technological development to development to development to exactly meet 
Change reduce product enhance product to design in the needs of 
cost by lowering quality, features, only enough the particular 
materials content, deliverability or performance business 
facilitating ease switching costs for the segment 
of manufacture, segments application 
simplifying needs 
logistical 
requirements etc. 
Process Learning Curve Process Process Process 
Technological process development to development development 
Change improvement support high to tune to tune the 
tolerances, greater production production and 
Process quality control, and delivery delivery 
development to more reliable system to system to 
enhance scheduling, faster segment segment need 
economies of response time to needs in order in order to 
scale orders and other to lower costs improve 
dimensions that performance 
improve the ability 
to perform 
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What follows from this is that technological choice will have to be 
evaluated not only in terms of the technological features of an innovation but in 
terms of the company-internal context and the market it will have to compete in. 
This in turn is the defining principle for strategic management decisions. While 
entry into a new technology can be based on the options approach (Dixit & 
Pindyck 1995), any larger scale commitment needs to be set in the context of the 
wider strategic goals and resources of the company. 
Where new technological opportunities appear unattractive to a company. 
an alternative strategic route is direct intervention in market rules and institutions 
thus limiting the scope for a new technology to be exploited. This course of action 
has been explored in the `corporate political activity' and institutional literature 
and will be critically reviewed below 
Corporate Political Activity 
Porter (1983) recognized that one potential path to gain competitive 
advantage in an industry is to change the rules of competition. Technology can be 
a carrier for such changes, but often it requires institutional changes to 
accommodate the specific requirements of new technologies. This can be seen 
especially in industries under strong regulation, such as the electricity industry, 
which will be considered in the case studies below (see also Frankenberger 2006). 
There are two levels to the argument here. Firstly, as outlined, there is a 
fundamental premise that organizations do engage in the rule-making process that 
shapes the institutions in which they operate. Secondly, it can be asked what 
influences the precise nature of the strategic response to certain institutional 
environments? 
"Institutions [... ] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction" (North 1990: 3) and as such frame the basic rules of competition in a 
market place. They are not set in stone: Different actors negotiate and change 
them through channels of political and economic engagement. Institutions set the 
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boundaries to the value that can be extracted from individual technologies. In this 
respect, Eggertsson refers to the `property rights' that institutions confer on 
individual investments, in the sense that they limit the value that can ultimately be 
reaped from them (Eggertsson 1996: 8-9). Consequently, a company's strategic 
considerations include the degree to which it can actively intervene in the 
institutional rule-making process in order to increase (or decrease) the pay-off 
from new technologies 
Given the case for institutional engagement by individual companies, 
consequently it can be asked what strategies they might pursue in the institutional 
field. Oliver (1991) distinguishes responses that range from acquiescence to 
manipulation, given the particular institutional context in which these decisions 
are taken. It is assumed that firms fundamentally prefer stability and legitimacy in 
their business environment over uncertainty and risks. Thus, the lower the degree 
of legitimacy attainable and the lower the economic gain from conforming to 
institutional requirements, the higher the likelihood of organizational resistance to 
institutional changes (Oliver 1991). 
Yet, besides this external dimension to institutional strategies, companies 
also need to consider their own capabilities when determining the potential benefit 
from institutional changes. There is as yet little analysis in the literature of the 
strategic interaction between technology choice and the direction of institutional 
engagement by individual firms. The `corporate political activity' (CPA) literature 
has been focusing extensively on the reasons for firms to engage in political 
activities and has identified numerous tactics, such as lobbying, advocacy 
advertising, constituency building, financial contributions, and coalition 
formation, which firms undertake to manage their political environment (Oliver & 
Holzinger 2008). 
Nevertheless, a recent review of work in the CPA literature in fact 
highlighted the need to integrate 'political activities' with general `business 
activities' (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler 2004). Furthermore, CPA 
has mostly been 
classified as a cost and a burden for corporations. Yet, 
institutional engagement, if 
used strategically, can be considered a key capability of a 
firm itself that can 
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potentially contribute to the value created by its activities (Oliver & Holzinger 
2008). There has been little analysis of the strategic development of institutional- 
engagement capabilities in their own right and their value to the firm, albeit 
Holzinger and Oliver have recently provided a dynamic capabilities framework 
(Oliver and Holzinger 2008). They conclude that "in contrast to the conventional 
economic wisdom that firms outcompete rivals by offering higher quality or 
lower-priced products, [... ] firms may also out-compete rivals by employing 
strategies that shift the supply curve of rivals upwards. Proactive lobbying efforts 
that result in public policies that prevent rivals from using substitute resources to 
those valued resources possessed by the lobbying firm (e. g. a new pollution 
control production technology) constitute a shift in the industry's supply curve 
that can raise rivals' costs or erode their competitive advantage. (Oliver & 
Holzinger 2008: 36)" 
Hence, the CPA literature fundamentally confirms the value of positioning 
a firm with regard to its competitors in an industry. Yet, rather than adapting their 
capabilities to the industry they are competing in, recent contributions have 
focused on the scope for firms to use political influence in order to adapt market 
environments to their particular capability set. This becomes particular important 
where industry regulation and public policy has a significant influence on industry 
competition, a feature directly applicable to the electricity industry. Here, markets 
for certain technologies can be effectively `shut' or `opened' by specific policy 
measures. 
2.2.3. Discussion and Summary 
The previous sections have outlined the contributions that organizational 
theory and the strategic management literature can bring to the understanding of 
the role of incumbent electric utility companies in the commercial adoption and 
diffusion of new RETs. 
Three arguments have been put forward why incumbents might not realise 
the full potential of radical new technologies, such as RETs. Firstly, a mismatch 
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might exist between the organizational structure of a company and the 
requirements of a new technology. This can be found at different levels. Firstly, 
the size and overhead of a company might mandate certain minimum return 
criteria on investment, which in turn narrows the menu of suitable technology 
investments. More fundamentally, established company routines in a boundedly 
rational environment can prevent companies from identifying innovations in the 
first place. 
In principle, companies have several options to cope with emergent 
innovations. Christensen and Overdorf (2000) suggest that in order to free an 
innovation from the structural inhibitions inherent in an established company, it 
should be developed in a separate spin-out venture. Furthermore, the options 
approach developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1995) outlines how investments into 
new technologies can be done in relatively small increments to learn more about 
their potential over time and thus put a company in a more informed position once 
it is ready to make a more substantial investment. 
Yet, even where new technologies are properly understood, it is secondly 
argued that incumbents often find it difficult to formulate adequate strategies 
towards them (Rosenbloom & Christensen 1998). If innovations do not `fit' into 
the strategic priorities of an incumbent, they might be disregarded despite their 
potential. Empirical observation show that `discontinuous' or `competence- 
destroying' innovations arise mostly outside the bounds of incumbent firms 
(Tushman & Anderson 1986). As will be further argued in section 2.3.2, in the 
case of the electricity industry, new small-scale technologies could erode the 
value of sunk investment in generation and transmission assets of established 
companies. Given the ownership of most conventional generation plant by large 
utilities, it is not in their interest to be competitively or otherwise forced to invest 
in radically new technologies while existing investments are still being 
depreciated (Neuhoff 2005). 
Thirdly, given the scope for corporate political activity to influence the 
markets in which new technologies will be introduced, companies actually 
have 
the option to slow down or speed up their diffusion by means of political 
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intervention rather than direct market competition. Aldrich and Whetten (Aldrich 
& Whetten 1981) have long argued that dominant organizations in a network 
industry resist technological change unless it works to their advantage. As has 
been outlined in the section on lock-in, the dominant market position of utilities is 
partly based on the given `technological paradigm' of the present electricity 
system. This potentially presents large barriers to new entrants. New technologies, 
such as small-scale renewables provide a technological threat to this set-up and 
could thus provide an entry door for new competitors, changing the rules of the 
game and challenging conventional corporate structures (Jacobsson & Lauber 
2006). 
Yet, there is a gap to bridge between company level incremental 
investments and industry-wide diffusion of new technologies. Throughout the 
previous sections, various potential obstacles have been highlighted that render 
the process of adopting emergent innovations by incumbent companies 
increasingly difficult. These processes are related to the short-run issue of 
positioning a firm in its industry and the strategic adaptation of company 
objectives. However, as highlighted by Rip and Kemp (1998), technological 
artefacts are embedded in economic and political institutions and continuously 
modulated and shaped by societal interactions, a fact particular salient in the 
electricity industry. Thus, technology diffusion is a long-run process that typically 
requires several decades and involves reconfigurations not only at the company 
level but at wider systemic levels such as market institutions. 
Hence, while the various contributions in the literature outlined above 
examine particular aspects of the short-run impediments to technology adoption in 
incumbent companies, what is missing is an integrated long-run perspective that 
specifically examines the interactions of these wider reconfigurations. 
Consequently, for the purpose of this research, it was decided not to 
restrict the unit of analysis to a partial view of the industry, but to use the systemic 
interactions between technologies, organizations and their institutional embedding 
as the focal point for the research. Furthermore, as noted, the timescales involved 
in technology diffusion are often different from the short-run investment horizon 
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that fits into the strategic management analysis, warranting a framework that 
allows for these systemic interactions over time. 
As a final part of this chapter, the next section will consequently review 
the co-evolutionary and specifically the `systemic innovation' literature, which 
provides a reference point for building a systemic framework for the research 
considered in this thesis. 
2.3. Co-Evolution and the Systemic Innovation 
Literature 
This section is divided into three parts. It will firstly give an overview of 
the variety of co-evolutionary and systemic approaches to innovation, outlining 
the breadth of possible applications depending on the specific research question 
investigated. Secondly, it will explain further the reasons for choosing the specific 
technological innovation systems approach as the focal point for my own study, 
and outline this approach in more detail. Lastly, it will discuss the limitations of 
this approach, which consequently links into the final discussion of the literature 
reviewed in this chapter and the elements employed in the analytical framework 
which will be developed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.1. Co-Evolutionary and Systemic Studies of Innovation 
- Overview 
In the general management and organizational science literature, research 
has aimed to explain such diverse phenomena as competitive advantage of firms 
and industries (Van de Ven et al. 1999; Murmann 2003), as well as vertical 
integration of industry structure (Jacobides & Winter 2005) through co- 
evolutionary arguments. These studies' aim is to combine multi-disciplinary 
approaches to establish a more contextualised and historically grounded 
explanation of their study subjects and thus provide novel answers to established 
problems. 
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Van de Ven et al. 's study (1999) is the result of a large-scale research 
programme of longitudinal studies tracking fourteen diverse innovations in 
different settings over time. They find that innovations occur neither sequentially 
nor orderly. Rather they are best characterized as a nonlinear dynamic system. 
The research specifically investigates the development of corporate cultures for 
innovation within a company and its interaction with institutional rules to trace 
cycles of innovative activity. In this approach, the research question focused 
especially on the organizational context for innovation and the way in which 
policy-makers (through the interaction of companies and institutions) can foster 
such innovation-conducive environments. Thus, co-evolutionary processes were 
investigated in the context of policy-making and the resultant impact on 
management activity. 
Conversely, Murmann (2003) uses an economic-historic approach to 
compare the development of an entire industry, the synthetic dye industry, in the 
UK, Germany and the United States. He considers the co-evolution of national 
institutions (such as educational system and patent laws), firm population and 
technological advances to establish why British synthetic dye manufacturers, 
despite being the first to develop this technology, ultimately lost their competitive 
advantage to German companies. Murmann argues that different co-evolutionary 
feedback loops between the institutional, organizational and technological sphere 
in Germany and the UK were responsible for the industrial leapfrogging that 
occurred. 
Importantly, Murmann (2003) argues that a focus on any one the three 
dimensions alone - institutions, organizations and technology - would have been 
insufficient to fully understand the differential development that occurred. 
Superficially, the UK was endowed with better natural resources and the United 
States had a stronger entrepreneurial culture. Yet, in analysing the co-evolution of 
the three dimensions, Murmann was able to demonstrate the differential 
development between the three countries and hence explain the differential 
fortune of the three national industries. 
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In another co-evolutionary approach, Jacobides and Winter (2005) 
combine recent contributions from the economic transaction-cost literature with 
the recourse-based view of the firm (as also developed in section 2.2.2) to provide 
novel answers to the question of when industries vertically integrate and dis- 
integrate. Again, the importance of a systemic and co-evolutionary approach is 
highlighted in order to obtain both a complete picture of an industry and of its 
development over time. Using evolutionary language (as outlined in section 
2.2.1), Jacobides and Winter argue that search activity and selection of 
capabilities is dependent on the evolution of transaction costs in an industry, 
which consequently amplifies trends towards specialisation or vertical integration 
over time. This in turn impacts on the `roster of participants' in an industry and 
hence the pressure to widen or shorten search criteria for novel capabilities. 
In summary, the essence of co-evolutionary arguments in this literature is 
two-fold. Firstly, they specifically embrace multi-causal explanations for 
technological change, with such change seen as a process transcending changes in 
technological artefacts alone. Technological change is explored using several 
dimensions, such as technological artefacts, organizational adaptation, market 
designs, and wider institutional rules. Secondly, this literature specifically 
emphasise the inter-dependent evolution of these dimensions. Changes in one 
dimension create tensions with the others, thus triggering further changes and 
creating continuous feedback loops between the different dimensions. Indeed, 
March (1994) argues that "... one of the more important post-Aristotelian 
developments in evolutionary theory is the emphasis on endogenous 
environments, on the ways in which the convergence between an evolving unit 
and its environment is complicated by the fact that the environment is not only 
changing but changing partly as part of a process of co-evolution. There is mutual 
adaptation between the unit of co-evolution and the environment. " (March 
1994: 43) 
In this tradition, a particular approach for the study of innovation at 
different levels has been the `systems approach' to innovation. Delineating 
specific `systems' allows researchers to set `boundaries' for their research field 
and consequently to study interactions within these limits. Recent examples have 
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been work on `carbon lock-in' (Unruh 2000; Unruh 2002), `socio-technical 
regimes' (Kemp & Rip 1998), `technological transitions' (Geels 2002; Geels 2004) 
and `innovation systems' (Edquist 1997b; Carlsson et al. 2002; Nelson 
2002; Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). While details differ between these approaches, 
they broadly consider technological change not just in terms of developments of 
physical technologies but as a process interacting with changes in wider socio- 
economic structures. Hence, this class of approaches to innovation studies will 
subsequently be called `systemic studies of innovation'. 
Systemic approaches to innovation have been built on `co-evolutionary' 
perspectives of technological change (Edquist 1997a; Nelson 1998) and are 
characterised by slow-moving, incremental change due to the interlinked nature of 
various variables from the economic, social, institutional and technological 
sphere. This perspective is especially useful in the analysis of complex systems 
such as the electricity industry, which has been conceptualized not just in terms of 
the electricity generating technology, but in terms of the market set-up, 
organizational structure, policy environment and academic discourse in the field 
(Hughes 1987; Jacobsson & Bergek 2004; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis 2005). Kemp 
and Rip consequently refer to stable technological systems as "configurations that 
work" (Kemp & Rip 1998: 338), while innovation is seen as a `reconfiguration' of 
a set of variables, a process involving `modulating' and `shaping' existing regimes 
(Berkhout & Gouldson 2003). 
Depending on the specific perspective taken in the various contributions to 
the systemic innovation literature, boundaries are set in different ways around the 
system. Typically, key parameters in these studies include: 
" Number and type of dimensions in a system 
" Level of analysis- macro-level to niche 
" Timeframe - ongoing, months, years, decades 
" Geography - region to nation to global (Carlsson, Jacobsson, 
Holmen, & Rickne 2002) 
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Geels, in his study of technological transitions in the shipping industry 
from the sailing ship to the steam-engine propelled boat, used a multi-level 
framework, including niche developments but also examining the macro-level 
landscape. Within this, he identified seven dimensions that influenced the socio- 
technical dynamics: "technology, user practices and application domains 
(markets), symbolic meaning of technology, infrastructure, industry structure, 
policy and techno-scientific knowledge" (Geels 2002: 1262). The timeframe 
included in his study encompassed 120 years between 1780 and 1900 and 
involved the global shipping industry and its changing usage of different types of 
boats from the early sailing ships to the modern steamships. 
Conversely, Jacobsson et al. in their study of German solar cell technology 
developments focused on just one country and technology and a limited time- 
period of 25 years (Jacobsson, Andersson, & Bangens 2004). Three elements of 
the `technological innovation system' around the solar cell industry were 
examined: Actors, and their competences, market and non-market networks among 
them, and the institutions in which they are embedded. The main concern in their 
study is the development of `functions' that the technological system fulfilled in 
order to become self-sustainable. In this way they trace one technology along its 
development from niche to larger markets and the way in which actors, their 
networks and the wider institutions can adapt to accommodate further 
development or, indeed, can also slow it down. 
Finally, Malerba proposes a focus on sectoral innovation systems to 
examine "a set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of 
agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, 
production and sale of those products" (Malerba 2002: 250). Hence, this concept 
transcends both specific technological and national boundaries, with sectors being 
located sometimes in small regional clusters, yet sometimes also spanning global 
networks, as, for example, within multinational corporations. 
The approaches outlined above echo the `technological paradigm' 
perspective and the evolutionary-economic view on technological 
development, 
which similarly assume the formation of networks around emerging technologies 
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that consequently can define research agendas and influence companies' search 
processes (Nelson & Winter 1982; Dosi 1982). Hence, systemic approaches to 
innovation actually build on the same literature as outlined in the sections 2.1. and 
2.2., which is reflected in the recent remark by Nelson that "the development of 
the conception of an innovation system [... ] has largely been the work of 
economists and other scholars of technology advance who adhere to an 
evolutionary theory of economic growth" (Nelson 2002: 265). 
Still, the examples given above are but a small sample of studies that serve 
to outline the breadth of applications possible within the systemic innovation 
literature. In selecting the boundaries for the research in this thesis, the focus was 
on a framework that examines "... the competition between emerging technologies 
and incumbent technologies (and between the associated technological systems)" 
(Jacobsson, Andersson & Bangens 2004: 5). This closely matched the 
technological innovation systems (TIS) approach as developed by Jacobsson et al. 
(Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmen, & Rickne 2002; Jacobsson, Andersson, & Bangens 
2004; Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). Its technology specific features and 
evolutionary-systemic character fit closest with the research questions pursued in 
this thesis. 
2.3.2. Technological Innovation Systems 
As outlined in Carlsson et al. (2002), TISs can be studied at different 
levels of analysis. Hence, the approach can be applied "... to technology in the 
sense of a knowledge field, to a product or an artefact, or 
finally to a set of related 
products and artefacts aimed at satisfying a particular 
function... a competence 
block" (Carlsson, Jacobsson, Holmen, & Rickne 2002: 237). An example for the 
first level of analysis would be to open up the 
black box of wind energy 
technology and analyse the reasons for specific technological 
developments, for 
example direct-drive vs. gear box equipment or pitch vs. stall 
blades. However, 
this will not be the subject of this research. 
Instead, the interest is on the second 
and third levels of analysis, where the 
focus is on the specific relationship 
between a product and the market in Nvhich 
it is introduced. As Carlsson et al. 
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(2002: 239) argue, "... a knowledge-based approach would tend to be concerned 
with technological problem-solving activities... whereas a product focus would 
tend to be chosen when the primary interest is in diffusion and use of new 
technology... " - which indeed is the focus of this study. 
Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) outline a specific analytical framework for 
the investigation of the diffusion of RETs. This is based on the original notion of a 
technological system, introduced by Carlsson and Stankiewicz, who define it as 
"... network(s) of agents interacting in a specific technology area under a 
particular institutional infrastructure to generate, diffuse, and utilize technology. 
Technological systems are defined in terms of knowledge or competence flows 
rather than flows of ordinary goods and services. They consist of dynamic 
knowledge and competence networks. " (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991: 111) As in 
Jacobsson et al. (2004), three components are considered: Actors (and their 
competences), their associated networks, and finally the institutions in which they 
are embedded. 
Here, and in subsequent work by Jacobsson et al. (Jacobsson & Johnson 
2000; Johnson & Jacobsson 2001-, Johnson & Jacobsson 2003; Jacobsson, 
Andersson, & Bangens 2004; Jacobsson & Bergek 2004), the main focus is on the 
process of creating a self-sustaining innovation system, which is able to carry a 
new technology from niche applications to the mainstream market. In this, it is 
stressed that "... the innovation and diffusion process is both an individual and 
collective act. The determinants of this process are not only found within 
individual firms; firms are embedded in innovation systems that aid and constrain 
the individual actors within them" (Jacobsson, Andersson, & Bangens 2004: 4-5). 
Building on the technology `life-cycle' literature, technological 
development is conceptualised in terms of functions that need to be fulfilled by a 
system in order for a technology to be successfully 
improved and shaped to 
compete in the market. Hekkert et al. 
(2006) define functions as "the activities 
that contribute to the goal of innovation systems. 
" 
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Jacobsson and Bergek (2004: 818) identify five such functions: 
" The creation and diffusion of new knowledge, 
" The guidance of the direction of search among users and suppliers, 
" The supply of resources such as capital and competencies, 
" The creation of positive external economies, 
" The formation of markets. 
By focusing on the interactions between the constituent parts of an 
innovation system, both in terms of resource and information flows, it is possible 
to identify which functions are working well, and which functions are 
insufficiently developed. Where functions are well-developed, a system develops 
self-sustaining feedback loops, which aid the development and diffusion of new 
technologies into broader markets. Where functions are not developed, specific 
policies and measures can be targeted to overcoming potential obstacles 
(Jacobsson and Bergek 2004). 
A key theme in the technological innovation systems literature is the 
competition between established and newly emerging systems. Hence, functions 
of new innovation systems are analysed in terms of `inducement' and `blocking 
mechanisms' for their further development. While `new firm entry' is seen as 
unambiguously inducing the development of key functions such as the `creation 
of new knowledge', the `supply of resources' and the `formation of markets', 
"ambiguous" behaviour by established firms is seen as having the reverse effect of 
blocking the development of such functions (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004: 825ff). 
Analogous to the `technological paradigm' language, established systems 
are a closed network of agents and their competencies, embedded in a particular 
socio-economic rule-set, with a well-developed set of supporting functions. 
Where the economic basis of such a system is threatened by an emerging 
innovation system, it is expected that resistance towards the functional 
development of an emergent innovation system will be exerted by the established 
actors. With regards to the energy system, 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2004: 826-827) 
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state that "the ambiguous and/or opposing behaviour of some established energy 
suppliers and capital goods suppliers has reduced the legitimacy of renewable 
energy technology and has, thus, blocked the supply of resources and guided the 
direction of search away from these technologies [... ] it has also added to 
customer uncertainty and vulnerability, which has blocked market formation and 
delayed important steps in the knowledge-creation process. " 
Given this potential for obstruction, government policy is seen as a key 
cornerstone to aid the formation of the five functions mentioned above. Especially 
in the early stages of a technology's life-cycle, support for knowledge creation, 
the supply of resources and (niche) market formation are seen as critical for the 
creation of a self-sustainable innovation system. However, where policy fails to 
deliver such objectives, it can turn into a `blocking' mechanism itself (Jacobsson 
and Bergek 2004). 
While the TIS approach provides a comprehensive macro-level 
perspective on technology competition between different technologies and their 
supporting structures, it has not yet developed a comprehensive micro-level 
rationale for the behaviour of individual agents in the systemic context. For 
example, while the explanations for incumbents' behaviour with regard to an 
emerging TIS are intuitively appealing, in reality many different modes of 
behaviour can be observed, not all of which are consistent with the explanations 
provided by the TIS literature. Consequently, the next section will review some 
recent criticisms. 
2.3.3. Critique of the TIS Approach 
Critics have centred on three features of the analytical framework 
employed by the TIS approach. Firstly, it is argued that although governments are 
assigned an important role in the systemic dynamics through the role of policy, 
their constraints and the general dynamics of policy-making are under- 
represented. For example, incumbent companies can exert significant pressure on 
policy formulation and are often in an advantageous informational position 
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relative to regulatory authorities (Kern & Smith 2008). Hence, issues of power- 
relations and agenda setting need to be taken into account more explicitly (Smith, 
Stirling, & Berkhout 2005). 
Secondly, Smith et al. (2005) argue that explanations of technological 
change in the systems perspective rely strongly on structuralist arguments and 
leave little room for individual agency. Furthermore, the role of individual actors 
is interpreted in functionalist terms with regard to their contribution to the overall 
system, neglecting the specific context in which agents are embedded. Hence, 
incumbents are often considered to block the introduction of novel technologies 
because of their structural position within the system. Similarly, Hekkert et al. 
lament that "the innovation system framework suffers from institutional 
determinism" and hasn't sufficiently developed an explanation for the "actions of 
the entrepreneur" (Hekkert et al. 2006). 
A related critique of co-evolutionary research in general concerns the 
depth in which co-evolutionary processes can be demonstrated to occur. An 
important consideration for co-evolutionary studies is to establish a precise causal 
mechanism by which two study subjects co-evolve. As Murmann (2003: 22-23) 
argues that "co-evolution may be mimicked by such things as sequential 
adaptation from different causes or simultaneous adaptation to the same 
environment. " Hence, it is central for co-evolutionary research to establish "the 
bidirectional causality linking the two parties in the relationship... The key 
challenge for such arguments is to establish that causal processes indeed do 
connect the two partners in a co-evolutionary relationship. " In focusing on 
structural arguments and functional arguments, an empirical problem arises to 
demonstrate the precise mechanisms that connect individual agents in a systemic 
framework and the causal link of their co-evolutionary relationship. Without a 
deeper notion of individual agency within systemic structure, the reasons for 
individual actions that deviate from what can be expected based on a structural 
and functional analysis are hard to identify. 
A last criticism centres on the role and properties of the system's 
functions. It is worth remembering that systems as such do not have a leader or an 
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explicit direction on which everyone agrees. Rather, they are the sum of the 
individual actions and expectations of each system's constituent parts. What 
Smith et al. (2005: 1492) label the "... tendency to treat regime transformation as a 
monolithic process dominated by rational action and neglecting important 
differences in context" seems to stem from a cognitive approach that implies a 
knowledge of the ultimate goal on behalf of each individual actor and a resultant 
rational behaviour to attain that goal. Yet, where uncertainty prevails and 
knowledge is fragmented, evolutionary theory suggests various modes of learning, 
knowledge interactions and trial-by-error as dominant responses (Simon 1955; 
Arthur 1994). Hence, as will be argued later in chapter 5, functions in this context 
can be conceptualised as `emergent properties' of the system that arise as the 
accumulation of many individual interactions, each with their own purpose and 
context. 
In summary, critics have called for more attention to the way actors can 
respond differentially to changes in common systemic variables and to the 
implications this has for the analysis of systemic change. Authors have attempted 
to address this criticism by focusing on the expectations of individual actors. This 
has allowed a link between future states of the world and present actions. 
Furthermore, by explaining the formation of expectations in terms of the socio- 
economic context and power structures within systems, it has allowed for a view 
of technological change that retains the notion of social embeddedness (Geels 
2004; Smith et al. 2005). 
Yet, in this literature, shifts in expectations have often been linked directly 
to shifts in behaviour. For example, Geels states that "[i]mportant cognitive rules 
are shared belief systems and expectations, which orient perceptions of the future 
and hence steer actions in the present" (Geels 2004: 910). However, as has been 
argued in section 2.2.2, expectations in a company context have to be embedded 
into a wider strategic rationale in order to lead to concrete actions. Hence. the 
challenge is less to anticipate and develop new technologies per se but to integrate 
them within the overall strategic aims of the firm (Porter 1983). Hence, it can be 
argued that shifts in companies' expectations do not necessarily lead directly to 
shifts in behaviour but are filtered through the corporate strategy lens. 
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In summary, the TIS approach provides a comprehensive framework to 
capture key dimensions that impact on the diffusion of new technologies such as 
RETs. It builds on an evolutionary view of technology development that 
emphasizes incremental change and the importance of knowledge networks and 
the social dimension of the technological diffusion process in organizations and 
institutions. Yet, while the research has been able to penetrate deeper into the 
structural and socio-economic context of innovations, models of the motivations 
and behaviour of individual firm to complement the systems approach have failed 
to keep pace. Consequently, integrating elements from the organizational theory 
and strategic management literature, as outlined in section 2.2, could fruitfully 
extend the current analytical framework. 
2.4. Summary and Discussion 
The starting point for this chapter was the recognition that technological 
diffusion does not depend solely on the properties of the technological artefact but 
also on the properties of the wider market environment in which it is introduced. 
In order to analyse the role of incumbent companies in the diffusion of renewable 
energy technologies and following Rip and Kemp's (1998) definition of 
technology, an appropriate framework was sought that captured developments at 
the level of individual firms and market institutions as well as technologies 
themselves. Consequently, this chapter has critically reviewed three different 
literatures that can contribute to the research questions pursued in this thesis. 
Each literature opened the black box of technological development to offer 
a partial insight into the underlying processes. However, none was deemed 
appropriate on its own to offer a comprehensive picture of the complex 
interactions at work. Table 2 summarizes the key messages of each literature with 
regard to three key dimensions of technological development - technological 
artefacts, organizations and institutions. 
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Table 2: The treatment of technologies, organizations and institutions in the three literatures 
Technology- Organizational 
Diffusion/ Theory and 
Technological 
Increasing-Return Strategic Innovation 
Models Management System 
Competing 
Cumulative Strategic positioning systems, 
Technology Learning, Increasing device; dynamic modulated and 
returns capability shaped 
by 
system 
interactions 
Routines and 
Inducing or 
Organization Lock-in bounded rationality; 
blocking 
strategic adaptation system functions 
Co-evolution 
Institutions Increasing returns 
Corporate political with 
strategy technological 
artefacts 
Having commenced the review with simple technology diffusion models, 
their lack of a firm theoretical grounding and high level of abstraction from 
specific contexts was noted. Besides these abstract models, those focusing on 
increasing-returns diffusion paths offer some degrees of sophistication and 
complexity. The path dependency literature considers technological development 
in terms of the increasing returns properties that can be observed in some 
industries. Here, positive feedback loops reinforce initially small differences 
among competing technologies to an extent that one eventually dominates the 
other. This is reflected at an organizational level in the learning captured by the 
companies undertaking the technological development. Companies will eventually 
focus on the dominant `technological paradigm' in order to benefit from 
complementary investment and higher market certainty. These arguments can be 
extended to the level of institutions as they, too, face high set-up costs, benefit 
from learning experiences and complementarities and ultimately reduce 
uncertainty. 
The path dependency argument provides, however, only a partial picture 
of technological development in abstracting from concrete commercial and 
technological contexts. The narrative behind path dependency arguments relies on 
initially random variations, which in their extreme form denies the possibility of 
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purposeful technological development. Secondly, the path dependency literature 
only provides a linear story of how technologies can become dominant but not 
how such path dependencies are consequently overcome. This, lastly, ignores the 
dimension of strategic decision making within companies, which includes the 
option of exploring new avenues of technological development and strategic 
differentiation to overcome states of `lock-in'. 
At this point, the organizational theory and strategic management literature 
opens the black box of the firm and introduces two important dimensions of 
organizational decision-making. Firstly, this literature assumes boundedly rational 
firm environments, in which firms operate organizational routines to search, select 
and retain new technological options. Secondly, technology adoption by the firm 
is interpreted as a complex and interactive learning process that is characterized 
by uncertainty about its future outcome. This provides a firm-level explanation for 
the emergence of path dependencies and `technological paradigms', which are 
interpreted as channelling and stabilising technological development within the 
firm. 
In this context, the strategic management of organizational capabilities 
becomes the key dynamic decision-making variable to explain organizational 
development over time. Strategic positioning through the development of unique 
capabilities in an industry allows a company to gain sustainable competitive 
advantage. Hence, while the view on organizational structure provides an 
explanation of which technologies will be selected through organizational 
routines, the strategic management literature complements this with a company- 
internal `demand pull' perspective, whereby technological development becomes 
a key lever for strategic positioning of the firm. The interaction of both 
dimensions of organizational behaviour consequently determines the degree and 
direction of technological development in a firm. 
This view is complemented by the analysis of corporate political activity 
by firms to secure favourable regulatory environments and market designs. 
However, in this literature, the interaction of corporate political and corporate 
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business strategy has only received limited attention so far (Oliver & Holzinger 
2008; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler 2004). 
Hence, while the organizational behaviour literature in general 
complements the technological diffusion literature discussed earlier, there remain 
at least two weaknesses. Firstly, the strategic management of technology adoption 
in the firm is mainly concerned with the short-run positioning of a company, 
while industry-wide technology diffusion can be a matter of decades (Grubler 
1998). Hence, while the strategic management literature provides an 
understanding of short-run, marginal trade-offs for company investments, it is less 
helpful in tracing the long-run evolution of a technological life-cycle, which often 
involves multiple firms at the different stages of maturity (Tushman & Anderson 
1986). 
Secondly, the organizational theory literature does not capture the 
reciprocity between firm behaviour and the evolution of social and technical 
systems alongside these organizations, as evidenced, for example, in the case of 
the corporate political activity literature. Hence, while specific interactions 
between companies AND technologies or companies AND institutions have been 
studied, the wider interactions between these three dimensions to technological 
development have not been the subject of study themselves. 
Hence, the last section of this chapter reviewed the technological 
innovation systems framework as an example for such a systemic approach. While 
it builds on the concepts of technological paradigms and bounded rationality and 
hence provides a good fit with the other two literatures, it has a major drawback in 
not considering company behaviour in its specific context but rather in terms of 
the functional and structural embedding within the wider system. Hence, while it 
provides a framework that studies the interactions between all three dimensions, it 
so far has not developed fully a rationale for explaining specific individual 
behaviour within this structural context. 
Yet, a key consideration for research in this tradition is the demonstration 
of a causal mechanism that links the evolution of different dimensions of a 
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system. As Murmann (2003: 22) argues: "Co-evolution may be mimicked by such 
things as sequential adaptation from different causes or simultaneous adaptation to 
the same environment. " Hence, what is often lacking in systemic innovation 
research is a detailed mechanism that explains how the inter-connection in a co- 
evolutionary relationship is causally linked. Consequently, this research seeks to 
extend existing systemic innovation approaches and address this critique by 
establishing an extended micro-level explanation for differential individual 
agency in response to changes at the systems level. 
This literature review has provided the basis for such an analytical 
framework. This will be developed in chapter 3 and situated in the specific 
context of the electricity industry. It will take key elements from the literature 
review above to conceptualise the three key dimensions - technologies, companies 
and institutions - to provide a testable approach to the analysis of 
incumbent 
electric utility companies' role in the diffusion of renewable energy technologies. 
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3. Analytical Framework and Methodology 
The guiding question of this research is to analyse the role of incumbent 
electric utility companies in the diffusion of RETs. In the previous chapter, it was 
argued that diffusion is a process not just involving technological artefacts alone, 
but also requiring adaptation of supporting institutions and organizations. Hence, 
it is necessary to generate insights into the interaction of companies and their 
wider systemic environment. 
In reviewing the relevant literature in the previous chapter, it was argued 
that each of the frameworks presented had drawbacks which would restrict the 
analysis of the study subject. Hence, it was proposed that several elements of the 
existing literature could usefully be combined to an analytical framework that 
provided a systemic approach to the analysis of the diffusion of RETs that 
retained a behavioural model for explaining divergent responses by individual 
companies. The dimensions of such a framework will be outlined in the following 
sections. 
This chapter is structured in three parts. Firstly, section 3.1 will introduce 
the analytical framework employed in this research. This includes the 
technological, organizational and institutional dimension to innovation and the 
interactions among them in the electricity industry. Secondly, in section 3.2, 
corporate strategy is introduced as a link between company internal activity and 
system-wide developments. Two specific aspects of corporate strategy will be 
considered: Technology strategy, which focuses on the link between company 
capabilities and system-wide technology diffusion and corporate political activity, 
which examines the effect of corporate lobbying activity on system-wide 
institutional developments. Lastly, in section 3.3, the research methodology and 
the case study approach are introduced. 
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3.1. Co-evolutionary dimensions for the study of 
electric utilities and the diffusion of RETs 
As has been argued in the previous chapter, the diffusion of new 
technologies is both an individual and a collective act (Saxenian 1994). 
Companies develop capabilities and associated strategies to gain competitive 
advantage on the back of new technological developments. At the same time, 
innovation is conditioned by `technological paradigms' (Dosi 1982) and 
institutional and organizational inertia. 
These considerations warrant a research approach that takes into account 
the systemic interactions among these dimensions, while retaining a behavioural 
model of context-specific actions by individual agents. The literature review in the 
previous chapter highlighted that, while individual approaches can provide partial 
insights into these dynamics, none is sufficient on its own to investigate the 
problem of this research study. Hence, an analytical framework is now proposed 
to close this gap and at the same time provide a novel contribution to the literature 
in extending the systemic approach to innovation with a strategic dimension. 
In the co-evolutionary perspective developed in this section, three 
dimensions will be considered: Organizations, Technologies and Institutions. This 
builds on the literature review in the previous chapter, hence each element will 
only briefly be introduced again below. Subsequently, Section 3.2 extends this 
framework by specifically considering strategic approaches to co-evolutionary 
change on the side of incumbent firms, thus making the framework dynamic. This 
opens up the black box `organizations' and examines two strategic decision- 
making variables: The strategic development of technological capabilities and the 
strategic institutional engagement. 
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3.1.1. Organizations 
Companies are conceptualised here in the evolutionary and resource-based 
perspective that has been developed in section 2.2.2. The most important aspect 
from these literatures for this analytical framework is the development of firm 
routines and capabilities, both as determinants of organizational performance and 
influences on strategic direction. 
Routines are used in both the management and systems-of-innovation 
literature to conceptualise organizational processes. Based on the model originally 
developed by Nelson and Winter (1982), routines guide the search, selection and 
retention of options for the allocation of scarce resource within organizations. 
Routines are set up so that employees can perform tasks in a consistent manner 
over time and across different functional units of a firm (Christensen & Overdorf 
2000). This makes them unique to the company in which they operate and creates 
path-dependencies according to the specific company's culture and history. 
However, there is a close relationship between routines and the concept of `core 
competences' or `capabilities' used in the resource based view of the firm 
(Burgelman, Christensen, & Wheelwright 2004). 
Organizational capabilities are considered here as the key strategic 
differentiator between companies. Given differences in the availability of tangible 
and intangible resources among companies, unique capabilities and corresponding 
strategies are built to gain competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 
1997; Grant 2005). Hence, `capabilities' encompass the specific combinations of 
resources and competences which distinguish a firm relative to its competitors. 
Like routines, capabilities evolve over time in a path-dependent manner, 
thus leaving companies in different starting positions, for example when 
faced 
with new technological challenges. Yet, both concepts 
describe two distinct 
aspects of the same organizational development. 
Indeed, it can be argued that 
routines and capabilities have a symbiotic relationship. 
Routines are the processes 
by which companies search for opportunities and evaluate their options according 
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to their capabilities. At the same time, since search is local, bounded by the tacit 
knowledge embodied in the company and its employees (Foss 2003), capabilities 
form the platform from which search activities are initiated. 
The development of routines and capabilities provides the company's 
internal dimension to the systemic interactions arising within this framework. 
Connecting this view with a systemic perspective on developments in the firm's 
external environment, such as institutional changes in the market and the 
availability of new technologies, allows a dynamic picture of co-evolutionary 
change. A company's development of capabilities is both framed by as well as 
framing institutions and technologies. 
In this context, strategy provides "a perspective that cuts across the 
boundary of the organization, matching capability (an aspect of the organizational 
context) with opportunity (an aspect of the environmental context)" (Rosenbloom 
1978: 228). Hence, this research will specifically consider the interaction between 
organizational capabilities and routines with their external systemic environment. 
Before outlining the features of this specific approach, the other two systemic 
dimensions, technologies and institutions, will briefly be outlined. 
3.1.2. Technologies 
Despite arguing in the previous sections that technological change should 
be considered as a multidimensional process, for analytical purposes it is here 
separated out. Hence, `Technology' is used in a narrow sense as the current mix of 
technological artefacts deployed and under development. They require specific 
capabilities (see section 2.2.2) in order to be utilised to serve specific market 
demands, which can be forecast using `experience curves' or `learning curves' 
(lEA 2000). 
Confining technologies to this narrow definition represents the perspective 
that firms take in a technology-user industry (Neuhoff & Sellers 2006), which is 
not directly involved in proprietary technology 
developments. Electric utility 
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companies focus on the production, transmission and supply of electricity by 
utilising a set of available technologies. These technologies are developed outside 
the realm of individual utilities but in specialised technology supplier companies 
(Hartmann & Boensch 2005; Markard & Truffer 2006). This was confirmed in the 
course of the interviews for this study, where it was stressed repeatedly that 
utilities were "not in the business of technology development". 
Technologies are conditioned by the institutional environment in which 
they operate. While their technology-inherent features define the overall limit of 
possible value that can be extracted from them, institutions narrow this range by 
setting socio-economic limits on the possible applications of a technology. This 
will now be discussed in the next section. 
3.1.3. Institutions 
The term `institutions' is used here in the sense developed by institutional 
economists, meaning the `rules of the game' or more formally, the "the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990: 3). Although North 
distinguishes between formal and informal institutions, the focus here is 
especially on the development of formal institutions such as new markets for 
technologies. Markets are not considered to arise spontaneously but are 
conceptualised as the outcome of economic and political conflict (North 
1990; Acemoglu 2004). Since market rules influence the allocation of scarce 
resources, actors will aim to influence rule development according to their own 
interests. 
The notion of institutional change in this perspective implies an active 
involvement of actors with a stake in the institution's outcome. Hence, from a co- 
evolutionary perspective, the impact of institutions on the potential development 
of technologies, for example through market introduction programmes, as well as 
the direct impact on the profit opportunities in a market, are viewed as lying 
within the scope of a company's policy of corporate political activity (Eggertsson 
1996). 
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As companies develop strategies for their capability developments, 
corporate political activity becomes an avenue to increase the value in the market 
of a specific capability and the size of the resultant market share that can be 
obtained (as discussed in section 2.2.2). Hence, a company' s political activity 
builds on the specific capabilities that have been developed over time. In this 
sense, corporate political activity is assumed to be aligned with the specific 
capabilities built within a company. Given the differences of capability 
developments among firms and the stickiness of them in the short-run (Dosi 
1982; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997), specific political activities can diverge 
among companies with different capabilities. 
3.1.4. Interactions between organizations, 
technologies and institutions 
In practice, the above dimensions of the co-evolutionary perspective 
interact with and reinforce each other over time. Tensions at one level set off 
realignment processes and co-evolutionary changes at other levels. Using the 
simple set-up outlined above, specific configurations for the interactions of these 
dimensions can be identified (Kemp & Rip 1998). 
Before using this framework to analyse the strategic decision-making 
process in companies, an illustration can demonstrate the connections between the 
different levels. As an example, the historic set-up of the electric utility industry 
in many developed countries is described below. These patterns were also visible 
in the three countries that will be introduced as the case study countries in section 
3.3.2 below. Historically, this industry has been remarkably stable, which has 
been widely described in the innovation literature as a state of systemic `lock-in' 
due to its historic path of development (Kemp & Rip 1998; Unruh 2000; Neuhoff 
2005). There were three aspects to the established institutional configuration in 
the electricity industry before market liberalisation commenced in the 1990s: 
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Institutions 
On the level of formal institutions, regulated monopolies with guaranteed 
markets were frequently the norm. State-ownership of electricity companies was 
witnessed in many countries. Geographically defined monopolies had a duty to 
supply electricity in return for being sheltered from competition. The aim of 
universal electrification of the populace and setting up of new infrastructure 
provided the overriding rationale for this institutional set-up at the outset of the 
industry. 8 
Technology 
The concomitant technological configuration consisted of large-scale, 
mostly fossil-fuel and nuclear power stations, coupled with long-distance high- 
voltage transmission lines to the load centres. The number of power plants relative 
to the number of load centres was small and consequently, the size of individual 
plants was large. These large capital expenditures were justified firstly with the 
economies of scale to be gained through larger unit sizes. Secondly, however, the 
captured customer base in a monopoly market meant that the capital-intensive 
investments could command a low interest rate due to the low-risk of recouping 
the initial capital outlays as long as technology risks were understood. 
Organizations 
Finally, the organizational structure was centred on the model of a 
vertically integrated electricity company that owned assets in generation, 
transmission and distribution, and retailing. In some countries, integration even 
stretched back into fuel supply, mainly in domestic coal mines. In this context, 
system planning was integrated in one organization and technological choice and 
the direction for new innovations mirrored the organizational and institutional 
8 Hannah (1982) outlines how the electrification of remote areas in the UK was secured through 
cross-subsidies from urban areas within the nationalised electricity industry. The prevalent socio- 
technical configuration at the time served this purpose very well in the context of the post-\ýar 
expansion of electric services. 
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structure, one reinforcing the other (Hannah 1982; Unruh 2000; IEA 2001; Helm 
2003). 
The triangle institution-organization-technology in Figure 6 below 
summarizes the relationship between these three dimensions. This basic structure 
proved to be stable over several decades in many European countries, and 
specifically in the three countries that formed the basis for the case studies 
presented in this thesis. In the absence of outside shocks, the interdependence 
between the technological and socio-economic dimensions provided the path 
along which re-configurations were gradually channelled. 
Institution 
- Geographically- 
defined monopoly 
- Duty to supply on 
Monopoly 
- Captured Customer 
Base 
- State-ownership 
Technology 
Large-scale power stations 
Fossil-fuel and nuclear 
technology 
High-Voltage, long- 
distance transmission grid 
Organization 
- Vertically Integrated 
Monopoly 
- Asset ownership along the 
whole electricity value chain 
- Backward Integration into 
fuel supply in some 
countries 
Figure 6: Relationship between institutions, organizations and technology in electricity 
markets 
After about 1990, institutional changes at the European and national level 
altered the sheltered nature of the electricity market in most European markets. 
Measures to open the market to more competition created opportunities for new 
organizations but also led to a growing series of mergers and acquisitions among 
formerly geographically separated monopolies, which created new large-scale 
utility companies (Glachant & Leveque 2005; Bergman 2005). The EU recently 
put pressure on the implementation of its Electricity Market 
Directive 
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2003/54/EC9, especially with a focus to `unbundle' the different aspects of the 
electricity business. Thus, electricity transmission and distribution - which is 
considered a natural monopoly - now has to be legally and organizationally 
separate from the generation and retailing business' 0. 
Furthermore, new technological opportunities emerged, mainly in the form 
of CCGTs and new RETs. CCGTs can be built in relatively small, modular units' 1 
(Rukes & Taud 2004) while RETs are often one order of magnitude smaller than 
conventional generation technologies and thus do not necessarily fit into the 
established technological configuration (Rukes & Taud 2004). RETs are also 
amenable to decentralised applications and in many cases independent of an 
external fuel supply, which can be considered a further source of mismatch 
between the traditional organizational and technological structures (Awerbuch 
2000; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis 2005). 
In sum, these changes to the environment in which electric utility 
companies operated created significant tensions to their business model (Sine & 
David 2003). While the systems literature predicts significant inertia among 
established companies because of various sunk costs and the danger of 
"deskilling" their key capabilities (Hughes 1987), new opportunities emerged for 
utilities to expand into new business areas and differentiate themselves from key 
competitors (Markard & Truffer 2006). 
The approach outlined above has some similarities with Murmann's work 
on the synthetic dye industry in the 19th century (Murmann 2003). In his analytical 
framework, he analysed the co-evolutionary development of three dimensions - 
institutions, organizations and technologies - to understand why the UK's 
synthetic dye industry could not hold on to its initial technological lead over its 
German competitors. 
9 The Electricity directive 2003/54/EC updated the original electricity market directive 96/92'EC 
10 On 15 November 2005, the European Commission highlighted problems in the EU electricity 
markets, which were seen foremost in four areas: "Market concentration, 
Vertical Foreclosure and 
lack of Market integration and Transparency" (European 
Commission 2005a). 
11 Units start at 250MW compared to typical coal and nuclear power units of 
1000MW 
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The research pursued in this thesis is based in a different industry and 
historical period but draws on similar dimensions as found in Murmann's work. 
However, there are two important differences. Firstly, the three dimensions, as 
used in this thesis, have been developed specifically to capture the key features of 
the electricity industry. For example, while in Murmann's study, the institutional 
dimension consisted primarily of the patent law and the university system at the 
time (important factors for his study), the institutional dimension in this study is 
concerned with formal electricity market and renewable energy policy rules. 
Secondly, while Murmann's research question was concerned with the 
development of whole national industries over time, the research focus in this 
thesis is specifically on individual agency among companies in an industry. 
Hence, the aim of this thesis was to develop a co-evolutionary framework which 
allows for individual agency and thus differential responses to systemic changes. 
As argued in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.3, adopting a co-evolutionary perspective 
means going beyond merely describing interactions between technologies, 
institutions and organisations to analysing the specific causal links between these 
dimensions as they each change over time. Consequently, the next section will 
add a strategic dimension to the co-evolutionary framework established above, to 
provide a detailed causal mechanism for co-evolutionary interactions. This builds 
on the same theoretical insights that have already contributed to the systemic 
innovation view. 
The next section outlines this approach in more detail, before section 3.3 
will outline the methodology and research approach used in this study. 
3.2. Strategic Dimension to co-evolutionary Change 
The previous section outlined the interdependence between three 
dimensions of the electricity system - organizations, institutions and technologies. 
However, interdependence as such gives little guidance on the nature and 
direction of change over time among them. Hence, this section aims to provide a 
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dynamic perspective on co-evolutionary change by integrating a strategic 
perspective on organizational behaviour with regard to the other two dimensions. 
It is noted at the outset, that the scope for differences in strategy within the 
same innovation system has long been highlighted. In their classic paper on 
technological innovation systems, Carlsson and Stankiewicz have already argued 
that "firms differ [... ] in the extent to which they use the knowledge they have. 
and in how they use it. They differ in the resources they devote to advancing their 
knowledge base and the effectiveness with which they conduct research... Firms 
differ in their ability to perceive opportunities and in their willingness to take 
risks" (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991: 100). Geels (2004) talks of `strategic games' 
that will be played within structural boundaries. 
In the context of competition emerging from market liberalization, the 
development of technological capabilities as well as the engagement with 
institutional rule-making become strategic decision variables for the affected 
companies. Strategy in this context is the link between the internal processes and 
capabilities of a firm and their application in the external systemic environment. 
Two strategic decision variables will be introduced in the framework: 
Acquiring new capabilities and engaging in the process of institutional rule 
making. As introduced in section 2.2.2, these are the two corner stones for 
companies to build sustainable competitive advantages for their businesses. 
Capabilities define the technological opportunity frontier to extract value from 
new and reconfigured technologies. Institutional rules set the boundaries for the 
application of technologies in the market and hence set the societal limits to the 
extraction of value from a technology. Together, they define the opportunity set 
for a company to operate in (Eggertsson 1996; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen 1997). 
The focus on these two decision variables is the last step to arrive at the 
first aim of this thesis. The aim was to create an analytical framework that 
specifically considered the interactions between changes at the systems 
level and 
the evolution of corporate strategy at the 
firm-level. In this context, the tN\ o 
strategic levers introduced above are used as the 
basis to analyse these interactions 
75 
and trace their co-evolution over time. Decisions about developing technological 
capabilities and corporate political activities will be taken simultaneously and 
interdependently. Technology development will be influenced by what is 
institutionally feasible and vice-versa. However, for analytical purposes, both will 
be discussed separately in the subsequent sections. 
3.2.1. Building technological Capabilities 
The idea on which the technology strategy literature builds suggests that a 
firm's technology strategy has to align with its broader strategic goals (Porter 
1983; Freeman and Soete 1997). Porter (1983: 9) captures this succinctly: 
"Competitive Strategy is an integrated set of policies in each functional activity of 
the firm that aims to create a sustainable competitive advantage. Technology 
strategy is but one element of an overall competitive strategy and thus must be 
consistent with and reinforced by the actions of other functional departments. " 
This view suggests that the specific organizational context of the firm is as 
important to its strategic decision as wider systemic technological developments 
around its boundaries. So, the decision whether to add specific technological 
capabilities has to be considered not just in the market context (i. e. technological 
improvements and market growth rates) but also in terms of a firm's existing 
capabilities and routines. Firms have developed a set of capabilities in the past and 
operate unique routines to refine and add to this capability set. Thus, the decision 
about the direction of new capability additions and/or refinements is set in the 
context of the historic development of the firm. Resource constraints limit the 
scope of involvement in any one activity and mandate the setting of priorities in 
each time period considered. Recent research has stressed the idiosyncratic nature 
of discovering new strategic opportunities (Denrel, Fang, & Winter 2003) as well 
as the localised co-evolution of learning and dynamic capabilities (Zollo & Winter 
2002). 
As a starting point for the analysis, it is assumed that the closer existing 
capabilities are aligned to new technological opportunities, the more 
likely will a 
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company integrate them into its strategy (Porter 1983; Rosenbloom & Christensen 
1998). Hence, when evaluating new technological options, a company's search 
will initially be guided by its existing set of capabilities and routines. This 
influences the perception of expected market sizes, future technological 
developments and their impact on the competitive environment of the firm 
(Christensen 1997). 
For example, Christensen (1997: 87ff) describes how incumbent integrated 
steel makers ignored the opportunities provided by new `mini-mill' steel-making 
technology and eventually lost almost half their market share between 1965 and 
1995. Yet, Rosenbloom and Christensen (1998) suggest that the challenge lies less 
in understanding and developing new technologies per se but in changing and 
adapting strategy towards them. 
In this sense, the notion of strategy adds to the systemic perspective on 
innovation through considering individual companies not just in terms of their 
structural position within a system's network of actors, but also in terms of their 
individual capabilities and historically grown routines. For example, in 
Christensen' case study of the steel industry, incumbents were focused on a 
particular higher-end part of the market and consequently geared their strategy 
increasingly towards meeting the demands from customers in this segment. Their 
industry position as such did not stop them from implementing the newly 
developed mini-mill steel-making technology. However, the historically grown 
cost structure of the incumbent corporations, as well as the requirements from 
their customer base, led to a conscious decision to focus resources and capabilities 
increasingly on particular segments of the market that fitted this historic evolution 
of the firms. 
Again, it is argued here that if the strategic dimension to capability 
development is ignored, systemic innovation analysis would risk paying 
insufficient attention to company specific motivations for or against engaging in 
activities with system-wide ramifications. For example, in the recent emphasis on 
`functions of innovation systems' (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004; Hekkert, Suurs, 
Negro, Kuhlmann, & Smits 2006; Negro, Hekkert, & Smits 2007), functions such 
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as `the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, the supply of resources, and the 
guidance of the direction of search' are studied at the systems level to evaluate 
whether a technological innovation system is performing well or not. Yet, using 
the notion of corporate strategy provides a perspective from within a company of 
why resources are allocated in a particular way and thus not just vvhether a 
particular systems function might be inadequately addressed, but also why. We 
return to this theme in the discussion of the case studies in chapter 5. 
In summary, incorporating a perspective that recognizes the capability 
distribution in an industry and the strategies built on them could provide a richer 
background for systemic analyses of technological change. As technological 
development occurs, it impacts differently on the company population in an 
industry, depending on the specific context of each firm. Hence, even among a 
class of companies, such as incumbents, a narrow focus on their structural 
position within a system would be insufficient to capture their possible responses. 
3.2.2. Engagement in institutional Rule-Making 
The institutional environment in which firms operate is not exogenous to 
them (Oliver 1991). It is shaped by firms that try to mould it to their advantage 
(Oliver 1997; Jacobides and Winter 2005). Corporate political activities, or 
corporate attempts to shape government policy in ways favourable to the firm, are 
commonly employed by firms across countries (Hillman, Keim et al. 2004). 
However, how to coordinate political activities with other business activities has 
received little attention in the literature, despite the parallels with the literature on 
technology strategies. 
While the development of technological capabilities is a necessary pre- 
requisite for success in a new technological field, the ability to shape the 
institutional rule-set in which such technologies are introduced becomes an 
additional condition for success, even more so in highly regulated industries such 
as the electricity sector. Institutions hence become a conditioning 
factor for the 
amount of value that can be extracted from a given technology. 
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Hence, as a starting point for analysing this decision variable, it can be 
argued that the institutional rule-set governing a new technological field shapes 
the extent and direction of strategic involvement by the firm (Eggertsson 
1996; Oliver 1997). In setting their strategy for technological capability 
development, companies need to form a simultaneous point of view of system- 
wide institutional developments and the companies' potential leverage within 
them (Oliver 1991; Oliver 1997). Hence, they will determine the potential benefit 
from institutional changes based on their own resources and capabilities and 
consequently the potential to exploit opportunities created by a widened 
institutional space (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler 2004). 
Oliver and Holzinger (2008) have put forward a taxonomy of four 
different institutional engagement strategies that are based on the specific 
capability context within the firm. Hence, they distinguish between defensive, 
reactive, anticipatory and pro-active strategies that will be adopted depending on 
the firm's specific capabilities and type of regulatory environment (see Figure 7 
below). Increasingly pro-active strategies can create increasingly sustainable 
competitive advantages for the firm as they aim to tailor regulatory institutions 
specifically to the dynamic capabilities of the individual firm. However, Oliver 
and Holzinger's (2008) framework a static capability and technology set is 
assumed, while in this research the co-evolution of both dimensions is 
investigated over time. Hence, Oliver and Holzinger did not address the question 
of the dynamic interaction of business and political strategy over time, and their 
impact on technology diffusion. 
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Figure 7: Taxonomy of corporate political strategies Source: Oliver & Holzinger 2008 
Building on Oliver and Holzinger's (2008) framework, two different types 
of integrated strategies can be expected from the companies in this research: 
Companies that have actively developed new technological capabilities are 
expected to develop increasingly proactive CPA strategies. Conversely, 
companies that have not developed new technological capabilities will develop 
increasingly defensive CPA strategies. 
Institutional change has played an important role in the systemic 
innovation literature (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991; Edquist 1997a; Geels 2004; 
Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). It is seen as a key stepping stone for the diffusion of 
new technologies and their wider social acceptance. Consequently, including the 
strategic decision-making process on institutional engagement into the proposed 
analytical framework enriches the systemic analysis of innovation. It underpins 
the analysis of systemic co-evolution by providing an analytical tool to examine 
the motivations of individual companies in institutional conflicts (Smith et al. 
2005). Furthermore, it considers a previously unexplored dimension to the 
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development of systemic `functions' by focusing on the strategic rationale of 
individual companies for blocking or inducing the formation of institutions. 
3.2.3. An Analytical Framework for Studying the 
interactions between company strategy and co- 
evolutionary change 
The first aim of this study was to enrich systemic studies of technological 
change with a perspective on individual agency. Consequently, the discussion 
above served to illustrate the idea of strategic choice for companies set within 
wider systemic structures. This section integrates this perspective to consider how 
the interactions between both levels could be used in a dynamic co-evolutionary 
framework. 
The key aspect is that strategy serves as a feedback mechanism between 
individual companies and their external environment. Strategies are formulated on 
the basis of existing strength and capabilities of the firm (Rosenbloom 
1978; Burgelman & Rosenbloom 1989). At the same time, strategies are 
influenced by opportunities in the external environment. 
Figure 8 on the next page illustrates this idea graphically and brings 
together the co-evolutionary dimensions from section 3.1 with the company 
strategy aspects discussed above. Strategic choices at the firm level are influenced 
both by wider institutional and technological changes and by the firm's own 
resources and capabilities. Firms' existing capabilities and routines underpin the 
starting position for corporate strategy, providing the company-internal frame for 
decisions about developing new technological capabilities and associated political 
activities. However, these interact with wider systemic developments in 
institutions and technology over time. As a result, the execution of strategy 
provides learning feedback to the firm through the resulting interactions in both 
framing and being framed by the direction of change at the systemic level 
(Burgelman & Rosenbloom 1989). In an evolutionary perspective, corporate 
strategy consequently adapts to these wider systemic developments through 
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experience (`learning-by-doing') from strategy execution (arrows on the left and 
right). This in turn leads to adaptations of technological capabilities and political 
activities at the firm-level (flow arrows at the bottom). Furthermore, institutional 
and technological changes interact on a systems level (flow arrow at the top). It is 
with these interactions in mind, that the analytical framework is labelled co- 
evolutionary and dynamic over time. 
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Figure 8: Co-evolution of firm strategy, technology and institutions 
Smith el al. (2005) call for a closer examination of the specific contexts in 
which systemic transformations occur. This highlights the fact that even 
in long 
established systems incumbent firms are able to adapt to external pressures, rather 
than being overwhelmed by them. It is contended that strategy analysis, as 
positioned in this framework, can shed more light on the specific circumstances 
in 
which firms are able to manage such adjustments. 
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Having established the framework for the analysis, the next section will 
now outline its specific application in the context of the research for this thesis. 
Hence, it will explain the methodology used for this approach and the selection of 
the three case study countries. 
3.3. Methodology and Boundaries of the Research 
3.3.1. Methodology 
Having outlined the analytical framework employed to analyse the 
research question, this section now discusses the choice of methodology and the 
sampling strategy. The research builds primarily on the systemic-innovation and 
strategic-management literature. However, given the lack of comprehensive 
theories in this field, this thesis integrated both approaches to develop a novel 
analytical framework, which was consequently applied and tested in three case 
studies to generate new empirical and theoretical insights. 
Yin defines case studies as "... a strategy for doing research which 
involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence. " (Yin 1994: 48) 
According to Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt 1991), case studies are 
especially appropriate in new topic areas where comprehensive theoretical 
frameworks or empirical support are lacking. One of the strengths of the case 
study method is the potential depth of analysis and the immediate connection of 
theory with empirical observations (Gassmann 1999). 
As the aim of this study was both to test an extension to the existing 
theoretical frameworks and to generate new insights from this novel framework, 
the case study method was chosen as the most appropriate (Eisenhardt 
1989; Robson 2002). A modelling approach to test the analytical framework would 
have been an alternative approach. However, the lack of theory to build causal 
links in a model, the opportunity for exploration of the phenomena with real 
83 
actors in the field and ultimately the limited time and resources at hand to carry 
out both in-depth case studies and a modelling approach led to a decision against 
model building. Modelling as a potential area of future research, building on the 
results from this study, is discussed in the conclusion in chapter 6. 
Data Reliability, Validity and Generalizability 
Two general problems with the case study method are firstly. the 
reliability and validity of data collection and secondly, the generalizability of the 
results obtained (Robson 2002; Flick 2002). With regard to the first issue, data was 
collected with the aim of triangulation in mind. This involves applying different 
methodologies, using multiple data sources and theoretical angles to increase the 
robustness of the results obtained (Flick 2002). Robson lists four main types of 
triangulation that mark out good research designs (Robson 2002: 226): 
1. Investigator triangulation - using different interviewers 
2. Theory triangulation - "... approaching data with multiple perspectives 
and hypotheses in mind. " (Denzin 1989: 239-240) 
3. Methodological triangulation - Combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches 
4. Data triangulation - use of different data sources 
Point 1- investigator triangulation - was not possible in the context of a 
PhD research project. However, the three other features of triangulation were 
followed in the research process. While it would have allowed for controlling 
investigator bias to his/her research subject, the number of interviews conducted 
and the relative homogeneity of interviewees (senior managers of incumbent 
electricity companies in three European countries) provided some compensation 
for this factor. 
Theory triangulation was an implicit part of the research design, given the 
two distinct research traditions analysed in order to develop the novel analytical 
framework. Hence, data collection and evaluation was based on approaches that 
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emphasize different explanatory variables for the observed phenomena and thus 
allowed the juxtaposition and comparison of different theoretical arguments. 
The method for data collection, -processing and analysis was primarily 
qualitative although quantitative data was used as part of the company analysis. 
However, the debate about the choice between either a quantitative or qualitative 
method has increasingly moved towards questions of research practice such as the 
appropriateness of each approach and should be based on the nature of the actual 
research problem at hand (Wilson 1982; Robson 2002). Bauer and Gaskell (Bauer 
& Gaskell 2000) stress that it is more the degree of formalization and 
standardization which distinguishes the two approaches than the juxtaposition of 
words and numbers. The aim for rigour in the research practise and concerns for 
reliability and validity of data is equally present in both research streams (Flick 
2002) and was the main concern in the research design of the study presented 
here. 
From the outset, it had to be recognised that the field of analysis in this 
research is an open system. It would have been impossible to capture all 
conceivable variables that influence decision-making on company strategy. 
Unlike the researcher in a laboratory, external influences cannot be shut out or 
controlled in the real world. Thus, a fixed and linear research design 
(what is 
considered the `scientific approach'), consisting of hypothesis 
formulation, testing 
and evaluation is not strictly possible. As Robson (2002: 168) observes, 
"... while 
the essential test of validity of a finding in the natural sciences 
is that it has been 
directly replicated by an independent investigator, this approach 
is not feasible 
when a [qualitative] design is used". 
Hence, data triangulation was followed by seeking data from a variety of 
sources and using an iterative process 
in connecting the development of the 
analytical framework and the 
data collection process. Firstly, desk-based 
background research was carried out, which 
included the theoretical literature 
review outlined in chapter two 
but also provided detailed market and policy 
surveys in order to select appropriate case study countries. 
Furthermore, archive 
searches were conducted 
in industry journals and data providers such as 
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`Windpower Monthly' and `Bloomberg'. Based on these surveys, companies were 
identified for inclusion into the case studies, and for each of them. a short profile 
was developed, giving an overview over a set of standardised data. This built on 
the discussion in the literature review in chapter 2 on compan` -related factors 
influencing technology strategy, with a specific focus on existing operational 
routines and capabilities. 
Secondly, companies were contacted directly in order to gain a better 
understanding of the actions and interactions in each of the case study countries 
and to complement the information obtained from the secondary sources 
described above. Two alternative approaches were considered for this part: Survey 
questionnaires and interviews, which can be structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill 2003). It was decided that semi- 
structured interviews offered the best approach for obtaining the necessary data 
while still remaining a realistic option within the time and resources available. 
A semi-structured interview approach was deemed suitable for two main 
reasons. In an exploratory study, semi-structured interviews can be helpful to 
`find out what is happening and to seek new insights' (Robson 2002: 59). Given 
the multitude of potential influencing factors and the absence of a general 
explanatory theory to comprehensively predict the behaviour of the involved 
companies, obtaining individual viewpoints from involved actors was important in 
understanding individual market contexts and to inform the development of the 
analytical framework (Eisenhardt 1991). Understanding context specific-factors is 
important to delineate to what extent "data gained from a particular study provides 
theoretical insights which possess a sufficient degree of generality or universality 
to allow their projection to other contexts or situations" (Sim 1998: 350). 
Perceptions of the opportunities and risks in the electricity market are likely to 
vary from company to company. Thus, in order to better understand the 
interactions between individual company strategy and system-wide developments. 
semi-structured interviews allowed the exploration of 
both the company 
perspective on past developments in the industry as well as their outlook on 
future 
developments. 
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Furthermore, semi-structured interviews are helpful to "understand the 
reasons for attitudes and opinions of the interviewees" (Saunders et al. 2003: 250), 
which allows to gain insights into the motivations and incentives of individual 
actors. This would not be possible in a comprehensive manner with a standardised 
questionnaire. Freedom to discuss these areas of interest is instrumental in order 
to fully explore new ideas and issues (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill 2003). 
Hence, Robson (2002) argues that exploratory studies based on semi-structured 
interviews are particularly appropriate where the objective is to generate and test 
ideas and hypotheses (Robson 2002: 59). 
Still, conducting semi-structured interviews does not prevent the 
researcher from data collection in a rigorous manner. The main themes and 
questions asked were identical for each company, thus delivering comparable 
data. Similarly, in the background research on each company, a set of standard 
indicators was collected in order to compare the relative standing of each 
company in the market. In this way, a similar degree of standardisation was 
achieved compared to a questionnaire, while the interview format allowed an 
exploration and probing of the issues in more detail. The main themes of the 
interviews can be found in an appendix to this chapter, while the company 
indicators are listed for each country in the case study section of chapter 4. 
Problems with bias in the data collection can arise where only small 
population samples are taken. (Saunders et al. 2003). In this respect, the 
depth of 
the background research prior to the interviews gains central importance. Before 
engaging in individual interviews, comprehensive background company profiles 
were created to be able to probe specific events 
in the company's history and 
question possible assertions made about past events. Hence, 
it was possible to 
evaluate and analyse the answers in the context of the companies' competitive 
standing and historical development. Furthermore, 
in each country selected, it was 
aimed to include companies with at least 50% of the total market share, 
to allow 
for a comprehensive view of the market. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) argue that 
`closure' in case study research is achieved when adding additional cases 
does not 
add or only minimally adds additional theoretical 
insights (Glaser & Strauss 
1967). Besides this theoretical dimension, this phenomenon, 
known as `theoretical 
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saturation', also involves a pragmatic considerations (costs of additional case 
study research versus additional insights) (Eisenhardt 1989). Given the 
homogeneity of the `product' electricity and consequently the similarity of 
organisational approaches of utility companies and their market share 
concentration (Newbery 2005b), this seemed sufficient to capture country 
differences while maintaining a manageable workload. 
Generalizations from case study results concern the "transferability of 
findings from one context to another" (Robson 2002: 182). Multiple case studies 
do not allow for statistical generalizations but allow for analytical generalization; 
Findings and patterns of data from case studies which provide this kind of 
support, particularly if they simultaneously provide evidence which does not fit in 
with alternative theories, are the basis for generalization (Robson 2002: 183). 
A key concern for generalization is the robustness of the data that 
underlies any findings, which in turn can be improved by triangulation. In this 
context, "triangulation is less a strategy for validating results and procedures than 
an alternative to validation which increases scope, depth and consistency in 
methodological proceedings" (Robson 2002: 227). 
Using case studies for building or expanding new theories is now a 
frequent method in social science research (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt 
1991; Flick 2002). If research is carried out in a rigorous fashion, "such theories 
are likely to be testable, novel, and empirically valid" (Eisenhardt 
1989: 547). 
However, they are still theories about specific phenomena. As Eisenhardt 
(1989: 547) put it, ""Grand" theories require multiple studies - an accumulation of 
both theory-building and theory-testing empirical studies. " Consequently, findings 
from this study will be able to contribute to the literature in extending existing 
theoretical frameworks and suggesting new avenues for research, both 
in applying 
the results in new settings and in aiming for higher-level generalizations. 
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3.3.2. Geographic and Technological Boundaries 
This section describes in detail the process which led to the selection of 
the target countries and companies for this research. It also describes the process 
of carrying out the semi-structured interviews. Carlsson et al. ( 2002), in their 
discussion of key methodological issues with regard to innovation system 
analysis, stress the need for a clear delineation of the system boundaries. Hence, 
the first task in this section was to set boundaries for the proposed work and thus 
clearly define what is included and excluded in the research. 
Given the resource and time constraints of this research, the focus had to 
be limited in terms of the technologies included and the number of different 
national markets covered. After surveying developments in a number of European 
countries (Stenzel, Foxon, Gross 2003), the decision about both types of 
boundaries was set simultaneously. Among the many new RETs12, wind energy is 
the most widely used technology across Europe and thus has relatively good base 
data on which to build the analysis. As it is also the most widely used `new' 
technology among large utility companies in Europe, it was consequently decided 
to focus on wind energy as a case study of renewables. For example, Table 3 
summarizes data of European utilities from December 2002, which shows 
significantly larger interest in wind energy than biomass technology among the 
companies surveyed (Hamburgische Landesbank 2002). 
12 Sellers (Sellers 2005) divides development of RETs into two phases -A first wave of 
`traditional' RETs, consisting of geothermal, hydropower and traditional 
biomass technologies, 
and a second wave of 'new' RETs, such as wind energy, solar energy and 
advanced forms of 
biomass technologies. 
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Table 3: Current and planned investment in wind and biomass by European Utilities 
(Source: Hamburgische Landesbank 2002) 
Utility Wind in Biomass in Wind Biomass planned 
Company MW MW planned in in MW (target 
(December (December MW (target year in brackets) 
02) 02) year in 
brackets) 
EdF 10 n/a 480 n/a 
(2004) 
EnBW 10 12 n/a n/a 
Endesa 825 16 1295 n/a 
(n/a) 
Energi E2 183 308 158 n/a 
(2003) 
E. ON 51 n/a 60 (2003) 100 (2005) 
Iberdrola 1213 8 2256 n/a 
(2006) 
MVV n/a n/a 400 200 (2005) 
Energie (2005) 
RWE 229 50 771 n/a 
(2010) 
Scottish 185 n/a 2785 n/a 
Power (2010) 
Sydkraft 11 150 30 (2003) 100 (2005) 
Vattenfall 28 448 n/a n/a 
Secondly, the number of countries to be analysed had to be limited, as 
time constraints would prevent an exhaustive analysis of utilities across the whole 
of Europe. Yet, Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) highlight that different networks 
and their constituent firms are likely to follow different courses of action in the 
face of new technological developments. "When new technologies become 
available, providing expanded and different technological opportunities, the 
bounded (and different) visions of managers imply that firms and their networks 
may differ greatly in their perception and ability to seize these opportunities. 
Rationality... could well be argued to be not only limited but quite different 
among both firms and networks. " (Jacobsson and Johnson 2000: 632) 
Eisenhardt (1989: 546) considers the potential for the "juxtaposition of 
contradictory or paradoxical evidence... across several cases" a 
key advantage of 
case study research for making new theoretical advances as 
it forces the 
researcher to "... reconcile these contradictions to reframe perceptions 
into a new 
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gestalt". Hence, it was an aim in the selection of the case study countries and 
companies to achieve a breadth and diversity of experiences. 
In order to achieve a juxtaposition of different experiences both among 
countries and within countries among companies, three criteria were applied: 
Firstly, countries were screened by their overall success in installing wind energy. 
Secondly, these countries were analysed with regard to their renewable energy 
support schemes and electricity market design. Lastly, the utilities within the 
countries were screened according to overall market position and their 
involvement in the wind energy market. 
As shown in Figure 9 below, only five countries shared over 80% of the 
installed wind capacity up to 2002. As has been proposed in the analytical 
framework, the institutional and technological dimensions of the wind energy 
system co-evolve over time. Hence, the institutional environment in those 
countries can be considered central to the wider development of the affected 
technology, wind turbines in this case. 
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Figure 9: Worldwide development of wind power 1990-2002; comparison of installation in 
India, Denmark, USA, Spain, Germany and the rest of the world; Source: (Sellers 2005) 
However, due to resource constraints, only European countries could be 
included in this study. Reiche (Reiche 2005) describes renewable energy policy 
developments in the 25 EU member countries. A key finding in this survey is that 
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sixteen of these countries have implemented a "feed-in" tariff renewable energy 
support scheme. The other nine countries use a variety of schemes, including 
auctions, tradable certificate schemes and tax credits to support renewable energy 
technologies. 
The two countries with the most installed wind capacity globally, 
Germany and Spain, both operate feed-in tariff policies (Reiche 2005). However, 
both countries operate different electricity market designs, with Germany 
operating a wholesale spot market based on bilateral trading, while Spain has a 
mandatory pool market for all electricity generators in place 13 (Crampes & Fabra 
2005; Brunekreeft & Twelemann 2005). Hence, including both countries in this 
thesis allowed the study of the two leading wind countries worldwide, while 
simultaneously analysing the effect of the feed-in policy system under different 
electricity market conditions. 
In order to increase the variety of cases and especially include the 
experience of a relative laggard, a third case study country was added to the 
analysis. Among the countries without a feed-in tariff policy, the dominating 
support mechanisms are tradable certificate schemes in various guises. A recent 
report on harmonization of European support schemes for renewable energies 
listed such mechanisms as the main possible alternative to feed-in tariffs 
(European Commission 2005b). However, among the countries with such policies, 
there is little long-term experience in their operation (Reiche 2005). The UK's 
renewable obligation certificate (ROC) scheme has been in operation since 2002, 
which makes it the longest running certificate trading scheme for renewable 
energy in Europe. As the UK also has no prior experience with feed-in tariffs'` 
and witnessed relatively low levels of wind installations compared to the other 
two countries (BWEA 2005), it was selected as the third case study country. The 
selection of these three countries allowed analysing the effect of different 
13 The differences between both market designs will be explained more fully in the country 
sections in Chapter 4. 
14 Both Italy and Sweden have also been running certificate trading schemes since 2001 and 2003 
respectively. However, both countries' previous policies 
included a feed-in tariff system (Reiche 
2005). 
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institutional environments on the strategy of utilities, varying both the type of 
wholesale electricity market arrangement and renewable energy policy. 
As can be seen from Table 4 below, there are broadly three combinations 
of wholesale market design and renewables policy across these countries: The UK 
relies mainly on voluntary electricity markets of bilateral and over-the-counter 
trade. In terms of the market, renewables are treated equally to other technologies 
but are additionally supported through a quota and obligation policy. Germany 
similarly relies mostly on voluntary trade through the EEX power exchange or 
bilateral contracts. Renewables, however, are promoted through a separate 
guaranteed feed-in tariff plus a duty on distribution companies to prioritise 
despatch of `green' electricity. Finally, Spain operates a mandatory pool market 
for all electricity produced from generators over 50MW, while renewables are 
similarly supported through guaranteed feed-in tariffs which have priority 
despatch in the pool. Detailed policy and market background information are 
presented in the case study sections of the next chapter. 
An empirical puzzle arose in the preliminary desk-based research, when 
examining the share of incumbent utility companies in the total installed wind 
capacity in each of these countries. It varied widely from around 1% to over 80%. 
Markard et al. (2004) had found in the field of green electricity retail products that 
utilities pursued different strategies, differentiating between strategy types with 
different degrees of engagement such leading, learning and participating. Given 
the variance in the renewable energy installations, it could be expected that similar 
strategy differences will be found in the present research as well. A short 
summary of the key institutional and policy features in the three countries 
is 
provided in Table 4 below: 
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Table 4: Properties of market regulation, renewables policy and incumbent investment into 
wind energy in the UK, Germany and Spain 
Share of 
Main electricity market Renewables Policy incumbents in features total wind 
capacity 
NETA/BETTA _ 
Renewable Obligation 
UK voluntary bilateral trade, 
Certificates, obligation 81 4% 
over the counter market on suppliers 
to fulfil . 
quotas 
Guaranteed feed-in 
EEX power exchange - tariff, duty on 
Germany voluntary bilateral trade, distribution companies 1.2% 
over the counter market to dispatch all 
renewable electricity 
Quasi-mandatory Pool for `Special Regime', 
generators over 50MW; guaranteed feed-in 
Spain priority dispatch for tariff or top-up 57% 
`special regime' premium on wholesale 
electricity market price 
Having decided on the geographical and technological boundary, the third 
boundary had to be set with regard to the number of companies included in the 
study. The focus in each country was on the large incumbent utility companies 
that operate along the traditional value chain of the electricity market (i. e. 
electricity generation, grid operation and retail). As regulation of electricity grid 
ownership varied between the three countries, companies were required to operate 
at least in the electricity generation and retail field. As incumbents, they were 
furthermore required to operate at least one type of conventional power plants 
such as coal, nuclear, oil or gas turbines. In order to cover the majority of the 
market operations of these incumbents, the total market share of the companies 
included in the study was required to be at least 50% in the respective national 
markets. As argued in section 0 above, the `product' electricity is highly 
homogeneous and similar organisational approaches and high concentration of 
market shares can be witnessed across the selected countries (Newbery 2005b). 
As the research progressed, the answers from the interviews were already 
processed in order to identify potential issues arising that required 
further 
enquiries. However, within the three countries, a level of 'theoretical saturation' 
was achieved within the initial set of target companies, meaning that no additional 
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questions arose that would have contributed to the present set of the research 
questions (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Eisenhardt 1989). 
All the utility companies included in this study are vertically integrated 
concerns with significant market shares in their respective national markets. All of 
them have interest in electricity generation and retail. In Germany, where the 
national transmission network has not been unbundled from the rest of the 
electricity industry, these companies also own the transmission network. In 
Germany and Spain, four companies together make up at least 80% of the 
respective markets in electricity generation and supply. The lower level of 
company concentration in the UK and the unavailability of one company for 
interviews, as outlined below, meant that the five companies included in the UK 
section of the study cover just 51% market share in electricity generation, while 
still covering over 80% market share in electricity supply. 
In building up a profile of potential companies, two main data sources 
were accessed: Firstly, the industry magazine `Windpower Monthly' has an 
extensive archive reaching back 13 years, thus allowing the creation of a good 
background database about a particular company's moves in the wind power 
industry, especially with regard to innovation-related activity. Secondly, 
Bloomberg Data Services provides access to historic financial market news dating 
back over hundred years, thus far exceeding the lifetime of the wind power 
industry. From this source, the plant ownership structure and key financial 
information about investment behaviour of individual companies, as well as news 
such as mergers, acquisitions and joint-ventures were extracted. 
Furthermore, two 
UK government consultations on the 2001 `Energy Review' of the 
Prime 
Minister's strategy unit and the 2003 `Energy White Paper' were used to 
identify 
UK companies active in the institutional field. These 
information sources were 
used to identify the key companies in each market. 
The companies originally 
included in the case studies for each country are shown in Table 
5 below. 
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Table 5: Companies initially included in the case studies from the UK, Germany and Spain 
Country Utility Companies 
UK - Centrica/British Gas 
- EDF Energy 
- E. ON UK (PowerGen) 
- RWE npower (Innogy) 
- Scottish Power 
- Scottish & Southern Energy 
Germany - E. ON 
- RWE 
- Vattenfall 
- EnBW 
Spain - Endesa 
- Iberdrola 
- Union Fenosa 
- Hidrocantäbrico 
All the above companies were contacted to participate in an interview in a 
six-month period between April and September 2006. The only company that did 
not agree to hold any interviews or provide any further information was "Scottish 
& Southern Energy" in the UK15. All the other companies were willing to engage 
in at least one interview. A total of 21 interviews were carried out. The primary 
focus for interviewees were departments with direct responsibility for wind 
energy developments. However, in order to get responses from different sections 
of the companies, interviews were also sought in the general corporate strategy 
and technical management departments in order to be able to contrast responses 
from within the same company. Besides the desk-based research carried out prior 
to the interviews, this provided a further source of triangulation of company- 
specific responses, as perceptions of company actions can vary between 
departments (Eisenhardt 1989; Denrell, Fang, & Winter 2003). A standardised 
interview guideline was used to generate comparable data from all companies. 
Table 6 sets out the main themes that were explored in the interviews. 
They focus on the company-internal and external influences on the formulation of 
corporate strategy with regard to renewables in general and wind power in 
particular. The interviews were not conducted in a linear fashion as the different 
themes arose out of different responses in the general flow of the discussion. 
15 The main reason given was fear of disclosure of sensitive information. 
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Nevertheless, themes that were not covered were specifically probed by the end of 
the interview. The interview guidelines with detailed questions can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
Table 6: Themes and areas of interest for the interviews 
Themes 
Company's position in the market - strengths and weaknesses, development potential 
Perception of the status of various renewables and wind energy in particular - 
awareness of technologies 
Perception of the prospects of various renewables and wind energy in particular - 
strategic potential 
Company's organizational set-up for renewables/wind and the amount and timing of 
investments 
Outlook on regulatory framework for renewables - institutional perspective 
Membership in industry and lobby associations - level and scale of regulatory 
engagement 
Interview length was at least one hour, with the longest interview lasting 
three hours. Interviews were recorded on a tape recorder, transcribed and sent to 
the interviewees for confirmation of accuracy of content. All interviewees were 
guaranteed anonymity in order for them to be able to speak freely. Hence, Table 7 
below does not give explicit names of the interviewees but only indicates the job 
title and the country of origin. 
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Table 7: Overview of the interviews conducted in the UK, Spain and Germany 
Date of Interview Country Job description 
21. April 2006 UK Head of Renewables Strategy 
4. May 2006 UK Manager, Corporate Strategy 
12. May 2006 UK Business Development Manager 
13. June 2006 UK General Manager, Renewables 
13. Jun 2006 UK Head of Strategy and Special Projects 
20. June 2006 UK Head of Renewable Energy 
26. June 2006 UK Head of Renewables Policy 
29. August 2006 UK Commercial Manager, Renewables 
5. September 2006 Spain Technical Director, Renewables 
7. September 2006 Spain Head of Investment Projects 
8. September 2006 Spain Head of Regulatory Policy 
11. September 2006 Spain Head of Technical Operations 
12. September 2006 Spain Director of R&D Projects 
11. July 2006 Germany 
Vice President Corporate 
Development 
11. July 2006 Germany 
Senior Analyst, Corporate 
Development 
12. July 2006 Germany Senior Manager, Renewable Power 
12. July 2006 Germany Manager, Corporate Development 
21. August 2006 Germany Head of Windpower Development 
22. August 2006 Germany Head of Renewables 
23. August 2006 Germany Head of R&D 
23. August 2006 Germany Head of Renewables 
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3.3.3. Data Analysis 
The presentation of the data collected will be undertaken in the subsequent 
chapter 4. In keeping with the analytical framework, the different dimensions "ill 
be presented independently in order to separate analytically each dimension's 
evolution. This will be done for each of the three countries investigated. 
Subsequently, chapter 5 provides a synthesis of the data and a higher level 
comparison of the findings from each country. 
The technological dimension can be outlined generically for all three 
countries, since the technology was equally available in all three countries 
throughout the time period considered. This will be done in the first section of 
chapter 4. It will provide the context for the subsequent analysis of the capability 
development decisions of the individual companies. 
The institutional dimension of each country will be represented by two 
aspects: The design of the wholesale electricity market in which the incumbent 
utilities operated, and the specific renewable energy support policies enacted in 
each country. Again, this will provide the context for the subsequent analysis of 
the corporate political activity of the incumbent utility companies. 
Finally, the organizational dimension will be examined through an in- 
depth analysis of the incumbent utility companies' response to these systemic 
changes. Here, the focus will be on the development of strategies around wind 
energy, the most important factors driving such developments, and finally the 
specific pattern of capability development and institutional engagement. 
Bringing these factors together in one analytical framework provides an 
empirically rich and novel contribution to the literature and allows for the analysis 
of the research questions inquiring about the evolution of corporate strategy in 
response to a changing systemic environment. Hence, chapter 4 addresses aim 2 
set out in the introduction, and provides the basis for the theoretical discussions 
envisaged in aim 3 and 4. 
99 
4. The Interaction of Utilities' Strategies 
and Systemic Change in three 
Countries: UK, Germany and Spain 
The previous chapter set out the analytical framework and the 
methodology for the data collection and analysis for this research. This chapter 
will now provide the results of the case studies. Following the analytical 
framework developed in the previous chapter, the data will be presented to 
analyse the interaction between three dimensions: The evolution of the market 
institutions in the electricity industry, the evolution of the wind turbine technology 
and finally, the evolution of corporate strategy of the incumbent utility companies 
in three countries. Consequently, the structure of this chapter is as follows: 
Firstly, section 4.1 describes the development of wind turbine technology. 
Wind turbine technology has been equally available in all three countries, 
providing the same technological opportunity set to all the companies considered 
(Neuhoff & Sellers 2006). This is important as it allows focusing on institutional 
and organizational cross-country differences, while technology was equally 
accessible to all. 
Subsequently, section 4.2 introduces the case studies and briefly outlines 
two general features relevant for the framing of the country-specific case studies, 
respectively the value chain of the electricity industry and the capabilities required 
for the development of wind farms. Consequently, each country is presented in 
turn, section 4.3 covering the UK, section 4.4 Germany and section 4.5 Spain. For 
each country, firstly the evolution of electricity market regulation is outlined, 
followed by a section describing the prevailing renewable energy policy regime. 
Hence, these sections provide the institutional context of the analytical framework 
and serve as the country-specific institutional context of the corporate strategies of 
the respective utility companies. These strategies are outlined 
in the final parts of 
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each country section, presenting the results from the semi-structured interview s 
and the background research. The strategy discussion follows the analytical 
framework outlined in section 3.2.3, focusing on the strategy-formulation process 
at the firm level and the resulting interaction with the systems level. 
Before turning to the case studies, the next section will now give a brief 
overview of the key milestones in the development of wind turbine technology. 
4.1. Wind Turbine Technology Development 
Following the first oil-crisis of 1973/1974, many industrialised countries 
rapidly scaled up their research budgets for alternative energy technologies, 
including wind power (lEA 2004b). This led to the emergence of several 
technology design options competing alongside each other. Firstly, designs 
competed on the principle of vertically vs. horizontally rotating blades. Secondly, 
among the horizontally rotating turbines, the number of blades varied, with 
designs exhibiting, one, two, three and even four blades. This design competition 
lasted from about 1970 to about 1990, with the three-bladed, horizontally rotating 
turbine ultimately emerging as the preferred design in terms of longevity, power 
output and amenability to the requirements of site developers (Heymann 
1995; EWEA 2004). 
Figure 10 exhibits the development of these turbines for the period 1980- 
2003, where they experienced a phase of rapid growth and refinement. Size 
increased tenfold and rated capacity hundredfold over these years. Furthermore, 
technology inside these turbines developed to incorporate various elements of 
power electronics, thus meeting increasingly demanding grid codes, for example 
with respect to resilience to outages and the provision of ancillary services 
(EWEA 2004). Technology development was initially dominated by US and 
Danish firms, which together held about 90% of the world wind turbine market 
between 1980 and 1990 (Garud & Karnoe 2003). Subsequently, technology 
providers diversified rapidly, with new entrants 
from Germany, Spain and India 
following the emergence of new markets. 
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Figure 10: Evolution of wind turbines, 1980-2003 (Source: EWEA 2004) 
The major driver behind the developments of wind turbines were the 
increasing support policies and public R&D budgets in TEA member countries, 
especially following the oil crises of 1973/1974 and 1980. Yet, wind power 
received only 1% of total public energy R&D budgets between 1974 and 2002, or 
$2.9bn out of a total of 291bn spent in that time period (IEA 2004b). Yet, as 
technology matured, more countries introduced additional policies, targeting the 
demonstration and market introduction of wind power. Figure 11 shows the 
evolution of policy instruments in lEA member countries from R&D support to 
demonstration grants and market introduction measures over time. 
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Figure 11: The introduction of renewable energy policies in IEA member countries (Source: 
IEA 2004: 92) 
As shown in Figure 10, wind technology was initially characterized by 
small unit sizes and low power ratings. This reflects the fact that individuals and 
companies involved in the initial design efforts and installations of wind turbines 
were similarly operating at a small and often localised scale. For example, the first 
single turbine set up in Denmark in 1975 was connected to the grid by an 
entrepreneur next to his house, without the knowledge or permission of the local 
grid company (Van der Steen et al. 2007). Yet, as wind turbine technology 
matured and new markets were opened up through government support schemes, 
the focus increasingly turned to larger and consequently more powerful turbines 
(Garud & Karnoe 2003). 
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The efforts to upscale wind turbine ratings were characterised by two 
competing approaches - `bricolage and breakthrough' (Garud & Karnoe 2003). 
The former was mostly practiced in the context of the Danish wind turbine 
industry and also by several small-scale German manufacturers (Heymann 1995). 
This method was characterised by incremental developments and improvements 
in the turbines, with an emphasis on learning-by-doing and user-developer 
interactions. The character of the Danish and German wind turbine market with 
many small-scale users was particularly amenable to this approach due to the 
close relationships between manufacturers and users as well as the connectivity of 
the different stakeholders in close industry networks (Garud & Karnoe 2003). 
Leading turbine manufacturers in this mould were `Vestas', `NEG Micon' and 
`Bonus' in Denmark, `Enercon' in Germany, and `Gamesa' in Spain. 
Conversely, the `breakthrough' approach focused on a concerted effort of 
the engineering and aerodynamics know-how of leading scientists, mainly in the 
USA, to quickly produce large-scale turbines. Most of the development work in 
this setting was done in laboratories and proprietary test stations. This led to poor 
knowledge diffusion and limited user-developer interactions (Garud & Karnoe 
2003). Another example of this approach was the attempt by a German 
engineering consortium to develop a 3,000 kiloWatt (kW) machine in the late 
1980s (Heymann 1995)16. Yet, these early attempts at rapidly scaling up the 
technology did not succeed at the time, and the development path took the 
incremental path depicted in Figure 10 above. Ultimately, one-megawatt (MW) 
and multi-megawatt machines emerged out of the incremental ('bricolage') design 
efforts, especially with the increasing interest in offshore wind farms. 
Furthermore, with the emergence of the three-bladed, horizontally rotating 
`dominant design', the technology spread internationally. Spanish company 
`Gamesa' initially manufactured a Danish design under licence, while the UK 
market was almost exclusively supplied by foreign turbines from Denmark and 
Germany in the early NFFO' 7 auction rounds (Mitchell (1995) cites that 345 of 
415 turbines in the first two rounds were of foreign origin). Germany saw the 
16 This case will be further discussed in section 4.4.3 
17 See section 4.3.2 for full details on the NFFO auctions. 
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emergence of several domestic windturbine manufacturers while also seeing 
activity by Danish and American companies. For example, `Vestas' installed its 
1,000th windturbine in Germany by the year 1998 (Vestas 2007). 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the wind turbine industry consolidated 
increasingly around a small number of leading manufacturers who were able to 
satisfy the rapidly growing demand for turbines worldwide. `Vestas' took over 
`NEG Micon', `Gamesa' bought its smaller Spanish competitor `Made' and 
`Bonus' was taken over by German engineering conglomerate `Siemens'. The 
evolution of the global wind turbine market is shown in Figure 12, while the 
global market shares of the leading turbine manufacturers is given in Figure 13. 
As turbines approached sizes of more than 1 MW, increasing interest arose 
in developing windfarms on the sea. This `offshore' environment provided higher 
and more constant wind speeds than would be attainable on land. Furthermore, the 
larger size of such windfarms offered the prospect of significant economies of 
scale in their development. These factors were seen as more than outweighing the 
higher installations cost that were necessary for such wind farms, while also 
avoiding some of the permitting obstacles witnessed at 
land (Gross 2004). 
Consequently, the first commercial scale offshore wind farms were built, starting 
in 2001 in Denmark with the 160 MW Horns Rev wind farm and in 2003 the 
60 
MW North Hoyle wind farm in the UK (IEA 2005c). 
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Figure 12: Worldwide installed wind energy capacity 1990-2004. Source: EWEA 2004, BTM 
Consult 2005 
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Figure 13: Worldwide Market Shares of Wind Turbine Manufacturers in 2004 Source: 
(BTM Consult 2005) 
In summary, the wind industry saw a period of rapid growth in the turbine 
size and technological maturity over the past two decades. With the emergence of 
a `dominant design' in the form of the three-bladed turbine, technology diffusion 
became increasingly global. Manufacturers took advantage of a growing market, 
which allowed the top companies to consolidate, to the extent that the top four 
companies supplied over 75% of the market in 2004, as Figure 13 above indicates. 
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4.2. Introduction to the Country Case Studies 
Having outlined the general development of the wind turbine industry, this 
section now turns to the country-specific case studies. In this section two aspects 
of the utility industry are discussed that apply equally in each of the three 
countries. This is firstly the value chain of the industry and secondly the 
capabilities necessary for the successful development of a wind development and 
operation business. 
4.2.1. The Value Chain in the Electricity Industry 
To put the utility industry into context, the typical value chain of the 
electricity industry is outlined in Figure 14 below (Markard & Truffer 2006). In 
the UK, following privatization of the industry in 1990, utilities were initially 
confined to owning assets either in the generation or the distribution and supply 
sector. The transmission18 of electricity was considered a natural monopoly and 
bundled in an independent grid operator company, National Grid. Subsequently, 
vertical integration led to the emergence of utilities owning assets in generation, 
distribution and retailing. In Spain, utility companies similarly operate in the 
generation, distribution and retail sectors, also on a regional-monopoly basis, 
while the transmission grid was consolidated in a separate, regulated monopoly 
company, Red Electrica Espana (REE), in 1985. Finally, in Germany, companies 
own assets along the entire value chain, from electricity generation, to 
transmission and distribution and finally the end-customer supply in particular 
regions, therefore being local monopolies. 
Generation Transmission Distribution Retail 
Figure 14: Typical Value Chain for electric utilities 
18 Transmission commonly refers to the long-distance, high-voltage (up to and over 375,000 volts) 
transport of electricity, while distribution refers to the lower-voltage (between 10,000 and 100,000 
volts) supply of electricity on a regional basis. 
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4.2.2" Capabilities for the Development of Wind Farms 
There are three capabilities in the area of the development and operation of 
wind turbines relevant to this research. These are knowledge about wind turbine 
technology and its suppliers, development of adequate sites from surveying to 
permitting and contracting, and lastly the integration of wind farms into the 
existing electricity system, both technically and economically. When discussing 
the company-specific strategy evolution, these three distinct areas of capability 
development will be distinguished (Hartmann & Boensch, 2005; Markard et al., 
2006). Aspects of these capabilities include: 
" Wind turbine technology; this includes knowledge about the state- 
of-the-art technology, development trends, supplier relationships 
and contract development. 
" Wind farm development; this includes site selection, local 
negotiations, finance, local planning application and permitting 
procedures and (sub)contracting. 
9 Network integration; this includes the maintenance of grid 
stability, balancing of output and integration into financial 
electricity wholesale markets. 
The analytical framework outlined in section 3.2.3 focused on the 
interplay of existing capabilities, corporate strategy and corporate engagement 
with the systemic environment. Specifically, a starting point in the literature was 
the assumption that distance between existing capabilities and the requirements 
for new technological capability developments will influence the degree to which 
corporate strategy will embrace a new technological opportunity. Similarly, it was 
assumed that the corporate political activity of a firm to influence the institutional 
environment for new technologies would determine the pay-off that a company 
could achieve from developing new technological capabilities. Hence, the relation 
between the existing capabilities and the needs of wind power development 
described above will be of specific interest to this study. 
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4.2.3. Three Case Studies on 
Incumbent Strategies and 
Environments 
the Interaction of 
changing systemic 
We can now turn to the country-specific case studies. Each case study is 
structured in four parts. The first two parts outline the evolution of each country's 
respective electricity market design and renewables policy, while the third part 
discusses the companies' individual corporate strategy with regard to wind power. 
The final part summarises the co-evolutionary development of institutions and 
company strategy in each country. 
In the first two sections, the timeframe is set to begin with the 
liberalization of electricity markets and the introduction of the first renewable 
energy policy, respectively. In outlining the evolution of these two areas, the 
institutional dimension to the analytical framework is represented. The sections on 
the electricity markets provide the wider context in which the utility companies 
operate, while the sections on the renewables policies introduce the context for the 
development of new technological capabilities. 
In the sections on the incumbent strategies, results will be presented both 
from the literature review, the industry data analysis and the semi-structured 
interviews. The focus here is on the internal dynamics in formulating company 
strategy with regard to developing technological capabilities and corporate 
political activity. 
Finally, the summary for each country brings these two levels together and 
examines the interaction between company strategy and systemic level 
developments. In this way the country-specific co-evolutionary paths can be 
examined separately, before chapter 5 will summarise the findings at a higher 
level for cross-country comparisons to investigate communalities among the paths 
in the three countries and their wider implications for theory and policy. 
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4.3. The UK 
4.3.1. UK Electricity Market Overview 
This section outlines the evolution of the UK electricity market in order to 
provide an institutional context for the development of individual firm strategies. 
It introduces the most important institutional changes in the market environment 
beginning with market liberalization in 1990 and outlines the organizational 
restructuring that had been taken place as a response. In section 4.3.2, the UK 
renewable energy policy environment is similarly outlined. 
The UK's electricity market has undergone numerous changes since the 
start of liberalization and privatization in 1990. Originally, Britain's industry was 
entirely state-owned, overseen by the Central Electricity Generation Board and 12 
Regional Area Boards (Hannah 1982). Privatization led to a separation of assets 
into three parts. Generation was split between three newly created companies. 
Two conventional generators took over the coal-, gas- and oil-fired power plants - 
`National Power' (40 power stations with about 30 Gigawatt (GW) capacity) and 
`PowerGen' (23 power stations with about 20 GW capacity) (lEA 2005b). The 
nuclear power assets remained in state hands after the initial attempt to privatize 
them as well did not receive a positive response. However, in 1996 a fleet of 
advanced-gas-cooled reactors and one pressurised-water reactor was eventually 
transferred to the private sector with the creation of `British Energy' (12 nuclear 
power stations with about 10 GW capacity). The distribution system and end- 
customer retailing was split into 12 regional areas, each held by one of the newly 
created Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), broadly following the historic 
distribution regions. The government initially retained golden shares in each of 
them to prevent mergers and takeovers, but these lapsed in 1995. The transmission 
system was separated and transferred to the newly formed `National Grid 
Company' (NGC) whose shares were equally held by the 12 RECS. However, in 
1995, the government asked the 12 RECs to divest their shares, and NGC shares 
were floated on the stock market. Regulation was conducted 
by a new regulatory 
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authority, the Office of Electricity Regulation, `Offer', which later merged with 
the regulator for the gas market, to become the Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets, `Ofgem'. In order to balance electricity supply and demand, the UK 
government instituted a power pool to act as a clearinghouse between suppliers of 
electricity (generators) and wholesale consumers of electricity (primarily the 
RECs) (IEA 2005b). 
The Pool guaranteed a high-level of transparency, yet the initial market 
set-up with a de facto duopoly between `PowerGen' and `National Power' meant 
that these two fossil-generators set the price in the market for more than 90% of 
the time (Newbery 1995; Newbery 2005c). This was assisted by a system of 
capacity payments which was calculated according to the reserve margin in the 
market and thus the value of capacity in stand-by. Consequently, generators had 
an incentive to withhold plants only to release them close to real-time after 
capacity payments had increased (Helm 2003). 
However, since RECs were initially forbidden to own generation assets 
directly, and generators were not allowed to own retailing assets either, new 
entrants into the market were stimulated. CCGT power plants were the preferred 
technology choice and new projects were constructed by independent power 
producers, covered through long-term back-to-back contracts that secured gas 
supply from the North Sea and electricity sale to the RECs simultaneously. 
Furthermore, by threatening PowerGen and National Power with referrals to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), the government induced both 
generators to incrementally divest some 14,000 MW of plant capacity between 
1990 and 2000 (Hunt 2002; Newbery & McDaniel 2003). Thus, over time, the 
duopoly nature of the market was slowly eroded and it has been argued that 
through the reduction of concentration in the industry, a high level of competition 
was slowly established in the UK market (Evans & Green 
2005). In 1990, the 
three largest generators controlled over 90% of the market (effectively PowerGen 
and National Power), in 2000, their market share was 
down to 49% and still 
falling (Hunt 2002). 
Still, Helm (2003: 134) points to the pivotal role that the pool played in 
securing competition: "A crucial feature of the Pool was that participation by 
generators was compulsory. All plants over 100 MW had to be despatched 
through this mechanism, and any supplier could buy at the Pool price... 
Compulsion made the Pool transparent and liquid, and it made discrimination by 
generators between suppliers much more difficult. " 
The Pool's strengths resided in its separation of the generation and supply 
side, and, by offering a system marginal price reference, a high level of 
transparency. Due to low switching numbers, the customer base of the RECs came 
to be considered a good balance to the increasingly competitive generation side of 
the industry. Hence, any increase in competitive pressure could potentially be 
offset by the relatively stable supply business. Consequently, a tendency towards 
vertical integration became immanent in the market. Once one company started in 
this direction, a vicious circle of increasingly illiquid and less transparent markets 
was likely to lead other companies down the same path. The clear ownership 
separation between generation and distribution/retail could only be maintained 
with strong regulatory oversight. As Helm (2003: 241) observes, "at any point at 
which the regulatory guard was relaxed, consolidation was inevitable. " 
Two events, happening almost alongside one another, led to a sharp 
reversal of the UK electricity market structure: Firstly, a series of takeovers and 
mergers between 1995 and 2002 consolidated the industry, in the wake of which 
every single REC changed ownership at least once, and in many cases twice. 
Secondly, following a review of the market structure in 1998, the mandatory Pool 
was replaced by a voluntary over-the-counter market, the New 
Electricity Trading 
Arrangement (NETA), in 2001. 
The takeover `mania' (Helm 2003) which started in the UK in 1995 was 
fuelled by three driving forces. Firstly, the expiry of the golden shares instituted 
by the government at the beginning of the privatization programme, secondly 
the 
drive to form `multi-utilities' and lastly, the attempt by American companies to 
enter the European market. 
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When the golden shares lapsed in 1995, the UK Trade and Industry 
secretary Ian Lang declared, that he was neither opposed to takeovers nor to 
vertical integration of electricity companies per se. On the contrary, he argued that 
it was always expected that the RECs would eventually face `normal' market 
pressures and that "exposing the RECs to such pressures is crucial to keeping 
management up to scratch and enhancing the efficiency of the industry as a 
whole" (Lang 1995). This was taken by many people in the industry as an 
invitation to pursue takeover attempts, and consequently led to sustained takeover 
activity in which a total of £ 16.2bn was spent between 1995 and 1997 (Helm 
2003: 22 1 ff). 
There were two main groups that were interested in the UK RECs. Firstly, 
water companies, which were privatized in the UK in 1989, aimed to expand their 
business following the `multi-utility' model, which stipulated that utility 
companies should combine several related network activities such as electricity, 
water, gas, and telecommunication in order to gain economies of scale from 
synergies in their operations. Secondly, several American utilities were expanding 
abroad at the time and the recently liberalized UK electricity market presented a 
seemingly profitable opportunity to do so. 
These takeover bids did not contribute to vertical integration in the 
industry per se, since none of the approaching companies had an interest in the 
UK electricity industry at the time. However, at the same time, the first bids by 
UK generators were also initiated. 
The first approach was made by `Scottish Power', which proposed to 
acquire the `Manweb' REC in the greater Manchester region. Scottish Power was 
already a vertically integrated company in Scotland but had not expanded into the 
England and Wales market yet. Manweb did not own any generation assets and 
had not engaged in the `dash for gas' which had led several other RECs to sign 
long-term contracts for electricity from new CCGT power stations. Thus, in this 
case, the only regulatory issue was the loss of a `comparator' 
in the supply 
business for Offer. In the event, these concerns did not outweigh the perceived 
benefits and the takeover was approved without conditions. 
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However, when National Power and PowerGen followed suit with their 
own takeover bids in 1996, both were eventually blocked by the regulators. Only 
after more CCGT power stations came online, and National Power and PowerGen 
agreed to further plant divestures, did the regulator perceive competition to be 
sufficiently strong to allow vertical integration of both companies. PowerGen 
bought the `East Midlands' REC in July 1998, and National Power took over the 
supply business of `Midlands Electricity' in November 1998. This set the stage 
for a series of further restructuring in the UK electricity industry in which 
virtually every company aspired to the model of the vertically integrated utility. 
As Newbery observes, "Concentration was ended by trading horizontal for 
vertical integration... " (Newbery 2005a). However, many of the new American 
entrants could not stem the investments in a period of falling prices and 
consequently sold off their assets to the newly arriving continental European 
utilities. 
Table 8: Generation capacity and customer numbers of the main utilities in the UK 
electricity market (Source: Company interviews, corporate reports and websites) 
Generation 
Percentage of Electricity 
Percentage of 
Company Capacity total generation Customers total electricity 
capacity customers 
British Energy 12,000 MW 17% n/a n/a 
Centrica/British 4,200 MW 6% 5.9m 22.1% Gas 
EDF Energy 4,980 MW 7% 3.5m 13.1% 
EON UK 10,100 MW 14.3% 5.3m 19.8% 
RWE npower 10,300 MW 14.6% 4m 15% 
Scottish Power 6,200 MW 8.8% 3.5m 13.1% 
Scottish & 10,000 MW 14.2% 4.3m 16% 
Southern 
Total Utilities 
5Mw 81.9% 26.5m 99.1% 
Other 12,770 18.1% 0.2m 0.9% 
Total UK 
7MW 100% 26.7 100% 
Consequently, by 2003, three European utilities had entered the UK 
electricity market, each to create a vertically integrated energy company in the 
UK. `E. ON' of Germany purchased PowerGen and its associated distribution and 
114 
supply businesses. Through these assets, E. ON UK today supplies around 6m 
customers and owns 9,900 MW of generation capacity. `RWE' of Germany 
purchased Innogy and npower, which were the new names of National Po«er's 
separate energy and supply businesses. Through its retail arm, RWE npower now 
has around 6m customers and generation capacity of about 8,600 MW. Finally, 
`EDF' of France purchased three distribution and supply regions in the south East 
of England, including London, and built up a portfolio of power plants, both under 
the name `EDF Energy'. It today has about 5,000 MW of generation capacity and 
supplies about 5m customers. Furthermore, through its French mother company, 
EDF Energy has an indirect interest in the UK-France interconnector cable with a 
capacity of 2,000 MW, which typically imports electricity from France to the UK. 
Besides these acquisitions from abroad, the two Scottish companies that 
had already been set-up as vertically integrated utilities in Scotland, purchased 
assets in England and Wales. As described above, Scottish Power purchased the 
`Manweb' REC. Through these combined assets, Scottish Power has about 6,200 
MW of generation capacity and serves about 5m customers today. The second 
Scottish company, Scottish and Southern Energy, was formed after the purchase 
of the `Southern' REC in the South of England. Also supplying electricity in 
Wales through its `SWALEC' brand, it has a total of 6m customers today and 
owns about 10,000 MW of generation capacity. 
The two other main actors in the UK electricity market today are British 
Gas/Centrica and British Energy. Since complete market opening to all household 
customers in 1998, Centrica has built up an electricity supply business on the back 
of its position as former gas monopolist. Also acquiring a series of power stations 
across the UK, it has 3,770 MW of generation capacity and almost 5 million 
electricity customers today. British Energy remained a generation-only company, 
unable to acquire a regional supply business. However, by virtue of its fleet of 
nuclear power plants and the addition of one coal-fired power plant to its portfolio 
it is the largest UK electricity generator today with about 12,000 MW of capacity. 
A summary of these figures is presented in Table 8. The fuel mix of total UK 
electricity generation capacity is given in Figure 15. 
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Fuel Mix of UK Electricity Production 2003-2006 
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Figure 15: Fuel mix of UK electricity production between 2003-2006, source: (DTI 2005a) 
Besides these large actors, several independent players remained in the 
generation business, two of which have significant generation assets. The giant 
Drax coal power plant of almost 4,000 MW of capacity was sold off by National 
Power in 1999 and, after being held by American company AES, has recently 
been floated as an independent company `Drax Power Ltd. '. `International Power 
Ltd. ' is a global independent power producer, which has built up a generation 
portfolio in the UK of 2,750 MW of capacity. Total installed capacity in the UK 
stood at 70.55 GW at the end of 2002, while peak load reached 61.72 GW in that 
year (lEA 2004a). 
The mandatory Pool was criticised from a number of angles. By 1997, the 
DTI had set up a review of the pool which ultimately culminated in the Utilities 
Act 2000, which instated the NETA, a voluntary market relying on bi-lateral 
contracts between electricity generators and retailers. There were two commonly 
cited criticisms of the Pool (Helm 1993: 308ff. ): 
- The payment of one system marginal price 
instead of a pay-as-bid 
mechanism 
- The liberal market principle of 
free voluntary trade instead of a mandatory 
market place 
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With respect to the first point, it was alleged that the operation with one 
system-wide market clearing price invited gaming from large operators to increase 
profits. Against this, it has been argued that it was not the market design per se 
that invited gaming but the market structure which conveyed market power to 
National Power and PowerGen, operating a de facto duopoly. While it was true, 
that a pay-as-bid system reduced the scope for gaming, a more competitive pool 
could equally reduce the scope for such market distorting behaviour. 
The second argument is a matter of principle, and was mainly contested on 
the ideal that a liberalized electricity market should ultimately be able to operate 
without any coercive element. The Pool was seen as an evolutionary step to the 
ultimate goal of a free market. However, critics argued, that electricity as a 
`commodity' would always need some form of intervention, since it could not be 
stored and demand and supply had to be balanced constantly. Furthermore, as 
noted above, the Pool also guaranteed a high degree of transparency and liquidity 
which maintained a form of competitive pressure (Newbery 1995). 
As Helm notes (2003: 308): "That there might be different kinds of 
competition, or that electricity generation might have a natural tendency to 
oligopoly appear not to have been seriously entertained... The lack of attention to 
the meaning of competition and competitive markets was to be a blind spot for 
both Offer (and Ofgem) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the 
commitment to NETA. " 
In this context, Newbery and McDaniel argue that "By the time NETA 
was introduced [... ] the wholesale market was arguably one of the least 
[horizontally] concentrated in the world... The [Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI)19] concentration of fossil plant (i. e. excluding nuclear) fell below 1800 in 
July 1999 and below 1300 in April 2000 - before NETA" (Newbery & McDaniel 
2003: 203). Yet, switching to NETA at a time when the industry progressed 
19 The HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring 
the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. 
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are considered to be moderately 
concentrated, and those in which the HHI 
is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be 
concentrated 
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increasingly towards vertical integration, allowed the bigger players to exploit the 
links between their generation and distribution and retail assets while leaving 
market participants without such links increasingly vulnerable to the exertion of 
market power. Already in 1998, Newbery predicted that the increased risks of 
trading under NETA with penal imbalance charges would encourage vertical 
integration between generation and supply or retailing. This in turn meant that a 
vertically integrated industry with risky imbalance penalties would if anything be 
harder for new entrants to enter (Newbery 1998). 
Helm summarizes this argument in two questions: "Would not the 
liberalization of contract forms suit the vertical players, so that different contracts 
could be set between own-generation and own-supply, from those offered to rival 
suppliers? Would not the big players also benefit from the lack of liquidity in the 
market place, which would result from a lack of transparency? [... ] Though Offer 
and Ofgem thought that the Pool created the scope for gaming, to the main players 
the problem with the Pool was that its very transparency kept them in the 
regulator's spotlight and limited their scope to exploit vertical integration - hence, 
the numerous Pool price inquiries, plant divestments, threats of a MMC reference 
and the price cap. " (Helm 2003: 311-312) 
In summary, within a few years of NETA being in operation, the 
electricity industry had consolidated into the above listed vertically integrated 
companies, and several generation-only companies, of which British Energy 
stands out. While British Energy is the UK's largest electricity generator, when it 
eventually went bankrupt it was bailed out by the government. 
20 Helm (2003: 240) 
20 It appears that the government is determined to keep British Energy afloat, no matter what the 
economic circumstances. This fact was highlighted in the parliamentary discussions around the 
government bail-out. In a statement to parliament on 28/11/02, Patricia Hewitt, the then 
Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry, argued: "I offered that loan because 
it was the best way of 
securing the safety of the nuclear power stations [... ]" and 
further: "Let me stress, Mr Speaker, 
that if British Energy were to go into administration all its nuclear liabilities would 
fall to 
Government. We cannot just walk away from them; no responsible government would. This is the 
reason why the situation with British Energy 
is different from any other generator. " This is echoed 
by a subsequent argument in the House of Commons 
by the Energy Minister Brian Wilson on 
06/02/03. In response to a question, which asked why the government would not 
"rush to the 
House to ask for authority to buy [... ] shares [... ] when other companies go 
into administration", 
he stated: "Because nuclear is different... 
Other companies, even other power companies, can go 
to the wall. Though it is sad when jobs are lost, one can turn the 
key and walk away if nobody 
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summarises this situation succinctly: "The vision of a disaggregated market with 
many generators and many suppliers competing in a standardized transparent 
pool, with a supporting futures market absorbing the risk of long-term contracts, 
had gone. Politicians and regulators simply let it happen. " 
4.3.2. UK Renewable Energy Policy Overview 
The first specific policy instrument to support renewable energy in the UK 
was the non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO) introduced in 1990. The introduction of 
the NFFO occurred on the back of the UK support-system for nuclear power. In 
the context of the privatization programme of the industry, it was already noted 
that the government was unable to sell off its nuclear power assets initially. 
Consequently, a `fossil-fuel levy' (FFL) was instituted which supported the 
continuous operation of the UK's nuclear power stations. In 1990, a share of the 
proceeds from the FFL was earmarked for contracts to support renewable energy 
projects. Consequently, the NFFO "developed out of the need to find a means of 
supporting nuclear power, once it was realized that the nuclear portion of the 
electricity supply industry could not be privatized in 1989 (Mitchell 1995)". 
The NFFO provided an auction mechanism, in which projects could win 
long-term contracts if they were the lowest-cost bidder. There were a total of five 
auctions between 1990 and 1998 with increasing volumes, see Table 9 (Mitchell 
2000; DTI 2005b). 
buys them, and that is the end of the story. In nuclear power generation that 
is the one thing that 
cannot be done. There must be an owner. " 
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Table 9: Wind energy under the NFFO in the UK. Source: DTI 2005b, Mitchell 2000 
Year 
Number 
of 
projects 
Awarded 
MW 
Actually 
completed 
projects 
Actually 
Completed 
MW 
NFFOI 1990 9 12.21 5 8.13 
NFFO2 1991 49 84.43 23 52.45 
NFFO3 1994 55 165.61 26 59.75 
NFFO4 1997 65 340.67 11 33.55 
NFFO5 1998 69 368.83 9 7.45 
Total n/a 1 
247 971.75 74 161.33 ýý7 
Many projects that were successful in the bidding stage never progressed 
to construction and were never completed, as can be seen in Table 9. There is a 
significant discrepancy between the amount of MW awarded in contracts and the 
amount of MW actually built, with only 17% of the projects awarded actually 
completed. The structure of the NFFO meant that bid applications had to be 
comprehensive with regard to site measurements, technology selection and 
financial structure, while at the same time final planning applications were only 
submitted to local councils after the successful outcome of each round. Thus, a 
substantial risk element had to be included. Yet, competition drove prices down to 
levels where projects became sensitive to small changes in the underlying 
calculations hence turning out uneconomic at a later development stage. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that some companies entered the competition 
with over-optimistic bids in order to lower the price range of the awarded 
contracts and thus squeeze out smaller competitors (Mitchell 1995, Mitchell 
2000). Table 10 below shows the substantial downward trend of the average price 
of the awarded wind contracts. 
Table 10: Average price for wind energy contracts under the NFFO auctions 1990-1998 
(Source: Mitchell and Connor 2004) 
NFFO-1 I Op/kWh 
NFFO-2 l lp/kWh 
NFFO-3 4.43-5.29p/kWh 
NFFO-4 3.56-4.57p/kWh 
NFFO-5 2.88-4.18p/kWh 
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In the absence of regular NFFO rounds, small wind developers were 
unable to plan their business in a continuous way. Only companies with sufficient 
equity were able to sustain long planning cycles and cope with the uncertainty 
over future business opportunities. Furthermore, in many instances smaller scale 
companies were unable to obtain project finance from third-party sources, due to 
the inherent risk in the NFFO mechanisms. Hence, even where projects were 
originally proposed by independent developers, they were subsequently bought up 
by the utility companies due to lack of resources or inability to secure financial 
backing from third parties (Mitchell 1995). Consequently, a clear trend towards 
large companies that were able to finance projects with their own equity was 
visible among the successful bids. This in turn set in motion a consolidation of the 
industry, reinforcing the trend towards large development companies (Mitchell 
2000). 
The reliance on large companies that were `remote' from the local 
developments, contributed to the high failure rate of UK wind energy projects 
(Toke 2002). Toke argues, that despite widespread support for wind power in the 
UK in general, local objections to wind power developments often hinder their 
progress, as a classical `not-in-my-backyard' (NIMBY) problem. 
The last round of NFFO auctions was held in 1998, after which the 
incoming Labour-government announced a policy review for renewable energy 
technologies. Hence in April 2002, a new scheme, the Renewables Obligation 
(RO) was introduced. The policy put an obligation on electricity supply 
companies to supply a certain percentage of electricity from renewable energy 
sources, with the percentage rising annually to ensure continuous development 
(Mitchell & Connor 2004). Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) had to be 
obtained through own-production or procurement on the market in order to cover 
each year's obligation. 
While ROCs are `technology-blind' in principle, i. e. there are no bands for 
specific technologies, in practice only those technologies that 
fall within the price- 
range offered by the ROCs are deployed. 
These are those nearest to the market in 
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terms of R&D, which has meant that most of the deployment taken place so far 
have been wind farms (Mitchell & Connor 2004). 
Certificates were awarded for every kiloWatt-hour (kWh) of electricity 
from eligible sources to the operator of that plant. While selling electricity on the 
normal electricity market, a supplementary income was consequently earned by 
selling the according number of certificates on a separate certificates market. 
Supply companies that were unable to meet their obligation had to pay a `buy-out' 
price for the shortfall, which was initially set at 3p per kWh, but linked to the 
Retail Price Index, tracking inflation. The amount collected in a `buy-out fund' 
was recycled to those companies that had covered their obligation with 
certificates. Thus, while 3p/kWh represented the nominal price cap for an 
individual certificate, the actual value was higher due to the additional money 
flow from the buy-out fund. An additional source of income were exemption 
certificates for the Climate Change levy. Mitchell and Connor (2004) estimated 
that the total value of these separate income streams amounted to 6-7p/kWh in 
2003, rising to 8.48p/kWh in 2006 at the latest auction for wind energy of the 
non-fossil fuel purchasing authority (NFPA 2006). 
The initial long-term obligation target was set at 10.4% of annual 
electricity production in 2010, rising in small increments from about 3% in 2003. 
As long as renewables development lagged behind the annual target, prices for 
ROCs were at their maximum price plus the expected value of the buy-out fund. If 
supply of ROCs exceeds demand, i. e. if the obligation target is exceeded, the 
value of the buy-out fund becomes zero and ROC prices are subject to downward 
competitive pressure. Hence, as developments reach the mandated target, there is 
a tendency to undershoot as the value of the ROCs decrease with the expectations 
of target fulfilment. Reacting to industry demand, the government consequently 
raised the ROCs goal to 15.4% in 2015 with an `aspiration' for 20% in 2020. 
The ROC measure continued to favour large development companies that 
were able to finance projects off their own balance sheets. Since ROC revenues 
were subject to fluctuations and there was uncertainty over government policy 
beyond 2010, banks were unwilling to offer project finance for new developments 
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(Mitchell et al., 2004). This prevented companies without significant financial 
backing from entering the market and left most of the development with 
established large-scale companies. Furthermore, separating trades in physical 
electricity and ROCs present significant transaction costs to new market entrants. 
In the absence of `consolidators' for such services, the ROC mechanism 
consequently favoured vertically integrated companies that were able to trade 
these commodities `in-house' among their subsidiaries (Mitchell et al., 2004; 
Toke, 2002). 
undertaken by the large vertically integrated utility companies, and several smaller 
independent developers that are able to obtain power purchasing agreements 
(Toke 2002). Current total installed wind capacity in the UK is 1353 MW. The 
evolution of wind power development in the UK is given in Figure 16, while the 
ownership distribution is given in Table 11 below (BWEA 2006). 
Today, the majority of wind power development in the UK is being 
Evolution of installed wind capacity in the UK 
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Figure 16: Evolution of wind power in the UK (Bwea, 2005; IEA, 2006) 
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Table 11: Installed capacity of wind farms owned by major UK utilities in 2005 (Sources: 
Company Annual Reports and Corporate Websites; BWEA 2006) 
Company Installed 
capacity 
Percentage of 
total installed 
capacity 
CentricalBritish Gas 62 MW 4.5% 
EDF Energy 4 MW 0.3% 
E. ON UK 195 MW 14.4% 
RWE npower 391 MW 28.9% 
Scottish Power 288 MW 21.3% 
SSE 162 MW 12% 
Total utilities: 1102MW 81.4% 
Other: 251 MW 18.6% 
Total UK: 1353 MW 
100% 
4.3.3. UK Utilities' Strategies 
Given this background, the incumbent utility company strategies are now 
presented. Figure 17 below provides an overview of the current fuel mix of the 
utilities discussed in this chapter, while Table 12 gives an overview of some key 
financial statistics of these companies. As can be seen from these figures, wind 
power still plays a marginal role in the fuel mix of the utilities studied. 
Most 
companies have announced specific renewable energy investment plans 
for the 
coming years. These plans with funds for three to five year periods often equal 
about the amount of total capital expenditure of the 
firms in the previous year. 
This is on the back of good financial health among all firms with operating results 
ranging from £345m to £1,44bn in 2006. 
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UK utilities fuel mix in electricity generation 2005 
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Figure 17: Fuel mix of UK utilities' electricity generation capacity in 2005. Source: company 
reports and websites 
Table 12: Overview of key financial statistics of UK electric utility companies; Source: 
company reports and websites 
l Capital Investment 
Capitalisation Ebit22 (full Expenditure Programme for 
21 (year-end 2006) year 
2006) (full year Renewables (latest 
2006) available) 
1000MW of ROC- 
Centrica £ 12.98bn 44bn £1 £537m qualifying capacity , until 2010; £750m 
investment 
EDF Energy 
£6.89bn £654m £674m 
n/a (¬10.23bn) (¬941 m) (¬972m) 
£406m (¬600m) in 
£7.25bn £828m £581m ROC-qualifying 
E. ON UK (¬10.76bn) (¬1,229m) (¬863m) capacity for the 
period 2007-2009 
£345m £274m 
¬700m (£460m) 
RWE npower £4.84bn (¬7.2bn) (¬512m) (¬407m) across 
Europe 
2007-2011 
1000 MW of 
Scottish £10.58bn £805m £940m ROC-qualifying 
Power capacity by 2010 
21 In the case of EDF Energy, E. ON UK and RWE npower these are estimates based on the 
`Enterprise Value" of the firm, which attempts to value each element of the firm on a discounted 
cash-flow basis ("sum-of-the parts analysis"); 
based on `Credit Suisse' research reports, year-end 
2006 
22 Ebit = Earnings before interest, interest payments and taxes; also termed `operating result' 
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The corporate strategies with regard to wind power will now be presented 
following the analytical framework outlined in section 3.2.3. This focuses on the 
decision-making process for developing new technological capabilities, and the 
approach to corporate political activity. The summary section will consequently 
broaden the perspective and examine the interaction between corporate strategy 
among the utility companies and the wider systemic developments outlined in the 
two previous sections above. 
The corporate strategies of UK utilities can be divided into two distinct 
phases, following the two renewables policy instruments described in section 
4.3.2 above. Firstly, from 1990 to 1998, the NFFO provided the framework in 
which investment decisions were taken. Consequently, starting with the 
announcement in 2000 of a policy change by the government, the Renewables 
Obligation (RO) was the main point of reference for corporate strategy in this area 
and, as will be outlined, the companies adjusted their approach accordingly. 
The NFFO Years 
During the period of NFFO tenders, three UK utilities were bidders in 
every round - `Powergen Renewables' (today part of E. ON UK), `National Wind 
Power' (NWP today part of RWE npower) and `Scottish Power'. The other 
utilities either did not exist in their present form or, in the case of Centrica, had 
not entered the electricity market yet. 
Among those utilities that were involved in the NFFO rounds, significant 
company-internal obstacles had to be overcome. Here, especially the difficulty to 
align existing capabilities, new capability developments and company strategy 
were visible. In reference to these early projects, managers at the 
involved 
companies declared: 
"There was serious opposition. We should not be doing this, we should put our money 
into 'real 'power stations[ ... 
] The dash for gas was getting under way, so there was a real view of 
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"why waste your money on a plant that has dubious merits, when we can build these magnificent 
stations that deliver firm power with cheap gas" and so on [... ] There was a great battle in the 
boardroom as to whether we should build any [NFFO projects] " 
"There was almost a moral attitude, that we got a subsidised prize through the NFFO 
and therefore we should not be doing this, this was immoral! And there were arguments, I 
understand, at board level about that. " 
. 
"It was very much project-by-project at the early stages, convincing the board of each 
project [ ... 
]. " 
With regard to the NFFO market, the two main rationales for investment 
among the involved firms were stated as learning about this new technology and 
understanding the new markets. This came about mainly through searches among 
the companies to extend their existing capabilities following the liberalization of 
the electricity market. 
In the case of Scottish Power, the case for wind power in its domestic 
Scottish market was pushed from early on by the regional government. Together 
with the emerging NFFO regime, Scottish Power aimed to position itself to take 
advantage of this institutionally created opportunity. 
"In the early nineties, there was a study by the Scottish Office that charted at least 1500 
MW of wind capacity - and turbines were significantly smaller at the time. So we saw an 
opportunity to develop some niche generation that could extend our existing renewables portfolio 
away from pure hydro. If it would happen in Scotland anyway we wanted to be part of it. " 
Furthermore, the NFFO gave Scottish Power the opportunity to step 
outside its Scottish home market and build generation capacity in the newly 
liberalized English and Welsh markets. It bid in every NFFO round (and in 
separate rounds for Scotland specific contracts in so-called Scottish Renewables 
Orders), acquiring development capabilities and also becoming acquainted with a 
variety of turbine manufacturers. In addition to own 
development, Scottish Power 
held a number of joint-ventures with local developers, providing expertise at the 
development stage and subsequently purchasing successful projects. 
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Powergen Renewables origins stemmed from the strategic aim of 
differentiation in the market. Privatization and liberalization of the electricity 
market provided the initial spur to initiate search activities for new opportunities 
beyond the traditional domain of the utility's business. Hence. Powergen founded 
a small unit called `electricity enterprises' which evaluated a variety of new 
energy technologies as potential new investment targets. This eventually led to the 
foundation of `Powergen Renewables'. In this case, the jolt in the market 
environment (Sine & David 2003; Markard & Truffer 2006) provided the initial 
spur to assess strategic opportunities outside the established capabilities of the 
firm. 
However, the wind energy business did not grow beyond a niche business 
within Powergen. This was blamed on the policy design of the NFFO which was 
considered unreliable: 
"One of the great problems with the NFFO was that you never knew, if there would be 
another round of the NFFO... and if there was another round, if our projects would be selected 
[... ] there came the point when we were actually spending quite a lot of money now, and 
consequently the question - is it worth doing it? " 
In 1995, in the context of the policy uncertainty and Powergen's aim to 
acquire a stake in a major US utility, it decided to sell-off Powergen Renewables 
as it was considered a non-core asset which had to be disposed of to raise money. 
Hence, Powergen Renewables was sold into a joint-venture with an engineering 
group that had an interest in offshore wind developments. Yet, the new joint- 
venture actually allowed the company to focus its strategy solely on renewable 
energy projects and also provided the necessary resources for these projects. 
"[... ] that actually was the point, where the renewables efforts at 
Powergen took off... 
Because we were a separate company that had a remit, which was to 
build renewable plants, and 
it only had to satisfy its own board, that was where 
it took off The efforts to build windfarms went 
from strength to strength [... ]. " 
Finally, NWP was founded as a joint-venture wind development company 
between National Power (now RWE npower), which held a 50% stake, and the 
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`Wind Energy Group' (WEG), itself a joint-venture between British construction 
company `Taylor Woodrow' and the airplane and turbine manufacturer ' British 
Aerospace', which owned the other 50%. The WEG brought capabilities in the 
upstream end of wind turbine supply through its stakes in a blade and a turbine 
manufacturer, while British Aerospace contributed their expertise in aeronautics. 
However, after a strategic review, British Aerospace pulled out of the consortium 
in 1993, and Taylor Woodrow followed one year later, in order to concentrate on 
its core businesses of construction, housebuilding and commercial property and 
merchanting. " In both cases, a focus on core capabilities within the companies led 
to the abandonment of this niche business for the firms. 
Yet, by that time NWP had established itself as a small but profitable 
company, which was the UK market leader in wind power at the time. It 
continued to operate as a 100% subsidiary of National Power, having developed 
skills along the wind energy development value chain. NWP was active in the 
NFFO, bidding and winning projects in every round. In NFFO round three, 
awarded in 1994, it was owner or partner in half of all awarded wind energy 
contracts and the number of contracts was capped for NWP so as to allow other 
bidders a share of the round (Windpower Monthly 1995a; Windpower Monthly 
1995c). By 1998, with 132 MW of operational wind farms, it owned and operated 
over one third of all wind energy capacity in the UK. In the words of one manager 
today, 
"NWP has a relatively unique history in developing close-to market renewable 
technology projects, clearly leading the UK wind market [... J it was something 'useful to sustain' 
for National Power. " 
In summary, among all three companies mentioned above the primary 
motivation was learning about the new technology and market environment. None 
of the three companies had integrated wind energy into the core of its business. 
This was most visible at Powergen, which sold Powergen Renewables into a joint- 
venture so that it could focus on its "core business". However, also at 
Scottish 
Power and npower renewables, managers characterized their early wind power 
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investments as "learning investments" and about "understanding the market" 
Hence, typical statements included: 
"All I can say is that I am glad I was not around then. I understand the processes, the 
hoops that we had to jump through to get the first project approved were much bigger than you 
might anticipate [... ] it even comes down to how do you construct a contract when nobody has 
done it before? You have to dream up between you and the first developer the ground rules for 
how you deal with this kind of stuff. " 
"It was to learn about the technology and to find projects to make decent investments 
with decent returns. " 
The limited strategic integration of wind energy is also visible in the 
political lobbying of the three companies, or rather in the absence thereof. The 
NFFO itself was introduced on the back of a policy supporting the nuclear 
industry, which the government was unable to sell off at the time of the industry's 
privatization. The inclusion of renewable energy in this policy owed at least as 
much to the government's aim to comply with European Union rules over state 
aid as to the explicit desire to foster an emerging niche market (Mitchell 
1995; Suck 2002). As outlined above, a major drawback of the NFFO for the 
companies was the erratic nature of the announced auction rounds. For example, 
while NFFO-1 and NFFO-2 followed each other in 1990 and 1991, NFFO-3 was 
only awarded in December 1994. Furthermore, serious delays in the handling of 
the auctions were reported due to the relevant departments being overwhelmed by 
`waves' of bids after each announced NFFO round (Mitchell 1995). Yet, neither 
issue was the subject of any corporate political activity by the above-mentioned 
utility companies with a view to alleviating the situation. 
In response to the government's consultation paper on a follow-up policy 
to the NFFO "no clear consensus" emerged among the utility companies for a 
preference of certain policy instruments. (Windpower Monthly 1999b). 
Consequently, the Renewables Obligation (RO) owed its emergence almost 
entirely to the regulatory change in the UK wholesale electricity market with the 
changeover from the pool market to NETA (see section 4.3.1 above for details). In 
this context, the Utilities Act 2000 abandoned the obligation on RECs to source 
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electricity from non-fossil sources (nuclear and renewables). which made a 
change in policy necessary. Consequently, the RO was considered a logical 
extension to the emergence of a bilateral market for electricity and no alternative 
was seriously put forward among the utility companies (Helm 2003; Mitchell & 
Connor 2004). 
The Introduction of the Renewables Obligation 
Corporate strategy among all UK utilities was significantly overhauled 
with the introduction of the RO. Its announcement arrived at a time when the UK 
electricity industry consolidated by vertical integration, as discussed in section 
4.3.1. With the obligation of the RO falling on the electricity supply business, all 
vertically integrated companies were affected. Consequently, all utilities stated in 
the interviews that the RO was a main driver for their renewables investments. 
Typical responses included: 
"The driver (for investment into renewables] is clearly the obligation, that there is a need 
to do something about it. With the economics, if the RO wasn't there, then I doubt very much that 
we would be doing it [... ] So yes, the RO is the only driver. " 
"The RO gave a 'kick-start' to the renewables business and made it clear that 
governments had a long-term interest in these technologies. " 
"The stimulus at the time certainly was the expectation that the Renewables Obligation 
would come in. Renewables in the UK was seen as a core business. And that was because our 
supply business had the obligation to supply the ROCs. " 
"Fairly soon after the renewable obligation came in, there was a recognition that we 
needed to make a step-change in terms of our level of activity, so a 
few years ago, this gradually 
changed and a recognition of that is the fact that we are now an integrated 
business within [the 
company] ... effectively, renewables are part 
of that core business. " 
"Around the start of the decade was really when the strategic focus sharpened on 
renewables and wind in particular, 
because of the RO. [... ] It was really the driver behind 
stepping up the gear with renewables 
development. We knew in the year 2000 that something 
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major was coming, although we did not know exactly what. But we then took the decision to take a 
good look at the strategy, have a good look at the available resource and get things under way to 
position ourselves. " 
Consequently, besides the three companies mentioned above, EDF Energy 
and British Gas/Centrica started investing in wind power capabilities. However, 
two distinct approaches emerged between the established companies and the 
newcomers. 
EDF Energy bought the wind power portfolio of an independent wind 
company and commenced with the development one offshore wind farm. 
However, it considered not to have the technological capabilities in order to 
contribute to the industry. Instead, it was stated that 
"EDF Energy wants to retain some specialist knowledge to be able to steer projects from 
the top. However, the detailed carrying out of work will be left to specialist consultants. " 
Hence, the mismatch of existing capabilities at EDF Energy and the 
requirements for wind power developments meant that no new capabilities were 
developed in this field. EDF did not see itself as having the local development 
capability for creating a continuous pipeline of onshore wind projects. Instead, it 
focused on becoming involved at an operational stage, through power-purchasing 
agreements and equity shares in completed companies. Consequently, its two 
onshore windfarms were bought from AMEC, the specialist construction 
company, while its offshore projects are developed in joint-ventures with 
specialist developers. 
British Gas/Centrica initially decided to focus on buying ROCs on the 
open market. 
"We don't go around the countryside looking for new opportunities ourselves, [... ] ýt, e 
did not have the right skills in doing that, so we much prefer other people to 
do that sort of thing, 
do all the hard work and do all the development stuff, and when the project 
looks like it becomes 
serious and it will happen, then they will come to the market, and we can get 
involved[ ... 
]" 
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Yet, with the emergence of offshore wind farms as a viable commercial 
option, it consequently decided to enter this field with a total of six offshore wind 
projects now under development, the largest such portfolio among UK utilities. 
The main driver here was the perceived complementarity with its capabilities: 
"When the `Round 11' bidding came around, it was an opportunity to say, hang on, here 
is an opportunity for us, something that we can contribute to, we do have offshore skills, we are 
offshore elsewhere in our business, so we know what we are doing, we have got engineering skills, 
we have got people that can do this kind of stuff - this is an area where we can make a 
contribution. [... J So, that seemed like a sensible place to become involved. " 
Consequently, Centrica's approach to wind power capability developments 
focused exclusively on the offshore wind sector. 
Among the three established companies - RWE npower, Scottish Power 
and E. ON Renewables - capability development within the companies 
concentrated on the inner organizational context, and the integration of wind 
power in higher levels of the hierarchy. 
"Wind had moved from a level where it was 'useful to sustain' but not material to our 
business, to a level where it became core business. ". 
"The focus on renewables grew exponentially [with the introduction of the RO] ... with 
an increasingly higher level involvement of people within the company. 11 
Furthermore, the nature of the RO required other company departments to 
get involved in the development of the renewables business. This covered 
especially the trading of electricity and maintenance of the assets. In this way, 
renewables became more integrated into the mainstream company activities. This 
is reflected in statements discussing the areas of capability developments 
following the introduction of the RO: 
"[... J your board becomes more familiar with these sort of projects, your trading people 
become more familiar with the way the electricity is produced, the 
legal people become more 
comfortable in dealing with the contracts, you can think 
it right across the business. " 
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"So there is a separate renewables business, but my perception is that there is far greater 
integration between the renewables business and the generation guys who run the stations, or the 
energy management team that tries to capture the markets prices or forecast the output. " 
While the RO provided the major spur for increased activity in the wind 
power business, it also guided the utilities' long-term expectations with regard to 
the limits of the policy. 
"Within our organization we are striving to achieve our target but there is no incentive to 
go beyond that [... ] In fact, there is a big disincentive. " 
"We created the Renewables Obligation `compliance' function which optimizes our 
assets accordingly [... ] Managing renewables is all about managing our obligation, these are the 
terms of reference that we have. " 
Consequently, the UK incumbent utilities saw the technology potential 
limited by the government's policy limits. The forecasted growth in offshore wind 
farm developments is considered to fill a significant share of the total obligation, 
hence leaving only limited space for further onshore developments. Consequently, 
while organizationally integrated into the incumbents' businesses, wind power did 
not acquire a strategic role for the growth of the companies involved. 
4.3.4. Summary of co-evolutionary developments in 
the UK 
In summary, the incumbent utilities analysed in this section saw the 
development of new capabilities in the area of technology know-how and wind 
farm development to the extent that they operated more than 80% of UK wind 
farms by the year 2005. Yet in the context of the much higher total installation 
rates seen in Spain and Germany, it has to be asked why the UK lagged behind 
these two countries despite the involvement of the utility companies? 
In the context of the analytical framework developed for this thesis, it is 
attempted to answer this question by examining the 
interaction between company 
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strategies and systemic developments. On the institutional level, the renewable 
policy design of the initial NFFO auctions provided several hurdles for new. 
independent companies to enter the market, as outlined in section 4.3.2. 
Simultaneously, the wind power subsidiaries of the incumbent utility companies 
bid aggressively for the contracts available, thus driving down the price and 
capturing a significant share of the market. In NFFO-3, NWP's projects were 
capped at half of all available contracts to leave some room for other developers. 
The erratic nature of the NFFO rounds, coupled with the difficulty of 
independent developers to obtain project finance favoured larger companies that 
were able to sustain longer periods of uncertainty and finance projects off their 
own balance sheets. A lack of strategic outlook in the policy also meant that 
potential newcomers would have had to build a wind development business on the 
hope that the then-Department of Energy would provide continuous and possibly 
increased rounds of auctions for the indefinite future. This factor again favoured 
established, well-capitalised companies who could sustain a niche business in the 
wind sector without having to rely on it for its main funding. This is exemplified 
by NWP, which was sustained as a "useful" niche business without aiming to 
improve the policy environment in which it operated. Due to the low level of 
diversity in the UK wind industry, the incumbent utilities only faced a very 
limited competitive threat from the emergent technology to their established 
businesses. Furthermore, the small number of independent actors in the wind 
industry only provided a limited basis for alternative institutional engagement 
strategies. 
With the wind power development being non-core and non-strategic 
within the larger organizational structure of the incumbent utilities, the policy 
changeover from the NFFO to the RO was met largely by indifference. Issues 
such as vertical integration and the changes in market design from a pool-market 
to a bilateral-trading model dominated the agenda at the time. Consequently, the 
introduction of the RO was announced as a sub-section of the Utilities Act 2000 
that regulated the future of the industry. 
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Consequently, the RO cemented the status quo as it again presented 
substantial barriers to entry into the market for independent companies. Firstly, it 
introduced substantial market risks and policy uncertainty, which required 
adequate premiums that pushed up the cost of capital for independent developers 
(Mitchell & Connor 2004; European Commission 2005b). Furthermore, the RO 
introduced additional transaction costs for independent producers who had to set 
up trades for the physical electricity and the various associated certificates, while 
the just emerging integrated utility companies were able to do these 'in-house' 
with their established capabilities. Lastly, it again limited the possible growth in 
wind power through the small annual increments at which the target was increased 
and the long-term limit in the target beyond what was aspired to by the 
government. This limited the scope of any strategic business plan that was solely 
footed in the wind energy business. 
However, as the renewables obligation fell on the suppliers' business at a 
time when the utility companies were vertically integrating, all utilities were now 
affected by it and had to respond to the policy. Consequently, companies assessed 
the opportunities for complying with the regulatory requirements and developed 
different approaches. In fact, `compliance' was the explicit word used by two 
utilities when asked about their approach to the RO, since it did not provide a 
strategic window to develop beyond what was required by the policy framework. 
Since ROC trading matched well with the existing electricity trading 
functions developed among incumbent utilities, all incumbent utility companies 
used this opportunity to extend their trades into the renewable energy area. For 
those utilities that had not entered the wind industry before, this provided the 
primary approach at first. Consequently, the emerging offshore wind market 
provided companies with the opportunity to expand into a new market with no 
established leader. This approach was especially sought by Centrica, whose 
existing offshore knowledge from its natural gas business provided synergies with 
the requirements in the offshore wind area. Those utilities that had already 
developed wind power capabilities also sought to expand their business into the 
offshore area, while it was furthermore integrated closer into their organizational 
hierarchy. 
136 
In summary, the incumbent utilities' position in this niche market, coupled 
with the limited scope offered by the institutional environment to independent 
wind farm operators led to a small overall industry population and low level of 
overall technology diffusion in the UK compared to the other two countries. The 
absence of a significant industry base in the institutional engagement process 
around the introduction of the RO led to the introduction of renewables policy as 
an afterthought in the wider electricity market regulation debate. The co-evolution 
between organisations and institutions was one of `compliance' and 
`accommodation' in a policy framework that limited competition in the emerging 
industry and set small, incremental development targets. 
4.4. Germany 
4.4.1. German Electricity Market Overview 
Germany enjoyed a long tradition of regional monopolies in electricity 
generation, with nine large generation and transmission companies at the time of 
German reunification in 1990. Furthermore, the regional distribution and supply 
businesses were owned and operated by hundreds of small communally and 
regionally owned companies, so-called `Stadtwerke'. Hence, overall, the German 
industry structure was highly fragmented and with significant state control at that 
time. 
Germany opened its electricity market to competition with the Energy Act 
of 1998, transposing the 1996 EC electricity directive into national law. However, 
immediately after Germany's reunification in 1990, the market started to 
consolidate around the model of the vertical integrated utility. Four large utilities 
emerged, which are E. ON, RWE, Vattenfall Europe and EnBW. They were 
created through a series of mergers and takeovers, among the large generation and 
transmission companies, while many of the small distributors and retailers were 
acquired along the way. Hence, these four companies owned assets in generation, 
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transmission, distribution, and retail, although their different businesses had to be 
legally separated from 2005 onwards. In the process of this consolidation, state- 
ownership mostly vanished although several board members were still recruited 
from regional governments. 
Their evolving market shares in electricity generation and the associated 
Herfindahl -Hirschman Index (HHI)23, showing the level of market concentration, 
is given in Table 13. By the time consolidation had concluded in the year 2000, 
they operated together almost 90% of Germany's electricity generation capacity. 
Furthermore, on the supply side, only `Mello', which is owned by EnBW, 
managed to establish itself with a presence across all parts of Germany and a 
significant customer base of around one million (Brunekreeft & Twelemann 
2005). The main electricity trading platform in Germany is the `EEX' spot and 
futures market in Leipzig, formed in 2002 as the result of a merger of two regional 
electricity markets. Liquidity on the EEX remains modest, with less than 10% of 
average daily electricity consumption traded in the various markets, yet the EEX 
prices remain the reference for the German electricity market (Green et al. 2005). 
Table 13: Market Shares and HHI concentration in electricity generation in Germany 
(source: Brunekreeft and Twelemann 2005) 
Percentages of Output 
1994A 1994B 2000 
VEBA 
E ON 16.9 14 28 7 
VIAL . 11.2 8.3 . 
RWE 
RWE 31.4 28.4 37 3 
VEW 7.2 6.7 . 
EVS E BW 
4.9 4.3 8 6 
Badenwerk n 4.9 4.3 . 
HEW 3.6 3 
BEWAG Vattenfall 2.9 2.3 15 
VEAL - 11.8 
Other 17 17 10.4 
HHI 1807 1595 2622 
23 The HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring 
the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. 
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are considered to be moderately 
concentrated, and those in which the HHI is in excess of 1800 points are considered to be 
concentrated (Newbery 1995). 
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New entry into the generation market has also been scattered. This is in 
part due to significant excess capacity at the start of market liberalization. One 
explanation for the lack of new entrants is that electricity prices remained very 
low in the period 1998-2001 and have only increased in recent years. This 
lowered the potential profit margin for independent power producers and made 
entry into the market more difficult. Bower et al. in an agent-based simulation 
argue that the price-fall can also be explained with strategic behaviour on the side 
of the incumbent utilities (Bower, Bunn, & Wattendrup 2001). 
However, another problem cited by Brunekreeft and Twelemann (2005) 
was the merger between E. ON and Ruhrgas, a vertically integrated gas company 
which controls about 75% of Germany's gas imports and 60% of the gas supply 
network (Brunekreeft & Twelemann 2005). This merger was blocked by the cartel 
office in 2002 on the grounds that access to gas was increasingly seen as critical 
to competition in electricity generation. However, this vote was subsequently 
overturned by the Federal Economic Ministry and the merger went ahead. 
Since new CCGT plants were the most popular candidates for new 
entrants into the generation market, it was difficult to bypass E. ON-Ruhrgas in 
order to secure gas supply contracts. This was seen as a barrier to entry, as 
independent power plant operators would have to negotiate with the subsidiary of 
a direct competitor and potentially reveal sensitive information. Consequently, of 
the four known CCGT developments in Germany, two projects pursued by 
independent companies failed outright, one is 25% owned by E. ON and 50% 
by 
EnBW, and only one 800 MW CCGT plant is currently being 
developed by a 
consortium of large energy customers and regional retailers 
(Brunekreeft & 
Twelemann 2005). The strongest growth in independent new power generation 
has been in renewables, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Until summer 2005, there was also no regulator for the industry and third- 
party access (TPA) to the German grid was negotiated 
through a series of 
informal association agreements (Verbändevereinbarung) of all the main 
stakeholders in the industry. The 
German cartel office assumed a passive 
background role threatening ex post intervention 
if the outcome of the 
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negotiations was unacceptable in its eyes. This set-up led to a ratchet effect, 
whereby "every new Association Agreement had to be more competitive than the 
former one" (Glachant, Dubois, & Perez 2003: 10) in order to demonstrate 
progress towards the goals of electricity market liberalization and to satisfy the 
cartel office. However, negotiations eventually broke down and the German 
government installed a dedicated regulatory authority for the electricity grid. 
While grid ownership remained with the four (legally unbundled) companies 
named above, grid tariffs now had to be cleared by the regulatory authorities ex 
ante. In its first review of tariffs in 2006, it cut the applied-for tariffs by ¬2.5bn or 
an average of 13% (Bänder 2007), thus establishing itself as a significant force in 
the German electricity industry. 
Over the coming decade, the German electricity industry is facing a 
significant programme of new power plant constructions. Some 20GW of nuclear 
assets will be phased out as part of a government-industry agreement until 2023, 
and a further 20 GW will be shut due to the age of the assets. Consequently, up to 
40 GW of new capacity will have to be replaced until the year 2020 (RWE 2006). 
Fuel mix of German Electricity Production 2003- 
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Figure 18: Fuel Mix of German Electricity Production 2003 - 2006; Source: BMWi 2007 
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Yet, the German fuel mix has been very stable between 2003 and 2006 
with hard coal, lignite and nuclear power the dominating fuel choices, as shown in 
Figure 18 above (BMWi 2007). 
4.4.2. German Renewable Energy Policy Overview 
Between 1990 and 2000, total installed wind capacity increased from 56 
MW to slightly above 6,100 MW (Stenzel, Foxon, & Gross 2003; BMU 2007). 
There were two pillars underlying this market expansion: Firstly, a market 
introduction programme aimed to install 100 MW - subsequently raised to 250 
MW - of wind capacity through a mix of grants and a guaranteed payment for the 
electricity produced. Furthermore, in December 1990, a new law was passed that 
rewarded wind farm operators with a fixed price for every kWh produced. This 
incentive, enshrined in the new `Feed-In Law' (FIL) (Bundestag 1990), was 
initially set at 90% of the average household electricity tariff, which represented 
around 0.17 DM (around ¬0.09) at the time. It furthermore put a mandate on grid 
operators to connect all renewable energy installations to the nearest grid point 
and feed all electricity production into the grid (Reiche, 2005). 
The FIL excluded installations in which the Federal Republic of Germany, 
a federal state, a public electricity utility or one of its subsidiaries held shares of 
more than 25%. This affected many of the incumbent utilities that were still 
in 
state ownership. Yet, electric utility companies were allowed to 
benefit from the 
FIL if they invested in renewable energy installations outside their monopoly 
region (i. e. in competition to a neighbouring utility). Nevertheless, an annex to the 
law reiterated the point that public utilities were still allowed to recoup 
investments into renewables in their own regions through the regulated tariff 
base 
(Bundestag 1990). 
Investments into wind energy have been undertaken by many private 
individuals. A common scheme in Germany were closed mutual 
funds which 
offered small equity shares in specific wind 
farm projects. These funds also 
benefited from a special tax break offered for investments 
into renewable energy. 
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Another popular type of schemes has been cooperatives, often involving farmers 
that planned to install wind farms on their local fields. These raised money 
predominantly in the local community and with the aid of local savings banks. In 
general, the simple formula of the FIL allowed these new types of energy 
investors to enter the market for the first time without facing significant 
administrative barriers. Grid access was guaranteed and paid-for by electricity 
customers through general transmission charges, while the FIL effectively acted 
like a 20-year power purchasing agreement, offering a high certainty of income 
over the guaranteed period. Consequently, a multitude of new wind energy 
development companies entered the market. Consequently, the ownership 
structure of wind farms in Germany is widely diversified today and a large 
number of independent companies are operating in this sector. 
The FIL remained intact for ten years, even though it was repeatedly 
attacked by the German utility companies (as will be discussed in the next section 
4.4.3). With the change in government after the federal elections in 1998, the new 
Social Democratic-Green government proposed several additions to the FIL to 
include new types of renewable energy technologies and stabilise the policy 
framework. Specifically, it aimed to decouple the price paid to wind farm 
operators from the average household electricity tariff and instead provide a more 
stable and predictable income stream. 
Consequently, in 2000, the new government enhanced the FIL by 
providing fixed-price contracts over a 20-year period to new wind farms. 
Furthermore, to encourage innovation and cost-reductions, prices varied by 
technology and were decreasing annually by a fixed percentage to take account of 
technological improvements. Finally, it removed the geographical restrictions on 
utilities, thus allowing all energy companies to benefit from the tariffs in the same 
way, no matter where they invested. A 2004 extension to the FIL also updated the 
long-term target for renewables from previously 12.5% of electricity production 
by 2010 to 20% by 2020. It furthermore introduced a separate and higher feed-in 
tariff for offshore wind. The evolution of the fixed prices for wind energy 
is given 
in Table 14 below. 
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Table 14: Evolution of feed-in tariffs for wind in Germany 2000-2004 (Reiche 2005) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Onshore Wind 
(first five years) 
9' 1 91 8.96 8.82 8.7 
Onshore Wind 
(after five years) 6.19 6.19 6.1 6 5.5 
Offshore Wind As above As above As above As above 
(first twelve (first five (first five (first five (first five 9.1 
years) years) years) years) years) 
Offshore Wind As above As above As above As above 
(after twelve (after five (after five (after five (after five 6.19 
ears) years) years) years) years) 
In the course of the FIL, Germany developed a substantial home grown 
wind industry. In 2005, there were 64,000 people employed along the value chain 
and annual turnover of companies in the sector reached ¬7bn, 51 % of which was 
generated abroad (BWE 2006). In fact, Lauber and Jacobsson (2006) argue that 
the successful economic development of the sector was a key factor in building up 
a political lobby base, which was able to defend the FIL law against potential 
modifications. Again, the discussions around the FIL will be outlined in the next 
section 4.4.3. Overall, wind energy development in Germany since 1990 can be 
divided into three phases. A growth phase between 1990 and 1995 was followed 
by a period of stagnation and uncertainty between 1995 and 1998, while the post 
1998 phase has been again marked by strong growth. The annual and cumulative 
installed capacity of wind energy is shown in Figure 19 on the next page. German 
utilities only have a small share in this development. As can be seen from Table 
15 below, their combined ownership came to just 248MW in 2005, which 
represents a share of little more than I% of total installations. 
Table 15: Installed capacity and investment plans for wind energy by Germany's largest 
utility companies in 2005 (Sources: From interviews with senior managers of the companies) 
Company Installed capacity Target 
E. ON 224 MW 950 MW offshore projects 
RWE 22 MW n/a 
Vattenfall 2 MW n/a 
EnBW n/a n/a 
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Figure 19: Evolution of Installed Wind Capacity in Germany (IEA 2006; BMU 2007) 
4.4.3. German Utilities' Strategies 
In the following section, the German incumbent utilities' strategies are 
now presented. Figure 20 below provides an overview of the current fuel mix of 
the utilities discussed in this chapter, while Table 16 gives an overview of some of 
their key financial statistics. As can be seen from these figures, wind power hardly 
appears in the fuel mix of the utilities studied, while nuclear, lignite and hard coal 
dominate the incumbents' portfolio. However, there are specific renewable energy 
investment plans for the coming years especially focusing on offshore wind. The 
total likely expenditure for these projects is currently hard to assess but are likely 
to fit within existing capital expenditure budgets on conventional generation. All 
firms reported positive operating results ranging from ¬1.1 bn to ¬3.7bn in 2005. 
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Figure 20: Fuel mix of German utilities' electricity generation capacity in 2005. Source: 
company reports and websites 
Table 16: Overview of key financial statistics of German electric utility companies; Source: 
company reports and websites 
Market Capital Investment 
Capitalisation EBIT (full Expenditure Programme for 
(year-end year 2005) (full year Renewables 
2005)24 2005) (latest available) 
EnBW ¬11.5bn ¬1.2bn ¬547m Extension of 
hydro plant for 
¬277m (2007 - 
2011) 
E. ON ¬35.8bn ¬3.7bn ¬1.3bn 1,350MW of 
German offshore 
wind projects 
2011-2014 
RWE ¬42.5bn ¬3.7bn ¬2bn ¬700m (£460m) 
across Europe 
2007-2011 
Vattenfall ¬8.7bn ¬I. lbn ¬515m 1,500MW of 
German offshore 
wind projects until 
2015 
24 In the case of E. ON and RWE, these are estimates based on the `Enterprise Value" of the firm, 
which attempts to value each element of the 
firm on a discounted cash-flow basis ("sum-of-the 
parts analysis"); based on `Credit Suisse' research reports, year-end 
2005 
Fuel Mix of German incumbent utilities in 2005 
8,390MW 25,623MW 32,615MW 13,327MW 
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EnBW E. ON RWE Vattenfall 
The early Days 1990-1994 
The initial approach to wind power among the incumbent utilities in 
Germany was marked by scepticism with regard to the viability of the technology 
and the fit with existing capabilities. Especially, the small scale of the turbines at 
the time relative to conventional plants meant that the German utilities did not see 
a viable business model at first. Hence, early considerations focused on R&D 
efforts to scale up the technology. 
The largest and most well-known of these was the development of the so- 
called `Growian' turbine between 1980 and 1987, which posted total costs of 
87.2m DM (about ¬44.6m) for a single prototype turbine (Heymann 1995). The 
`Growian' was a 3,000 kW demonstration prototype with a two-blade horizontal 
axis design and was co-sponsored by German utilities RWE, HEW (today part of 
Vattenfall) and Schleswag (today part of E. ON). However, the project was an 
abject failure, running over the original budget by 33%, operating for only 420 
hours over a three-year period and breaking down several times along the way 
(Heymann 1995). 
Preussenelektra (today part of E. ON) established a wind subsidiary, 
`Preussenelektra Windkraft' (PW), in 1989. PW similarly became active in wind 
technology research, backing projects that aimed to develop large-scale wind 
turbines. This included two government-backed projects to develop two 1.2MW 
and 3MW rated wind turbines, the WKA 60 and Aeolus II respectively. However, 
both projects never moved beyond prototype status and ultimately failed due to 
inadequate design and costs (Windpower Monthly 1994b). 
This focus on large-scale turbine development was a dominant topic in the 
German utility industry, even though typical turbines were rated at between 100 
kW and 250 kW at the time (EWEA 2004). This was explained with the generally 
large size of the utilities' portfolio and the size of the traditional generation 
technology, with large power plants typically surpassing 1,000 MW in many 
instances. 
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In the interviews, managers stressed the limited outlook for wind power at 
the time and their own reservations with regard to the technology. 
"If you think back 10 years with the monopoly structures in Germany, and the public 
ownership structures, it was politically motivated to be seen as investing a bit into renewables. 
This wasn't really a commercial project. " 
"We only had an observer role in the development of wind energy... it was more a topic 
that was en vogue, which you had to deal with... when the turbines still had this small size and the 
total installed capacity in MW was small, this was something that did not really appear on our 
radar screen. " 
"We could have invested, but we did not believe in this technology. The costs at that time 
were too high [... ]. This led us to believe that with the availabilities of the wind parks that were 
known up to then, this technology will never become viable. " 
"[ 
... 
] these were mostly small turbines that were not really of interest for us. I think this 
only changed with the recognition that you can generate electricity with this technology on a 
larger scale, it still has to fit into the business model somewhere. We are not a company that can 
install small power plants dispersed over several thousand sites, this does not fit our business 
model, we are not set up for that kind of task. " 
Furthermore, RWE board member Günther Klätte was cited declaring we 
need `Growian' to demonstrate that this technology does not work" (Heymann 
1995: 371; own translation), while the head of development for Preussenelektra 
Windkraft was quoted in 1994 as "... not seeing broad market penetration of wind 
within the foreseeable future" (Windpower Monthly 1994: 41). 
This early experience of failed research attempts to upscale the 
technology, together with the perceived mismatch between their existing 
capabilities and the requirements of the new technology, led German utilities to 
not engage with the wind energy industry when it first emerged. None of the 
utilities at the time invested in wind development capabilities or 
in building 
relationships with turbine suppliers. Two 
further reasons were mentioned that 
contributed to this decision. 
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Firstly, in the wake of the reunification, the entire industry was in the 
process of reorganisation, which involved integrating former East-German 
companies, merging among each other to form larger electricity generation groups 
and acquiring distribution and supply businesses to integrate vertically. This 
process absorbed most management capacity meaning that in the absence of 
obvious technology breakthroughs there was no reason to build new technological 
capabilities from the utilities point of view (Richter 1998: Liedtke 2006). 
Secondly, the design of the FIL meant that utilities were only able to 
directly profit from it when they investing in wind farms outside their own 
monopoly area. As Germany had a long history of non-compete agreements 
among utilities (Liedtke 2006), this clause prevented utilities from entering this 
new technology field, as it would have wider competitive ramifications. 
In summary, when faced with the first wind energy market introduction 
programme in 1989/1990 and the FIL, German utility companies did not take 
advantage of the opportunities provided. Importantly, this meant that they did not 
invest in new capabilities to plan, build and operate new wind farms, leaving this 
field largely to new specialised entrants into the field. 
However, in these early years, there was also little recorded opposition to 
this new institutional market niche opened by the government. In fact, both laws 
were passed with an all-party consensus in parliament (Jacobsson & Lauber 
2006). In this context, Johnson and Jacobsson argue that "at the time of the feed- 
in law, neither the opponents nor the proponents of wind power could have 
imagined the scale of the diffusion that ensued" (Johnson & Jacobsson 2003). 
Furthermore, Jacobsson and Lauber (2006: 264) comment dryly that "a few 
hundred MW ... was 
hardly a serious matter, and in addition the big utilities were 
at that time absorbed in taking over the electricity sector of East Germany in the 
process of reunification. " Hence, wind energy was generally perceived as a small 
distraction from the bigger issues that faced the electricity industry at the time. 
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Uncertainty and rising Conflict between 1994 and 1999 
However, beyond anyone's `imagination' (Johnson & Jacobsson 2003), 
wind energy quickly emerged as a rapidly growing source of electricity 
generation. Total installed capacity in Germany soared from 56 MW in 1990 to 
over 600 MW in 1994 and was rising at a rate of at least 500 MW per year from 
there onwards (BMU 2007). This started to affect the German utilities' 
businesses. As grid operators, they were mandated by the FIL to give wind energy 
priority access to their system and buy all green electricity produced by 
independent wind farm operators. This would lead to situations in some regions 
where the utilities had to regulate their own power plants downward in order to 
accommodate wind energy produced, which directly affected their income. This 
created a negative perception of wind power among the utilities, as stated by the 
interviewed managers. 
"In Northern Germany you have the situation by now, that nuclear power plants are 
sometimes used as peaking plants, because the feed-in law gives priority to wind energy. So in 
certain situations we have to regulate down our nuclear plants! This is unbelievable! " 
"A large share of wind energy in total production will have an impact on the operation of' 
the conventional power station fleet. This includes that we, as a power producer, can offer more 
balancing services, which is the energy that is needed to smoothen the fluctuating contribution 
from wind energy sources... but as a power plant operator, also I will not be happy if I have to 
regulate my output up and down just at the moment when my plant is operating smoothly on full 
power. 
Furthermore, Germany's electricity consumption grew by just 6.5% 
between 1990 and 2002, or about 0.5% annually (IEA 2004a). Together, these two 
facts meant that the rapidly growing wind sector started to displace conventional 
generation in the German electricity mix. As the FIL set no upper limit on the 
development of renewables in terms of time or scope, independent wind farm 
developers were able to grow and gain market share as long as they were able to 
find sites that allowed production at below the price set by the law. 
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Yet, the earlier decision not to invest into wind power development 
capabilities meant that the incumbent utility companies were unable to profit from 
the boom at the time. Consequently, beginning in 1994, the main utility industry 
association (VDEW) started to argue vigorously for the abolishment of the FIL. 
Moreover, several forms of corporate political activity were initiated by the 
VDEW and its member companies to limit the institutional space given to 
renewable energy by the law. Consequently, the period 1994-1999 marked the 
second phase of wind development in Germany, which was characterized by 
various institutional skirmishes and uncertainty over future growth prospects. 
Total installed capacity grew fourfold between 1995 and 1999, after having 
expanded tenfold in the period 1990-1994 (BMU 2007). 
A legal opinion commissioned by the VDEW in 1994 argued that the FIL 
was unconstitutional and could thus be challenged in the German Constitutional 
Court. Consequently, the VDEW advised its member companies that all payments 
under the FIL should be regarded as merely provisional (Windpower Monthly 
1994a; Windpower Monthly 1995d). This had two immediate effects: Firstly, 
some utilities stopped payment of the FIL fixed price altogether, thus threatening 
the economic basis of existing wind farms. Secondly, banks became more hesitant 
in providing new finance for wind farms as future earning could no longer be 
calculated with certainty. However, ultimately a complaint was never submitted to 
the Constitutional Court and all financial disputes were resolved either through 
political and regulatory pressure or judicial decisions. 
Concomitantly to this legal avenue, Schleswag, a regional utility in the 
windy North of Germany, started to refuse connection for new wind farms due to 
alleged technical grid constraints. However, in response a successful court case 
was brought against Schleswag and established the principle that wind farms 
should be connected as long as they had installed the technical equipment to be 
switched off in case of system emergencies (Windpower Monthly 
1995e; Windpower Monthly 1997). 
Besides this activity in the legal and technical area, utilities also lobbied 
political parties directly to abolish some of the key features of the FIL. The 
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conservative-liberal government of the time was not unsympathetic to the views 
of the utilities' industry, and a bill before parliament in 1997 proposed a drastic 
reduction in the guaranteed prices under the FIL. However, the German renewable 
energy lobby had garnered significant cross-party political support by that time so 
that the main pillars of the FIL were kept intact. Thus, the proposed reduction in 
tariffs was voted out at the parliamentary committee stage and subsequently the 
FIL was institutionally even further embedded in the 1998 energy market 
regulation that transposed the EU electricity market directive 96/92/EC into 
national law (Johnson & Jacobsson 2003; Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). This 
prompted another court case, led by the Preussenelektra utility (today part of 
E. ON), the parent company of Schleswag, which ultimately ended up before the 
European Court of Justice in order to clarify the legality of the FIL under EU law. 
This was decided in favour of the FIL in 2001 (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). 
In summary, this period was dominated by corporate political activity by 
several German utilities and their industry lobby association. The head of policy 
for Preussenelektra (today part of E. ON), Wolf Hatje, commented at an industry 
trade fair on the feed-in law, saying that "we will do everything possible to stop 
it" (Windpower Monthly 1998). In this environment, the development of 
capabilities to build wind farms was not a strategic option for the utility 
companies. Hence, one manger commented on this period: 
"[ ... 
] the early feed-in law was no disadvantage to the big utilities, but the main problem 
was that they argued so vigorously against it and then sued against it, so 
it would have looked odd 
if they themselves profited from it. " 
In consequence, wind power developed in an increasingly antagonistic 
climate, with small wind farm developers who profited 
from the FIL on one side 
and the large incumbent utilities, who were mandated to 
feed all electricity 
produced under the FIL into their grids, on the other side. 
Yet, this mandate to manage their grids with increasing contributions 
from 
wind power led the incumbent utilities to 
develop capabilities in the field of 
network integration of wind farms. 
In 1997, together with the German research 
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institute `ISET', a wind forecasting and integration tool was developed that was 
subsequently applied by the system operators to enable the larger scale network 
integration of wind farms in Germany (ISET 2007). Moreover, given the lack of a 
network regulator at the time, it appeared that the grid operators were able to 
exploit their monopolistic position in this field by charging higher grid fees for 
grid balancing services than strictly required. The fact that Germany had four 
different `balancing zones' - one operated by each of the four incumbent 
companies - each of which required their own stand-by capacity was long 
criticised by the German cartel office. In one report, it suspected that tariffs could 
be up to 80% higher than required than if Germany would operate only one 
unified balancing zone with according stand-by capacity requirements (IEA 
2005e). Finally, as the FIL operated separate from the electricity wholesale 
market, the integration of the trade of electricity from wind power remained 
outside the scope of these tools. 
Consolidation and Accommodation of Wind Power 1999 - today 
In this last time-period, corporate strategy of the German incumbent utility 
companies saw a significant change. Both on the level of developing new 
capabilities, as well as in the approach to institutional engagement, strategy began 
to increasingly accommodate wind power. 
By 1999, two factors had changed that gradually influenced this adaptation 
of the utilities' strategy. Firstly, wind technology had grown significantly, with 
the first 1-1.5 MW turbines appearing on the horizon. Offshore wind farms began 
to emerge as a serious possibility in the near future. This meant that `utility-scale' 
wind farms of comparable size to conventional power plants became conceivable. 
Secondly, the election victory of the social-democratic/green coalition 
transformed the institutional outlook for renewable energy. Having staked their 
credibility partly on this issue, these parties agreed that support for renewables 
would - if anything - be broadened and stabilised. 
This became manifest in a new 
renewable energy law, the Renewable Energy Act 2000, which stabilised and 
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extended the original FIL. It also removed the geographical restrictions on 
utilities, allowing all energy companies to benefit from the tariffs in the same 
way, no matter where they invested. This created a new boom in the w ind energy 
market, raising the total installed capacity from just under 3,000 MW in 1998 to 
almost 15,000 MW in 2003 
With this backdrop, German incumbent utility companies re-evaluated the 
option to invest in capabilities in the field of wind farm developments. Especially, 
the option of offshore wind developments finally led to the creation of new 
subsidiaries and the addition of relevant capabilities. This is reflected in the 
responses from the interviews: 
"There was a strategic decision within the company that we will only do offshore, which 
is easier to absorb into the grid anyway, because the wind blows more constant etc. So there is no 
onshore activity from our side and we would also not extend our portfolio in this direction. " 
"Our focus is on wind technologies because this is closest to economic viability, and 
within this focus, the main theme is offshore wind as this is what we can call "power stations "- 
which is what a utility company is mainly interested in. " 
Yet, in order to get involved in large-scale offshore wind projects, 
companies admitted to initially having to learn about the technology from scratch. 
This involved collaboration on a testfield in the North Sea to subject several new 
large-scale turbines to the offshore conditions and learn about developing such 
fields. Still, the utilities also started building and operating small-scale wind farms 
in the mean-time. Furthermore, one of the German incumbent utilities recruited its 
new head of wind power developments from an established independent wind 
farm developer. 
"We had to learn, these were learning projects to see how they work, how these plants 
are operated. And we believe that we have a good know-how in these areas by now to be ready to 
go offshore when the moment is right. To go offshore directly would be a big challenge, so this 
was at least partly a learning run. " 
"The development of contracts was a big issue. For example, our first contract with 
Vestas contained 6 pages, it was a standard contract. And they did not even have a solicitor with 
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whom we could have discussed, but we did add 20 pages of annexes. Today, we have 200 pages 
contracts, and this you have to go through with a manufacturer. " 
"Onshore, we have a few projects, but mostly against the background of getting to know 
the wind turbine manufacturers and to learn the rules of engagement. Also, there are few projects 
that satisfy all the requirements of a utility company. As there were few economically viable 
projects, there was only limited involvement and the strategic focus on onshore in Germany is 
really limitedd, the main emphasis is on offshore. 
"Our portfolio at the moment is looking primarily at offshore wind, and we are waiting 
for the outcomes from the testfield near Borkum at the moment. " 
The creation of wind farm development capabilities took several routes 
among the German utilities. Hence, E. ON, soon after being established in the year 
2000, started its `E. ON Energy Projects' subsidiary with a view to enter the 
emerging offshore wind market. In 2001/2002, E. ON Energy Projects quickly 
bought shares in three proposed offshore wind farm projects totalling 950 MW 
when completed, and proceeded with several small-scale onshore wind 
developments totalling 70 MW in 2005. Furthermore, one of E. ON's East German 
regional supply companies, E. ON E. DIS, started developing regional onshore 
wind projects in 2001, building up a portfolio of 154 MW by 2005. 
At RWE, its subsidiary `Harpen', which originally was a small company 
focused on the building and decentralised energy services sectors, entered the 
renewable energy fielding 1998, although mainly in other European countries. Its 
portfolio in Germany totalled just 22 MW in 2005. Yet, RWE consequently 
embarked on a strategic realignment that ultimately led to the integration of 
Harpen's renewables energy business into the main RWE Power division in 2006. 
It furthermore benefited from personnel exchanges with the RWE's UK division 
npower renewables in getting acquainted with wind farm development 
capabilities. 
Vattenfall created its `Vattenfall Europe Renewables' subsidiary in 2005 
with a strategic view to enter the emerging offshore wind market, 
having acquired 
one offshore site and also participating in the joint testfield 
in the North Sea. 
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EnBW is the only utility company covered in this study that decided not to 
enter the wind energy market in the timeframe considered. Two main reasons 
were cited for this decision. Firstly, in its core area in the South-West of 
Germany, the prevailing wind conditions are much weaker than in the windy 
North, thus giving much less scope for wind developments in its local market. 
Secondly, given the development of wind energy in Germany that had already 
taken place, EnBW felt that there were insufficient high-quality sites available and 
limited strategic scope to build a significant presence in the market. However, 
several other renewable energy options were investigated and implemented by 
EnBW at the time. 
Concomitantly, to this capability re-alignment, the corporate political 
activity strategy shifted away from outright opposition to the renewable energy 
support schemes. Given the institutionally stable outlook for renewables, 
arguments were no longer put forward against the support of wind power per se. 
Instead, the political lobbying was increasingly shifted towards the type of 
instrument used. In this respect, support grew among the incumbent utilities for 
the introduction of a European-wide quota system complemented by a green 
electricity certificate trading scheme instead of the feed-in tariff mechanism. 
Given that market liberalization required the introduction of electricity trading 
functions, tradable certificates could thus be integrated easily into established 
trading divisions, as could similarly be witnessed in the case of the CO2 emission 
markets, which started in 2005. 
"The FIL contains many elements that are inefficient. Why do small biogas plants get a 
higher tariff than large biogas plants? This leads to inefficiencies as it increases the average per 
kWh tariff and it should be removed from our perspective. So maybe, we can start with capping 
some of these over promotions. In a subsequent step, market mechanisms could 
be introduced and 
two years on from that a European certificate market could be envisaged. " 
"I presume that at some point in the future there will be a European-wide 
harmonisation 
of renewables schemes as well. And I could imagine it will not 
be a feed-in law. " 
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In conclusion, the German incumbent utilities belatedly started to develop 
wind power development capabilities, with the exception of EnBW. This came 
after the systemic environment for wind power matured both institutionally and 
technologically, providing new opportunities especially in the emerging offshore 
wind sector. Yet, in developing these capabilities, the companies had to go 
through several learning steps, in order to understand the technology and the 
market, before larger-scale investments were envisaged. Concomitantly to this 
capability development, institutional opposition to wind power, which had been 
fierce throughout most of the 1990s, weakened and shifted in focus to a critique of 
the FIL and the promotion of alternative policy tools such as a green energy 
certificate trading market. 
4.4.4. Summary of co-evolutionary developments in 
Germany 
The German incumbent utility companies underwent two distinct phases in 
their strategic approach to wind energy. Firstly, the decision not to develop 
technological capabilities to enter this new field was coupled with an increasingly 
vigorous effort to influence the institutional environment in order to limit the 
space given to this new technology. Only when this approach failed and various 
options for corporate political activity were exhausted, did the incumbent utility 
companies eventually enter the field, especially with a view towards the emerging 
offshore wind sector. 
The institutional environment for wind power was initially opened up with 
the introduction of the FIL in 1990. This provided a relatively stable investment 
environment with a long-term commitment horizon. It was furthermore backed-up 
by a special market introduction programme providing additional grants for new 
wind farms. The design of the FIL, which provided for a standard power 
purchasing contract between the grid operator and the wind farm operator, also 
created low entry barriers into the market, thus resulting in a host of new 
independent companies that started developing wind farms. A diverse and often 
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localised investor base furthermore meant that there was little opposition to the 
siting of new wind farms (Toke 2002; Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). 
However, German incumbent utility companies did not initially engage in 
the development of capabilities in this new area. There were two main reasons for 
this. Firstly, having conducted several R&D projects that failed to upscale wind 
turbines to larger outputs, they had concluded that this technology would not fit 
into their existing set of capabilities. Secondly, in order to profit from the FIL, 
incumbents were required o invest outside their core monopoly areas, at a time 
when the electricity market was not yet opened up to competition. This meant that 
the incumbent utilities could not profit from the expertise of their local and 
regional subsidiaries and would have to compete with other utilities in order to 
take advantage of the law. Consequently, giving up non-compete agreements to 
invest into an unproven niche technology did not appear on the utilities' agenda, 
and thus, the incumbents did not participate in the early boom in wind power in 
Germany. 
However, as operators of the German grid, the incumbent utilities were 
increasingly affected by the rising wind power installation rates. As the FIL 
mandated them to prioritise all electricity produced from new wind farms at the 
premium price, this affected the operation of the existing base of conventional 
power plants. 
Consequently, the German incumbent utilities increasingly aimed to 
undermine the institutional basis of the wind power boom by engaging in various 
forms of corporate political activity. Thus, through legal, technical and political 
avenues, it was attempted to halt the development of wind power in Germany. 
This sustained campaign between about 1994 and 1999 managed to slow the 
development of wind power in Germany and led to a levelling off of new 
installation rates. 
However, all of these institutional activities ultimately proved to be 
unsuccessful with various defeats in the courts, in parliament and through 
regulatory decisions. Furthermore, in 1998, a change in the federal government 
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meant that the institutional environment stabilised, as the new Social- 
Democratic/Green government had staked its credibility in part on an expansion 
of the use of renewable energy (Reiche 2005; Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). 
Yet, in this context, the potential to adapt the FIL to the German wholesale 
market in a similar fashion to the Spanish model (see section 4.5.2 below) was 
small, as neither utility- nor independent investors had an interest in such a 
solution. While utilities argued against any wind energy support scheme in 
principle, small-scale developers had not developed any market trading 
capabilities due to the sheltered nature of the FIL as a pure transfer payment. 
Hence, the arguments from either side became increasingly antagonistic and the 
opportunity for a middle ground to emerge vanished. 
At the same time, the unabated growth in wind power led to increasing 
maturity of the technology and increasingly larger levels of output per turbine. 
The first 1 MW machines were introduced to the market around 1999, while the 
first commercial offshore wind projects were developed in the North Sea (IEA 
2005c). 
Consequently, German incumbent utility companies re-evaluated their 
strategy towards wind power. Through the creation of renewable energy and wind 
power subsidiaries, three of the four utilities began to develop capabilities in the 
assessment and development of new wind farms. Although not an immediate 
investment opportunity, they declared specific interest in the emerging offshore 
wind field, as it provided the prospect of large-scale wind farms, with higher and 
more stable output patterns than could be expected on land. 
Nevertheless, even though the entry into the wind industry occurred at a 
late stage of the industry's development, initial steps of organizational and 
individual learning about this new technology were observed. None of the 
companies surveyed entered the offshore wind market 
directly, and in all the 
companies it was reported that early small-scale 
investments were made to learn 
about the process of building wind farms and to get to 
know equipment suppliers 
and understand the development of contracts and operational structures. 
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Concomitant to these capability developments, the institutional focus 
shifted from outright opposition to the FIL per se, to a stance that argued for a 
shift in policy towards a system of tradable green energy certificates, akin to the 
policy environment in the UK. Such a policy was seen not only as providing the 
best incentives to build renewable energy projects where the best resources could 
be found, but also as being best fitted to the existing trading capabilities and pan- 
European reach of the German incumbent utilities. 
Hence, in summary, the Germany wind industry today consists of a wide 
diversity of developers, owners and operators of wind farms, with the German 
incumbent utilities exhibiting a marginal presence of just above 1% of all 
operational wind farms in 2005. This situation is mirrored in co-evolutionary 
process between incumbent utilities' strategies and institutional development. 
Wind power policy provides for a sheltered niche market, separate from the 
wholesale electricity market in which the utilities operate. While wind farm 
operators are confined to the task of wind farm development and construction, 
utilities are tasked with feeding the produced electricity into the grid, with no 
market integration into the wholesale electricity market visible yet. The 
antagonistic development of wind energy and incumbents' strategy does not 
provide incentives for either the utilities or the wind developers to integrate wind 
power beyond the current arrangement. 
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4.5. Spain 
4.5.1. Spanish Electricity Market Overview 
Spain's electric industry privatization and market liberalization process 
happened over two distinct time periods, which saw the emergence of four 
privatized vertically integrated electric utility companies before the market was 
subsequently opened to competition in 1997. 
Up until the 1980s, the Spanish electricity system was run by a series of 
regional monopoly companies, most of which were state-owned, that owned 
assets in the electricity generation, transmission, distribution and retail sector. 
However, in the beginning of the 1980s, the government initiated a series of 
reorganisations of the industry in order to improve efficiency in the electricity 
sector and implement a form of cost-of-service regulation that provided a degree 
of competition between the companies, albeit this did not constitute a market 
opening yet (Arocena & Waddams Price 2002). 
The largest group to be formed was "Grupo Endesa", which was created 
by a series of mergers among state-owned utilities in 1983, and partially floated 
on the stock market as `Endesa' in 1988, with the state selling its final shares in 
1998. Endesa was the largest Spanish industrial conglomerate at the time of 
privatization, owning power plants, transmission lines, distribution and retail 
services and industrial and technical support services (Vitzthum 1992). 
Subsequently, `Iberdrola' was created through the merger of the two 
largest privately-owned utilities Hidroelectrica Espanola and Iberduero in 1992. 
The new company became Spain's second largest utility, exhibiting a similarly 
vertically-integrated structure with assets along the entire electricity value chain. 
Together, Endesa and Iberdrola controlled 80% of the Spanish electricity market 
in 1993 (Vitzthum 1993). 
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Besides these two large companies, two smaller actors emerged in the 
Spanish electric utility sector. Union Fenosa emerged as Spain's second largest 
privately-owned utility through the merger of `Union Electrica' and `Fuerzas 
Electricas del Noroeste' in 1982, built around their regional bases in Madrid in 
Galicia. Similarly, Hidrocantabrico was founded by the merger of several northern 
regional utilities based in the `Asturias' and `Cantabria' region. Union Fenosa had 
a market share of about 10% in 1993, while Hidrocantabrico held another 5%. 
Hence, 95% of the market was divided between four companies prior to market 
liberalization. 
The Spanish electricity market was liberalised on 1 January 1998 through 
the Spanish Electric Power Act (54/1997), which transposed the EU directive on 
internal electricity markets into Spanish legislation. This and subsequent 
legislation set out a schedule for subjecting increasing parts of the market to 
competition, starting with large energy consumers and opening up all areas for 
competition in 2003. The 1997 electric power act also instituted a new market 
operating company, `OMEL', to operate a pool market for all generators with 
plants above 50 MW rated capacity. The transmission system had already been 
unbundled from the rest of the industry in 1985 and was run by Red Electrica 
Espana (REE), a fully private company except for a remaining government share 
of 28.5%, which is expected to be floated soon (lEA 2005a). 
A specific feature of the Spanish electricity market is its continuous 
strong demand growth. Spanish electricity consumption per head is below the EU 
average and to some extent still catching up with the rest of the continent. The 
yearly growth rate averaged 5.3% over the past decade and total annual electricity 
consumption reached 239 TerraWatt-hours (TWh) in 2003, compared to 195 TWh 
in 2000 and 130 TWh in 1990 (IEA 2004a; IEA 2005a). Correspondingly, total 
installed capacity by utilities rose from 42.10 GW in 1990 to almost 65 GW in 
2003, and a further 5.3 GW of CCGT plants were expected to be added 
in 2005 
(IEA 2004a; IEA 2005a). 
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The most important technologies to cover the rising Spanish electricity 
demand in recent years were natural gas and wind energy. Figure 21 below 
outlines the evolution of the fuel mix in Spanish electricity production between 
2003 and 2006 (REE 2007). 
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Figure 21: Fuel mix of Spanish electricity production 2003-2006 (Source: REE 2007) 
A second particular aspect of the Spanish Market are the so-called 
Competition Transition Costs (CTCs), which are paid to the incumbent generators 
for a transition period. The argument behind CTCs was that the incumbents had 
invested in generation capacity before market liberalization commenced, and were 
thus saddled with `stranded costs' that they would be unable to recover once 
competition brought prices down. 
CTC payments are scheduled to be paid until 2010 and over that time 
period are worth up to ¬10.4bn. They are triggered when wholesale prices - or 
pool prices - fall below ¬36.1/MWh, an amount exogenously set 
by the regulatory 
authority as the expected entry level costs for new competitors. However, due to 
the incentive structure set by the CTC mechanism, prices have in fact converged 
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around that level. Each incumbent receives a fixed proportion of the total CTC 
payments, set according to market shares at the beginning of liberalization: 
Endesa's CTC share equals 51.2%, Iberdrola's 27.1%, Union Fenosa's is set at 
12.9% and Hidrocantäbrico's at 5.7%. However, the incentive structure of the 
CTC payments has led to some peculiar actions when an incumbent's market 
share differs from its CTC share. Crampes et al (2005: 134) describe the way that 
CTCs influence the bidding behaviour of the incumbents in the pool market: 
"... an increase in the pool price has a positive effect on the firm's profits 
that is proportional to its market share and a negative effect that is proportional to 
its CTC share. Thus, whether a firm is better off or worse off when the pool price 
increases depends on the difference between its market share and its CTC 
share. . . 
If this difference is positive, the firm stands at a net selling position and 
hence it is better off the higher pool prices are. On the contrary, if this difference 
is negative, an increase in pool prices reduces the firm's CTC revenues more than 
it increases its market revenues. Hence, firms face a conflict of interest as to the 
level of prices. " 
One impact of the CTCs was to suppress market prices when fossil fuel 
prices increased. Incumbents did not have to raise prices as much due to the 
additional income from CTC payments, which raised the barrier for new entrants 
into the market. In 2004, Endesa and Iberdrola still controlled about 80% of the 
generation and distribution assets, which is only slightly less than at the 
beginning 
of market liberalization. Abuse of market power remains a recurring 
issue in the 
Spanish electricity market. In July 2004, the Spanish Competition Court 
imposed 
the maximum possible fines on Endesa, Iberdrola and Uniön Fenosa 
for anti- 
competitive practices and abuse of dominant position. 
Furthermore, new 
investments have been announced strategically by the incumbents without them 
actually being carried out (Crampes et al. 2005). 
Also, interconnection with neighbouring countries is generally considered 
weak, with a 700 MW link to Portugal and several smaller 
links to France adding 
up to 1100 MW. Together these 
links represent just 4.2% of total installed 
capacity. Spain also exports electricity to 
Morocco through a unidirectional 355 
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MW sub-sea cable. The Portuguese and Spanish government undertook to create a 
single Iberian electricity market, Mibel, which started operation in 2006. Under 
this agreement, a single market operator would be created (The Spanish `Omel' 
and Portuguese `Omip' would merge into `Omi'), but the transmission system 
would still be managed by the two separate national companies. Still, there are 
plans for coordinating planning, expansion of network and the resolution of 
congestion between both companies (Crampes et al. 2005). 
The evolution of market shares in the Spanish generation and retail market 
are outlined in Figure 22 and Figure 23 below. Despite the introduction of 
competition in 1998, the market shares of the four largest firms fell only slightly 
in the intervening period, despite growing electricity demand. The European 
Commission in its `energy sector inquiry' investigated the HHI over the period 
2003-2005 in Spain, and found the average value at 2,790 with the maximum at 
3,259 and even the minimum at 2,318, thus pointing to a strongly concentrated 
market environment (European Commission 2007). 
The CTC payments are due to run out in 2010, thus removing one 
important barrier to new participants in the market. Furthermore, the recent 
acquisition of `Endesa' by Italian utility `Enel' and Spanish construction company 
`Acciona' led to a reorganisation of Endesa's assets and could well precipitate 
further mergers and takeovers. It has already allowed German utility `E. ON' to 
enter the Spanish market through the acquisition of some of Endesa's assets, 
while Portuguese utility `EDP' had already taken over `Hidrocantabrico' in 2005. 
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Figure 22: Shares of Spanish utility companies in electricity distribution and retail 2001-2004 
(Source: Crampes & Fabra 2005) 
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Figure 23: Shares of Spanish utility companies in electricity generation 2001-2004 (Source: 
Crampes & Fabra 2005) 
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4.5.2. Spanish Renewable Energy Policy Overview 
This section outlines the evolution of renewable energy policy in Spain 
since 1994. There are three phases to be distinguished: Firstly, a phase of slow 
introduction of renewable energy technologies following the first special policy in 
the 40/1994 electricity law. Subsequently, this law was reviewed and extended 
with the Royal Decree 2818/1998 and complemented in 1999 by a specific 
renewable energy development plan ('PFER'). This led to a sustained boom in 
wind energy installations, which was only limited by a lack of grid capacity in 
some regions. Finally, the law was reviewed and extended again through the 
Royal Decree 436/2004, which promoted a closer integration of wind energy into 
the general wholesale electricity market. Each of these milestones will be outlined 
below. 
Wind energy was supported with government grants and grid connection 
guarantees since the passing of the 82/1980 Energy Conservation Law (Dinica 
2006). However, wind power started to grow seriously in Spain in 1994 with the 
introduction of a feed-in law in Royal Decree 2366/1994, following the German 
example (Bechberger & Dinica 2005). This law had two essential features: It 
mandated REE, the Spanish grid operator, to connect all renewable energy plants 
to the electricity grid unless they threatened system security. It furthermore 
stipulated that utilities had to buy all electricity from renewable energy sources in 
five-year contracts with an implicit renewal guarantee at a fixed price, which was 
set by a Royal Decree. 
With these cornerstones, a protected institutional niche was created that 
allowed wind development to take place without being subjected to the liberalized 
electricity market. Consequently, installed wind capacity rose from 40 MW in 
1994 to about 850 MW in 1998 (lEA 2005a). 
However, Spain's subsequent boom in wind installations needs to be seen 
in the context of the 54/1997 Electricity Law and the 2818/1998 Royal Decree on 
Renewable Energy. Spain took the opportunity to combine a newly created `pool 
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market' framework with its support system for renewable energy technologies 
(The Royal Decree explicitly speaks of `developing' the 54/1997 law). 
In this regime, renewable energy producers were offered three different 
options to sell their electricity. Besides allowing to negotiate power-purchase 
agreements directly with suppliers, the government offered two types of feed-in 
tariffs: (i) Electricity could be sold directly to the nearest grid company for a fixed 
tariff paid for each kWh produced (as in the German system); or (ii) the electricity 
could be sold to the wholesale market with the producer receiving the market 
price plus a premium. Under both options all green electricity output was 
guaranteed to be taken up. The support levels for wind under the Royal Decree are 
given in Table 17 below: 
Table 17: Tariffs for wind energy under the Spanish Royal Decree 2818/1998 (Source: Dinica 
and Bechberger 2005) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Wind (fixed 
feed-in tariff 6.62 6.26 6.26 6.28 6.21 
in ¬c/kWh) 
Wind (top-up 
premium in 3.16 2.87 2.87 2.89 2.66 
¬c/kWh) 
Uptake of the option to sell directly into the pool market was very slow 
initially with most market participants choosing to use the fixed-price system. 
Yet, this regulation together with the government's target of 13,000 MW wind 
energy installations in 2010 created a real boom in installations. By the year 2002, 
Spain had just under 5,000 MW of wind capacity installed and consequently 
experienced some serious grid constraints which led to a subsequent slow down in 
installations. Refusal of connections by REE created a backlog of several 
thousand MW of projects awaiting a place in the electricity grid (Windpower 
Monthly 20030. 
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However, with Royal Decree 436/2004, REE dropped some of its 
objections to further connections of wind power after adapting the grid code to 
integrate wind energy with more sophisticated control technology. Consequently, 
the target for wind power was revised upwards to 20,000 MW by 2010. 
Concomitantly, the government revised the incentive structure of the feed-in 
tariffs to further integrate renewable energy into the Pool system. Hence, 
additional incentives were provided for companies that opted for the top-up 
premium and provided wind forecasts and certain ancillary services to the 
network operator (Bechberger & Dinica 2005). Consequently, the percentage of 
companies that sold electricity from wind power on the wholesale market rose 
from 20% in January 2005 to 90% by December 2005 (AEE 2006). 
In this way, wind was increasingly treated like conventional generation in 
the pool market system. It is planned that the fixed feed-in tariff is slowly phased 
out in favour of the market top-up premium. Also, for the first time, renewable 
energy operators are rewarded for providing certain grid support functions such as 
reactive power services or continuity of supply in case of voltage dips. 
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Figure 24: Evolution of Installed Wind Capacity in Spain (Source: AEE 2006) 
Total installed wind energy capacity in Spain is shown in Figure 24 above, 
while the distribution among the main utilities is given in Table 18 
below. While 
total installed capacity reached 10,000 MW in 2005, the incumbent utilities held a 
57% market share in this total. 
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Table 18: Market shares of Spanish utilities in the domestic wind energy market (Source: 
Company Reports and websites; AEE 2006) 
Company Installed Capacity 
in MW (end 2005) 
Installed Capacity in 
percent of total 
Iberdrola 3494MW 34.8% 
Endesa 1131 MW 11.3% 
EDP/Hidrocantabrico 738MW 7.4% 
ENEL/Union Fenosa 354.9MW 3.5% 
Total Utilities: 5717MW 57% 
Other developers 4310MW 43% 
Total 10027MW 100% 
4.5.3. Spanish Utilities' Strategies 
Given this background, the Spanish incumbent utilities' strategies are now 
presented. Figure 25 below provides an overview of the current fuel mix of the 
utilities discussed in this chapter, while 
Table 19 gives an overview of some of their key financial statistics. Wind 
power has a share larger than 10% at Iberdrola and EDP/Hidrocantabrico, while 
providing less than 5% at Endesa and Union Fenosa. Among the conventional 
generation technologies, the mix is fairly broad including coal, natural gas and 
hydro power and nuclear power among all four companies. However, given the 
specific renewable energy investment plans for the coming years among the 
incumbents, the share of wind power is forecasted to rise at all four companies. 
Total expenditure for these projects is above levels of current capital expenditure 
budgets and comes in an environment of high profitability among all firms, with 
EBIT ranging from ¬923m to ¬4.2bn in 2005. 
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Figure 25: Fuel mix of Spanish incumbent utilities in 2005 (Source: Company reports and 
websites) 
Table 19: Overview of key financial statistics of Spanish electric utility companies (Source: 
company reports and websites) 
Market EBIT Capital Renewables 
Capitalisation (year-end expenditure Investment 
(year-end 2005) in 2005 Programme (latest 
2005) available) 
EDP/Hidrocantabrico ¬9.5bn ¬l .1 
bn ¬932m ¬2.1 bn for years 
2006-2008 
Endesa ¬23.5bn E4.2bn ¬2.4bn ¬l. 9bn for years 
2005-2009 
Iberdrola ¬20.8bn E2.3bn ¬2bn ¬3.25bn for years 
2007-2009 
Union Fenosa ¬9.6bn ¬923m ¬1.1 bn ¬1.5-¬2.1 bn for 
years 2007-2011 
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The involvement of Spanish utility companies in the diffusion of wind 
power can be broadly divided into three phases. An early phase between 1990 and 
1997 involved dispersed and uncoordinated activity to install wind power on a 
small scale. Subsequently, between 1998 and 2002, interest in wind power surged 
dramatically and investments were scaled up and brought into the core activity of 
the firms. Finally, following the 436/2004 Royal Decree the industry consolidated 
and stabilised at a high level of activity. 
The early Days 1990 - 1997 
The early period of wind power investments was marked by attempts on 
the side of the utilities to learn about the technology and to satisfy the demands of 
the Spanish autonomous regions. The focus of development was on the regional 
level, working with the utilities' local distribution and retail branches and through 
their diversification division. 
Endesa, in its industrial diversification branch, owned a small pylon 
construction business, `Made SA', which started to move into the wind energy 
business in 1987 with several small-scale 150kW wind turbines. By 1995, it had 
developed a 500 kW prototype turbine. Supported with grants from the Spanish 
Institute for Energy Diversification and Saving (IDAE), it built several small wind 
farms in areas where Endesa owned the distribution grid, among others in 
Zaragoza in the Aragon region and on the Canary Islands (Windpower Monthly 
1990; Windpower Monthly 1995b). By the end of 1994, Endesa thus owned 
35MW of wind power, slightly less than half of the total installed capacity of 
77MW in Spain at that time (Windpower Monthly 1995b; Dinica 2006) 
Iberdrola's entry into the wind energy market started in 1994, when its 
subsidiary Energia Hidroelectrica de Navarra (EHN) - 37%-owned by Iberdrola at 
the time - announced a plan to 
install six wind farms in the North-Eastern Navarra 
region of Spain. The background to this proposal was the 
desire of the regional 
government, the other major backer of EHN, to reduce 
its dependence on 
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imported electricity from other regions. What made it significant for Iberdrola was 
not just the scale - the total capacity of the proposed wind parks would be 100 
MW, more than doubling Spain's total capacity at the time - but also the 
involvement of another Iberdrola subsidiary, Gamesa, which was originally 
focused on aeronautical and automobile components. However, it entered the 
Navarra deal through a licensing agreement with the Danish wind-turbine 
manufacturer Vestas, which granted it the exclusive right to construct its 500 kW 
turbine, one of the largest turbine available at the time, in a factory in Navarra. A 
final branch of Iberdrola that became part of the project was Iberinco, Iberdrola's 
engineering and services branch, which carried out installation and grid 
connection work for the EHN wind farms. 
Hidrocantabrico entered the market through its diversification arm `Sinae', 
which was originally an environmental services provider. Yet, in 1997 it 
established itself as a wind energy and cogeneration developer in the North- 
Western region of Spain, where Hidrocantabrico was originally based 
(Windpower Monthly 2000). Finally, Union Fenosa established its `Union Fenosa 
Energias Especiales SA' in its home region of Galicia in 1995. The spur here was 
the plan of the regional government to install 384MW of wind power in the region 
(Windpower Monthly 2001 a). 
Spanish utility managers stressed the importance of local involvement in 
these early wind energy projects and also the role of the autonomous regions: 
"Each company had their own renewables activity at a local level... You need to be very 
close to the local authorities, you need to speak the same language, you need to eat the same 
bread. " 
"... you can control the turbines centrally afterwards, but you contract your local people 
for all the project planning, for building the machines, you contract local people for 
maintenance. " 
"After the 1994 Royal Decree, many autonomous regions wanted their own wind energy 
plans. So we listened very carefully and made sure we would get a part of the pie. 
" 
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The role of the 17 Spanish autonomous regions becomes very visible when 
considering the regional differences of installed wind capacity. Five regions - 
Galicia, Navarra, Castilla y Leon, Castilla la Mancha and Aragon - were far 
advanced over the other parts of Spain and by the year 2003 held just under 85% 
of total Spanish wind power installations (AEE 2006). These regions had been the 
first to put out specific plans for wind power installations in their areas and 
consequently held tenders and allowed for fast permitting procedures on this 
basis. And each of these regions provided a home base for the Spanish utilities, 
with Endesa established in Aragon, Iberdrola in Navarra and Castilla la Mancha, 
Union Fenosa in Galicia and Hidrocantabrico in Castilla y Leon. 
The second factor for increased activity in wind power was the 2366/1994 
Royal Decree, which specified a feed-in tariff with a minimum contract guarantee 
and priority grid connection for all wind energy installations. The passing of the 
law spurred the emergence of a host of new wind development companies as well 
as the entry of several foreign firms in the Spanish market, which in turn 
increased dramatically the number of planned wind farms. Development activity 
surged to such an extent that within a year of the law being passed, an 
unprecedented 10,000MW of wind farms had applied for licensing (Windpower 
Monthly 1996). 
In this context, the incumbent utility companies initiated the development 
of key capabilities based on their regional expertise. Incumbents initiated wind 
development in those regions where they also owned the regional distribution 
network and had already established relationships with regional governments. 
Endesa and Iberdrola furthermore built on their wind turbine subsidiaries `Made 
SA' and `Gamesa' respectively to provide turbine supplies for their projects and 
additional technical and engineering knowledge. Consequently, a capability base 
was established along the entire wind supply chain from turbine manufacturing to 
wind farm operation, which provided the companies with an understanding of the 
requirements to develop wind farms in Spain, especially with regard to the 
importance of good relations with regional authorities and local knowledge about 
site selection and measurements for new wind 
farms. 
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Concomitantly to this capability development, institutional activity was 
confined to the lobbying of regional governments for favourable wind energy 
plans. While the 2366/1994 Royal Decree was heavily lobbied by the main 
renewable energy association `APPA', which represented all forms of renewable 
energy technologies, utility companies focused more on the regional governments. 
"If 1 do not invest in renewables in Spain, it is still a good business, so someone else will 
do the investment and take that part of the pie of the energy that should be mine. So where do I 
start most effectively? We know these people [in the regional governments], we meet with them 
regularly, we have had many, many discussions about all sorts of problems. " 
"There is nothing similar to the promotion of a wind farm. And it is not the same in 
Catalonia, Andalucia, Galicia, Portugal... So we started in [name of region] and grew our 
interest in line with the wishes of [name of region]. " 
"... what is really done in the local areas, is the contact, is the relationship building 
between the company and the local authorities. " 
"We are very active on the local level, we listen, we analyse and try to influence to get 
the best regulation for what we invest in. " 
Wind Energy grew rapidly from 77MW in 1994 to over 440MW at the end 
of 1997. All four incumbent utility companies had established their own wind 
development subsidiaries. Yet, simultaneously, a variety of independent 
companies emerged that aimed to exploit the favourable 
legislation and regional 
development plans. Together, this led to a diverse and very active 
industry, which 
is also illustrated by the entry of several foreign 
firms. For example, in Galicia, 
after the first wind energy plan was published 
in 1994, there were applications for 
a total of 880MW of wind farms, among them three 
foreign companies and four 
independent Spanish wind developers (Windpower Monthly 19950. 
The Take-Off of Iberdrota 1998 - 2002 
Albeit a growing business, wind development activities were still 
dispersed among the utility companies' hierarchy. 
At the four incumbent utility 
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companies, they were grouped either in general `Diversification' units, which 
operated non-core businesses for the companies, or in regional sub-groups that 
operated regional services. Hence, the stakes in the various wind farms were not 
yet centrally controlled, nor were the different operations consolidated at a higher 
level in the company. 
This started to change with the Royal Decree 2818/1998 and the 
subsequent announcement of the government target for 13GW of wind power by 
2010 in the 1999 renewable energy plan. Managers stressed the stability this 
brought to their business plans and the change in outlook on the market: 
"In 1998, the company was ready to take the challenge and the president was ready to 
foresee the increase in value that was possible through investment in clean technologies and was 
ready to lobby the regulators that this happened. " 
"There was a plan by the government - PFER - so the original objective for renewables 
was 13,000Mal of wind. With the associated feed-in tariff, with that regulatory framework, the 
wind sector started to grow a lot. It was very important to have a framework as such, even with 
some starting problems. The commitment of the government was very ambitious at the time. So 
people simply trusted in the government.., And the technology was really available. " 
"At that point financial institutions started to believe in wind. This meant that investors 
started to gain capacity to finance their investments, because the financial institutions started to 
feel that this renewables business wasn't that risky anymore. So the technology started to become 
more reliable and cheaper. " 
"... before, we had to pray for the board to say yes, and now, but from then on, when we 
sent a project to them, it was simply ticked off. So it was much more predictable. " 
Consequently in 1998, Endesa created its group `Endesa Cogeneracion y 
Renovables' (ECyR), which centralised its renewables and cogeneration activities 
in the Endesa headquarters in Madrid. Similarly, Hidrocantabrico transformed its 
environmental services business Sinae into a pure renewable energy developer 
and furthermore bought a smaller renewable energy developer, `Becosa', in the 
Andalucia region in Southern Spain in 2001. Union Fenosa continued to focus on 
its home region in Galicia while increasing its investment budgets. Nevertheless, 
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the starkest change in the strategy towards wind power can be found with 
Iberdrola. This will be explored in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Through its entry into the Navarra region, Iberdrola had been able to 
acquire capabilities along the full value chain of wind power development, 
including its subsidiaries `Gamesa' and `Iberinco'. Total installed capacity by 
Iberdrola and its subsidiaries stood at 364 MW in 1998 (Iberdrola 1999). 
Consequently, Iberdrola welcomed the Royal Decree 2818/1998 and subsequent 
government wind energy target of 13 GW and started to build a more focused 
strategy around it (Iberdrola I999; Iberdrola 2000). 
Like the other utility companies, Iberdrola started to consolidate its 
renewable energy interests in one dedicated unit. By 2001, renewables had moved 
away from the diversification unit into a `renewable energy' business unit, 
IbeRenova, which was set up at the corporate centre and subsequently 
consolidated the various renewable energy interests. 
However, more importantly, Iberdrola was able to replicate the original 
business model from the Navarra region across the rest of Spain. In doing this, it 
focused on building local development partnerships, establishing manufacturing 
and other engineering capabilities in the regions and involving its specialised 
Gamesa and Iberinco subsidiaries. 
Hence, in the province of Castilla la Mancha, it co-founded Energias 
Eolicas Europeas (EEE) together with EHN while Gamesa set up a blade factory 
there. In the Castile and Leon region it co-founded Biovent Energia together with 
the local industrial group Grupo Gasindur. In the Basque region, it owned 50% of 
Eolica de Euskadi, while in the Rioja region it held shares in three developers, 
36.25% in the DerRioja group, 25% in the Molinos de Cidacos company and 
68.75% in Eolicas de la Rioja. Furthermore, Gamesa, which went public in 1995, 
set up its own wind development company with activities in several Spanish 
regions and EHN expanded independently from Iberdrola with several joint- 
ventures. This activity was underpinned by a significant expansion of Iberdrola's 
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investment budget to ¬900m for the period 1999-2001, which was now centrally 
managed by IbeRenova (Windpower Monthly 1999a). 
Consequently, in January 2000, EHN announced the biggest ever order for 
wind turbines worldwide, placed with Gamesa, for 1400MW of capacity to be 
delivered over the coming three years. By the end of 2001, Iberdrola had already 
passed the mark of 1000 MW of wind installations. Following a strategic review 
at the corporate level, coinciding with the arrival of the new CEO Ignacio Sanchez 
Galan, a new strategic investment plan for the years 2002-2006 was passed with 
an even bigger focus on wind power. Its headline figures included the 
announcement of a ¬2.5bn investment budget for renewables, including about 
3,800 MW for new wind generation (Windpower Monthly 2001 b). 
Yet, Iberdrola's rapid expansion led to rifts with its key partners. 
Underlying this was Iberdrola's desire to integrate the renewable energy business 
in the corporate centre and to oversee the investment planning and setting of 
regional priorities for development. Firstly, in December 2001, E1 4N and 
Iberdrola failed in an agreement to pool their renewables activities under 
Iberdrola's roof, allegedly due to the reluctance of Navarra's regional 
government, EHN's other main shareholder, to give up control of what 
had 
become its most important regional company. This ultimately led to the 
withdrawal of Iberdrola from EHN at the end of 2002. The separation settlement 
divided the assets between both companies along geographic lines, with Iberdrola 
inheriting wind farms in Castilla La Mancha, Murcia, Brazil and Nicaragua 
(Windpower Monthly 2002a). 
Secondly, a rift occurred in July 2002 after Gamesa announced it would 
auction off almost 1000 MW worth of windfarms 
in operation and under 
development, despite Iberdrola's preference to keep them within the company. 
Still being its largest share-holder, Iberdrola consequently managed to strike a 
deal with Gamesa in purchasing all the windfarms on offer and agreeing 
to 
purchase a further 1,100 MW of wind turbines over the coming years at 
a 
discounted price. Both events together meant that by the end of 2002, 
Iberdrola 
owned 1,650 MW of wind generation 
(Windpower Monthly 2002b). 
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In the years 1999-2002, Iberdrola surged to become the utility with the 
largest wind portfolio in Spain. This was based on the capabilities already 
developed in the company and the emergence of an ever more favourable 
institutional environment for wind energy. Yet, the foundation of the dramatic 
increase in wind energy developments was the emergence of a targeted strategy 
around wind power which replicated its regional business model, first developed 
in Navarra, across Spain. Hence, Iberdrola simultaneously concentrated its wind 
energy strategy at the corporate centre, while simultaneously entering new 
markets through new regional joint-ventures, utilising Iberdrola's capabilities in 
the EHN, Gamesa, Iberinco and other regional subsidiaries. Consequently, the 
2002-2006 strategic plan was the most ambitious such plan announced by any 
utility in Europe at the time. 
Total installed capacity in Spain increased from 834 MW in 1998 to 4,891 
MW in 2002 (APPA 2007). The share of incumbent utility companies in this total 
installed capacity stood at just over 45%, while independent developers held the 
remaining 55% (Stenzel & Frenzel 2007). 
Consolidation, U-Turns and the increasing involvement of 
Spanish Utility Companies in the Wind Energy Sector 2003 - 
today 
By 2002, with the wind energy industry experiencing a major boom phase, 
the limited capacities of the Spanish electricity grid emerged as a key bottleneck. 
The Spanish grid operator, REE, had effectively capped potential wind energy 
installations at 13,000 MW for fear of serious risks to the stability of the 
electricity system. This lead to a backlog in the applications for grid connections, 
as several regions reached their capacity limits, and annual 
installations in 2003 
fell behind the 2002 level (Windpower Monthly 2003e; Windpower Monthly 
2004). 
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At the same time, adjustments to Spain's feed-in law were considered in 
parliament, which eventually led to Royal Decree 436/2204, described in section 
4.5.2 above. Discussions focused on three main changes to the existing regime: 
Firstly, there were proposed revisions of the feed-in tariff, both in terms of the 
level of support and the mechanism through which it was delivered, either as a 
top-up premium to the wholesale market electricity price or as an instrument 
entirely separate to the market. Secondly, with increasing amounts of wind energy 
on the system, REE pressed for a mandate on operators, to provide forecasts of 
wind farm output. In this way it was hoped that wind energy could be better 
integrated in to the electricity market as better forecasts would all a more efficient 
operation of the electricity grid. Thirdly, there were discussions about technical 
standards that wind farms had to fulfil in order to gain grid connection. It was 
proposed by REE that enhanced technological equipment of wind farms to master 
grid faults and contribute to grid stability would allow it to lift the 13,000MW cap 
on total wind energy installations . 
In the run-up to these policy changes and the tightening market conditions, 
the Spanish incumbent utilities founded a new wind energy business lobby group 
`Plataforma' - later renamed - `Asociacion Eolica Empresarial' (AEE) in 2003 
(Windpower Monthly 2003c). While the traditional renewable energy lobby 
group, APPA, mostly lobbied for wind energy on an environmental platform, 
encompassing all renewable energy technologies, AEE set out to work 
`pragmatically' and in partnership with government and REE to overcome the 
most pressing obstacles to a further expansion of wind power (Windpower 
Monthly 2003a). 
AEE's mode of operation was to set up working groups on the most 
important issues in the upcoming policy revisions. Consequently, in collaboration 
with REE, it initiated test trials for wind forecasting systems that would allow 
operators to better predict their output. At the time, penalties on imprecise or 
wrong forecasts were the main obstacle that prevented wind farm operators to 
participate in the wholesale market and receiving the top-up premium, instead 
preferring the fixed feed-in tariff. After success in the initial trials, the government 
set out to reward financially better wind forecasts and to further support systems 
179 
that would integrate REE's own forecasts with those of individual wind farm 
operators. Consequently, Royal Decree 436/2004 made wind production forecasts 
mandatory but penalties only applied for deviations of more than 20% from the 
original schedule. Furthermore, an additional premium was paid to operators that 
supplied certain information to REE. This allowed operators to enter the 
wholesale market and fine-tune their forecasting systems without risking 
significant penalties. 
A second working group, again involving AEE and REE, investigated the 
technical standard of wind turbines and their potential contribution to grid 
stability. The government had so far implemented a de-facto upper limit on wind 
power of 13,000 MW, based on technical advice by REE. However, AEE argued 
that this was seen as conservative and based on outdated wind turbine standards. 
Consequently, the working group developed technical norms and grid codes that 
would allow more wind power to be connected to the grid, which in turn would 
allow the government to lift its wind energy target. Consequently, under Royal 
Decree 436/2004, wind operators that traded in the pool market were now able to 
receive not only the top-up premium, but also a special market trading and 
security-of-supply incentive, related to the technical standard of a wind turbine. 
Furthermore, a new renewable energy target was set at 20,000 MW of wind power 
by 2010. 
Underlying these technical details was a fundamental debate about the 
mechanism of the feed-in tariff. Through its working groups and in its general 
lobbying approach, AEE strongly advocated a transition towards integrating wind 
energy into the wholesale market with a technology-related top-up premium and 
eventually abandoning the separate feed-in tariff (Windpower Monthly 2003b). In 
this respect, the outcome in the Royal Decree 436/2004 fully reflected AEE's 
objectives. Managers at incumbent utilities stressed the importance of these 
successes for their own business model: 
"I think the 2004 regulation the actual bend on the way. From that moment, things 
completely changed. Renewables were a trend 
beforehand, but a fact from that moment and it 
made every, actor change their mind. 
" 
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"It was a change for REE because they realised that this was something they had to deal 
with. Wind is a good idea but it only works when it is windy. You need a system that has back-ups 
so you don 't stop supplying electricity, Those things were all happening back in 2004 in a way that 
there was no way back. " 
"There were two approaches to controlling wind: It's a passive thing, you get a surplus 
when you produce, put in your pocket and you are done. Or you think that integrating wind is a 
main driver for the future, and you have to prepare all other things around, not just the cashing in, 
and you have to think that renewables and wind in particular is going to be one of the large 
technologies providing electricityfor the future. " 
"And a very important reason to change our strategy and become more aggressive was 
that in 2004, the Spanish government issued a new Royal Decree and that was an inflection point 
in the development in renewable energy. It was a feed-in tariff with two possibilities: Going to the 
market with a premium or a stable fixed-tariff But there was now this huge upside potential when 
going into the market and we made these investments to make it happen. We decided to be in 
renewables, we believed more in its long-term future, so we changed. " 
"Before the integration of wind, you needed to demonstrate that the investment in every 
project is a very, very good business, you needed to make a very good business plan and the 
returns had to be very, very high. Now, it is different. We are part of a very important utility in 
Spain, and it was clear that we needed to produce more wind, and 2004 showed that this was 
technically feasible... " 
While the 1998 Royal Decree created the environment in which wind 
power was able to grow initially, the 2004 Royal Decree started to integrate wind 
power into the wholesale market and shaped its technological path towards more 
advanced control technology. However, among the incumbent utility companies, 
different strategies emerged how to take advantage of this situation. While 
Iberdrola and EDP mirrored the institutional integration of wind power with 
developments inside their organizations, Endesa and Union Fenosa considered 
selling their renewable energy units, when debt reduction targets required the 
companies to sell non-core assets (Windpower Monthly 2003d). Both strategies 
will now be considered in turn. 
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By 2004, Iberdrola was two years into its 2002-2006 investment plan, with 
installed capacities already exceeding its targets. Consequently, the 2004 Royal 
Decree allowed it to scale-up its investment plans and deepen its capabilities in 
the renewable energy sector. 
The most visible example of this was the installation of a centralised 
renewable energies operations centre (CORE) in 2003/2004. CORE fulfilled two 
functions: Firstly, it provided weather forecasts and real-time output information 
for Iberdrola windfarms, thus aiding the market integration of renewable energy. 
Secondly, it allowed remote, real-time monitoring of every single wind turbine 
thus increasing the efficiency of operations and minimising maintenance costs. 
In the interviews, it was highlighted that CORE was central to Iberdrola's 
strategy of wind power expansion. Nevertheless, the impetus for CORE came 
with the shaping of the 2004 Royal Decree. 
"With the 2004 regulation taking shape, we spend a lot of money on two things: 
Prediction - if you don't know what is going to happen tomorrow you cannot deal in a liberalized 
market. So we did spend some money, some time and a lot of energy reducing forecasting 
deviations from 80 to 20%. Secondly, we said, when you have 3, or 10 or 100 machines, you can 
go to each one of them and see what happens to them. But when you have 4500 machines, you 
need to do something because you cannot have 4500 people sitting around to see what's going on. 
So we did spend a lot of money on a telecommunication system that is integrated in every machine, 
which allows us to tele-control every machine from a distance. [... J we now get about 350 
variables from each turbine - rotation speed, wind speeds, revolutions, pitch status, the gearbox, 
and we get all those from every machine to our centralised control system. " 
"... it is the only way that you can have large amounts of wind energy on the system. " 
"... we do it for the optimal exploitation of our assets. [... ] If we know today that we will 
have strong winds in the southwest of Spain tomorrow, where we have about 1,500 MW of wind 
installed, and we know that we have to do some repair work on a CCGT, we can programm those 
things to coincide. You don 't want to stop your CCGT on a day when the wind is 
f at, you stop it 
when you can use the wind. " 
With the introduction of CORE, Iberdrola was able to significantly scale- 
up its wind power investment programme, 
including an expansion into foreign 
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markets in Europe and South America. In 2004, it announced a new strategic plan 
for wind power, with a target of 5500MW by 2008, which was revised again to 
2007 with a new aim of 7,000MW in 2009 and ¬3.25bn of total investments. 
Hidrocantabrico, as the smallest of the four incumbent utilities in Spain, 
similarly held a small and regional position in the wind power market. However, 
with the 2004 Royal Decree taking shape, Hidrocantabrico significantly increased 
its presence in the wind power sector. Together with its Sinae and Becosa wind 
energy subsidiaries, it bought a stake in another independent wind developer from 
`Caja Madrid', the regional savings bank, in 2004, and grouped them in its 
corporate centre in the new renewable energy wind 'Genesa'. After being taken 
over by EDP, the Portuguese utility, it bought `DESA', another wind developer, 
for ¬700m and, together with EDP's own wind energy business, `Enernova', 
founded a new group `Neo Energia' that controlled all wind energy investments of 
the firm. In January 2007, it bought three further Spanish wind developers, 
Tarcan, Ceasa, and Agrupacion Eolica for ¬346 million. This was summarised by 
one manager: 
First, we decided to join together the companies, because it doesn't make sense in one 
company to have different groups with different strategies. So we integrated Enernova and 
Genesa, which became a big company in renewables in Iberia, and gave it the name Neo Energia. 
But then, the EDP board decision was to bet on renewables. 
The build up in development capacity was eventually reflected in Neo 
Energia's wind portfolio. While grid constraints in several of its active regions led 
to a backlog of connections between 2002 and 2004, it started to grow 
significantly from 359MW in 2004 to 1,181 MW in 2006 (EDP 2007). EDP's 
latest strategic investment programme in 2006 committed 47% of total group 
capital expenditure towards renewables and especially wind energy, with 2,800 
MW targeted for 2008 and ¬2. l bn committed. In 2005, EDP overtook Union 
Fenosa, and in 2006 Endesa, to become Spain's second largest utility investor in 
wind energy. 
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Both Iberdrola and EDP/Hidrocantabrico are now also expanding outside 
Spain, leveraging their capabilities in wind farm development. Indicative of this 
were recent deals between Iberdrola and Scottish Power, which involved 
acquiring the US wind developer PPM Energy, and the acquisition of US wind 
developer Horizon Energy by EDP. 
Endesa and Union Fenosa on the other hand, did not immediately integrate 
wind power into their strategy following the 2004 Royal Decree. On the contrary, 
in the period leading up to the new legislation, both companies put their 
renewable energy subsidiaries on sale. 
When Endesa announced ambitious debt reduction targets in 2003, a 50% 
stake in ECyR and also the wind turbine maker `Made' were put up for sale. At 
that time, it was seen as an opportunity to profit from the booming market 
environment for wind power to achieve a high price for this asset. Yet, by the end 
of 2003, and concomitantly to the negotiations over the revised Royal Decree 
436/2004, Endesa called off the sale of ECyR and declared it part of its `core' 
business. `Made's' wind turbine manufacturing business was still sold to 
`Gamesa', but its wind farm development unit was integrated into ECyR. 
Consequently, this was underlined with a new investment programme that aimed 
to increase its installed wind capacity to 3400MW in 2008, with ¬1.9bn 
earmarked. Furthermore, it opened its own remote monitoring and control centre 
for its wind farms in 2005 to aggregate its output across Spain and create and 
interface with its market trading unit. 
In hindsight, an ECyR manager commented: 
"Sometimes, what happens is that you have your structure, your experience in taking 
some decisions, but you still see what happens outside. And Endesa said, am 1 doing it right or 
not? So there has been a reflection of the direction. [... ] Someone realised -1 am losing business, 
I am losing opportunities. Then, the 2004 legislation and the increase in the targets was a 
confirmation that we were right to put ECyR at the core of the company. " 
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Similarly, Union Fenosa, citing financial imperatives, put up for sale an 
80% stake in its `Union Fenosa Energia Especiales' subsidiary at the beginning of 
2003, which was consequently purchased by Italian utility ENEL. Yet, in a similar 
turn of events to Endesa's handling of ECyR, Union Fenosa exercised an option to 
repurchase 30% in the renamed ENEL Union Fenosa Energias Renovables 
(EUFER) in 2004. Consequently, EUFER was run as a joint-venture between 
ENEL and Union Fenosa and developed a business plan to build 2750MW of 
wind energy in Spain and internationally by 2011, with at least ¬1.5bn of 
investments committed. 
Today, all four Spanish incumbent utility companies are significant actors 
in the wind energy industry. Figure 26 below summarises the evolution of their 
market shares in the wind energy market between 2000 and 2005. It shows the 
significant increase in activity at Iberdrola, starting in 2002 and EDP's later rise in 
2004. In 2005, utilities had a 57% market share in total installed wind energy 
capacity. 
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Figure 26: Installed Wind Capacity of Spanish Utilities (Sources: Own research based on 
company annual reports, investor presentations, press releases and 
AEE (2006)) 
All interviewed managers stated that wind energy had become a core 
activity of their company. The strategic 
investment plans, given in Table 20 
below, indicate the continuous interest of the utility companies in developing this 
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technology further. Based on these plans and the increasing consolidation of the 
sector, it can be expected that incumbent utilities will increase their market share 
further in the coming years. 
Table 20: Investment plans of large utilities for wind energy in Spain (Based on company, 
reports and presentations) 
Investment 
period 
Target value for 
wind energy 
Total sum 
invested 
Iberdrola 2007-2009 7,000MW in 2009 ¬3.25bn 
EDP 
Endesa 
2006-2008 
2005-2009 
2,800MW in 2008 
4,100MW in 2009 
¬2.1 bn 
¬1.9bn 
ENEL / Union Fenosa 2007-2011 2,750MW in 2011 ¬1.5-¬2.1 bn 
4.5.4. Summary of co-evolutionary developments in 
Spain 
With Spanish utility companies having consolidated the fragmented 
operation of the electricity system throughout the 1980s, they entered the wind 
energy industry through small-scale diversification and regional investments in 
the early 1990s. From this starting position, they adapted their strategy and 
integrated wind energy at the core of their businesses as the market started to 
boom and the technology matured. Simultaneously, their institutional lobbying 
shifted from the regional to the national level, arguing for better integration of 
wind power into the wholesale electricity market. With the resulting institutional 
changes, this set in motion further capability developments among the utilities to 
treat wind power technically and economically similar to conventional generation 
technologies. This ultimately allowed them to become leading companies in the 
integration of wind power worldwide, using wind power as an avenue to enter into 
foreign markets and engage in merger and acquisition activity. 
At the outset, there were two main institutional drivers for investments 
into wind power. Firstly, Royal Decree 2366/1994 specified a special 
feed-in 
tariff for wind energy production above wholesale market prices. 
Secondly, the 
25 Of which 850MW is planned for the Iberian 
Peninsula and 1,900MW internationally 
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Spanish autonomous regions set out their own wind energy plans, thus 
streamlining planning permissions and application procedures. 
Consequently, the Spanish incumbent utility companies entered the wind 
power market through their regional and diversification units, building on their 
local knowledge and political connections to construct wind farms in their own 
distribution and retail areas. This led to the creation of specific capabilities in 
wind development. Furthermore, Endesa and Iberdrola involved additional 
subsidiaries in the wind turbine manufacturing and engineering field in their wind 
farm developments, thus establishing capabilities along the entire value chain of 
wind power development. Still, the design of the feed-in law meant that besides 
the incumbent utilities, a diverse wind developer industry emerged with several 
independent actors building wind farms, including companies from abroad. 
The resultant growth in installed wind capacity turned into a significant 
boom with the passing of Royal Decree 2818/1998 and the government's 1999 
renewable energy plan. As total installed capacity passed the mark of 1,000MW 
and the institutional environment became more favourable, the Spanish incumbent 
utilities began to centralise their wind energy activities at the corporate centre, 
consolidating formerly dispersed investments. Yet, wind energy investments in 
Spain were determined by the degree of local and regional knowledge and 
connections, as the incumbent utilities had learned over the past years. Hence, the 
strategic approach emerging in this period was the replication of the regions-based 
business model across Spain, partnering with local wind developers and 
supporting the local economies with investments into factories and other strategic 
assets. 
The most aggressive approach was exhibited by Iberdrola, which soon 
emerged as the biggest utility investor in wind energy in Spain. Its strategy 
centralised the oversight of wind energy investments while rapidly engaging in 
several joint-ventures and strategic investments at the local level to create a reach 
across all of Spain. Having already developed a strong starting position, it 
consolidated its regional activities and bought out several of its former partners, 
among them its own wind turbine business, Gamesa, and EHN. Based on these 
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capabilities, a significantly increased investment budget and the favourable 
institutional environment, Iberdrola increased its installed capacity from 364 MW 
in 1998 to 1,650 MW in 2002, while all incumbent utilities operated close to 45% 
of total installed wind capacity at that time. 
With the high level of investments among Spanish utilities, the approach 
to institutional activity shifted increasingly from the regional to the national level. 
This culminated in the formation of a new industry lobby group, AEE, in 2003, 
which would engage in detailed discussions with the government and the grid 
operator over upcoming changes to the basic renewable energy framework and the 
integration of wind power into the electricity grid. Building on their existing 
capabilities and the scale of the investments, AEE argued for a closer integration 
of wind power into the conventional electricity markets and increasing 
technological standards so that wind farms could be treated in the same way as 
conventional power plants. 
Having been successful in their lobbying approach, the resulting Royal 
Decree 436/2004 provided numerous new incentives for wind farm operators, 
rewarding the installations of more advanced turbines and the sharing of wind 
forecasting data. This in turn allowed utilities an expansion of their capabilities in 
creating wind farm monitoring and control centres, that aggregate data from actual 
wind farm operations with forecasts for future output and market trading data, 
thus establishing sophisticated interfaces for the integration of wind power into 
conventional electricity markets. Hence, the new market framework made the 
development of new technical capabilities for the development and operation of 
wind farms economical and allowed Spanish utilities to establish themselves as 
leading wind power integrators worldwide. 
In summary, the co-evolutionary process between institutions and 
incumbent utilities led to positive reinforcing feedback loops of capability 
developments and institutional accommodation of increasing amounts of wind 
power. Both utilities and independent developers drove regulation to allow 
increasing amounts of wind power on the grid to be connected and integrated with 
increasingly sophisticated methods. 
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5. Discussion of the co-evolutionary 
dynamics in the three countries and 
policy Implications of the research 
The previous chapter outlined the co-evolutionary dynamics between the 
corporate strategies of incumbent utility companies and their institutional and 
technological environment in three countries. In this chapter, building on the 
analytical framework developed in chapter 3, the discussion moves beyond 
individual country borders and aims to draw out common patterns among the 
three case studies and to assemble the resulting implications for policy-making. 
Thus, this chapter addresses the third aim of this thesis: 
To discuss which factors contributed to the incumbents' strategies to 
adopt or resist the introduction of wind power. 
The premise for the research presented in the previous chapter was that 
incumbent utility companies hold a potentially powerful position in the electricity 
system with regard to the diffusion of new renewable energy technologies. Given 
their control over and historically grown links with the established electricity 
network, they could be a formidable force either in helping the introduction of 
these new technologies or in obstructing their wider application. In this respect, 
the case studies in the previous chapter highlighted the manifold interactions 
between incumbent utilities and their institutional and technological environment 
when faced with the introduction of wind energy technology. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Firstly, in section 5.1, it will focus on 
the application of the analytical framework in the three case studies. It will 
provide a firm-level perspective on the formulation of corporate strategy with 
regard to developing new capabilities and corporate political activity in response 
to a changing systemic environment. Having examined the organizational level 
and the link between firms with their systemic environment, section 5.2 will 
broaden the discussion from company strategy to examine the wider co- 
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evolutionary feedback loops between the three dimensions 'organisations', 
`technologies' and `institutions'. On the basis of this analysis, section 5.3 will 
discuss policy implications derived from the case studies both at a general level 
and in the specific context of EU policy making. 
5.1. Corporate Strategy vis-a-vis institutional 
and technological systems 
Throughout this thesis it has been argued that co-evolutionary research 
needs to take note of the individual actions that underpin systemic changes, and 
the motivations behind them. The analytical framework developed in chapter 3 
attempted to capture this premise by linking developments at the level of 
corporate strategy with developments at the systems level. Figure 27 outlines 
again the key interactions between both levels. 
This section will now examine the key similarities and differences in the 
co-evolution of corporate strategy and systemic development in each of the three 
case study countries. It will firstly focus on the company-strategy level, 
summarising the key milestones in each country and classifying them according to 
the degree of institutional engagement and technological capability development 
and will illustrate these milestones in the context of the analytical framework. 
Subsequently, section 5.2 will broaden out the analysis and compare the wider co- 
evolutionary development between corporate strategy and systemic change in 
each country. 
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5.1.1. Development of corporate strategies in the 
three countries 
The case studies showed similarities as well as differences between the 
firm behaviours and between the diffusion patterns in the three countries. While 
utility firms in both the UK and Spain were significant adopters of wind power 
generation, the German firms did not build a substantial base in this new 
technology. Yet, the national diffusion pattern of wind power is more similar in 
Germany and Spain, while the UK pattern is strikingly different. Table 21 below 
summarises the key figures from the three countries: 
Table 21: Diffusion levels of wind power generation in the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Spain in 2005. Source: Reiche 2005, own research 
United Germany Spain 
Kingdom 
Total installed wind capacity 1,337MW 18,428MW 10,028MW 
Share of wind power in total 0.45% 4.3% 7.78% 
electricity generation 
Total installed watts per 15 209 202 
capita 
Largest capacity of big utility RWE npower E. ON Iberdrola 
395MW 224MW 3494MW 
Share of all utilities in wind 81.4% 1.16% 57% 
energy installation 
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Figure 27: Co-evolution of firm strategy, technology and institutions 
The analytical framework developed in chapter 3 is now applied to these 
three cases to explain the observed differences. The key co-evolutionary 
mechanism in these countries can be described as follows: Firstly, new market 
rules opened up new market opportunities for technologies and services in the 
field of wind energy development. This set in motion company-internal 
alignments of existing capabilities, potential new capabilities to serve the new 
markets, and consequently corporate strategy towards this new market segment. 
Given this re-formulated corporate strategy, corporate political activity was 
similarly aligned, and consequently institutional engagement focused on 
influencing the policy-making process towards the business objectives of the 
incumbents. 
In this respect, the three countries offered three different illustrations of 
these interactions, each of which will be outlined in the paragraphs below. 
UK 
The focus of the UK case study was to understand the relatively low level 
of wind energy diffusion relative to Spain and Germany. With respect to the 
analytical framework, the main focus point was the institutional framework for 
wind energy (or lack thereof) and its impact on company strategy. 
The UK's NFFO auctions were introduced at a time when two large 
incumbents were dominating the England and Wales electricity market, and 
`Scottish Hydro' and `Scottish Power' were largely unopposed in Scotland. Yet, 
witnessing the `dash for gas' at the time, `National Power', `PowerGen' and 
`Scottish Power' reacted to the incentives provided by the NFFO to engage in new 
technological capability development in wind power. Initially, each company used 
partnerships and joint-ventures to limit the technology risk of their involvement 
and to broaden their learning experience in developing the necessary capabilities. 
The NFFO allowed for slow, incremental developments of capabilities while 
restricting the overall growth of the technology through 
limited and erratically 
announced auction rounds. Thus, the UK failed to create a strategic market 
opportunity for wind power that would have allowed more new companies 
to 
192 
enter the emerging wind energy industry. The small market niche that was created 
did not provide for the stability and growth prospect that new entrants in Germany 
or Spain were able to take advantage of. 
Given the policy design, incumbents were quickly able to dominate the 
UK wind power market as a whole, squeezing out small independent developers. 
Yet, among the incumbents, wind power continued to be a niche activity. Hence, 
the development of technological capabilities did not acquire central strategic 
importance, but rather, in the words of one manager, remained something "useful 
to sustain". In the interviews, it was highlighted that while limited technological 
capabilities were developed among the incumbents, the uncertain institutional 
environment acted as a key barrier to further development by preventing wind 
energy to be integrated as a core business of the incumbents in the UK. 
Furthermore, the incumbents' institutional-engagement focus remained in 
the area of the recently liberalized electricity market. Consequently, the 
incumbent utilities did not respond with pro-active corporate political activities to 
overcome the most pertinent barriers to growth under the NFFO legislation. In the 
absence of significant alternative lobbying networks, the wind power policy 
framework was subsumed in the larger electricity market liberalization process. 
This process continued with the introduction of the RO as a subsection of the 
reformed Utilities Act 2000. 
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With the RO having a direct bearing on the performance of the utilities' 
core supply business, however, organizational adaptation acquired more strategic 
importance among the incumbent utilities. However, as outlined in section 4.3.2, 
the RO continued to disadvantage independent developers as it favoured 
companies with large balance sheets that stem the financial risks and transaction 
costs associated with the trade in ROCs. All utilities acquired new capabilities, 
especially with a view to entering the newly emerging offshore wind business. 
Investment budgets for wind energy increased substantially relative to the pre-RO 
period while institutional engagement by the incumbent utilities focused much 
more strongly on the support regime for offshore wind farms and an improvement 
of the RO rates in this area. 
........................................................................................................... 
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Figure 28: Key features of the analytical framework in the UK 
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External context of the firm - 
opportunity; lack of competition 
UK Systemic Environment from new market entrants 
.............................................................. 
Hence, in summary, incumbents had a dual role of "passively-compliant" 
but "industry leading" champions of the wind industry. Figure 2 illustrates the 
main causal relationships drawn from this case study. Starting with institutional 
changes (1), the introduction of the NFFO lead to low levels of technology 
diffusion and hence provided insufficient competition and a lack of market 
opportunity for the incumbent utilities. This in turn meant there were insufficient 
drivers to integrate the wind energy business into the strategic core of the UK 
utilities (2). Hence, corporate strategy was directed towards passive compliance 
with regard to both development of own technological capabilities and their 
institutional engagement strategy (3). 
Germany 
The German case study focused on the reasons behind the low-level of 
wind-energy adoption among incumbents, while the market was developing at the 
same time into the largest globally. It was a unique fact that the early wind energy 
support programme from 1990 did not spark any technological capability 
development among the incumbent utilities. 
Three factors can be highlighted with regard to the incumbents' decision 
not to engage in this early phase of development. Firstly, the utility companies 
had been previously unsuccessful in achieving a technological breakthrough with 
rapidly up-scaling the relatively small wind turbines available at the time. As they 
did not believe wind power could contribute significantly to future energy demand 
and considered small wind turbines unsuitable to their business model of large- 
scale power generation, the utilities' outlook on the likely profitability of the wind 
market was negative. Secondly, German reunification and the prospect of an 
integrated pan-European energy market sparked a series of mergers and 
acquisition in the fragmented German industry. This remained the primary 
focus 
of the German incumbent utilities throughout the 1990s, as 
discussed in section 
4.4.1, leaving fewer resources at the time for developing new business areas such 
as wind power. Finally, the design of the feed-in 
law prevented incumbent utilities 
from profiting from it when investing in their own monopoly areas. 
This meant 
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that they were not able to utilise their local development and relational networks 
for the development of wind power. 
Yet, the continuous expansion of wind power started to impact on the core 
business of the incumbents, as they had to accept all electricity produced from 
wind power into their grids, while demand remained relatively stable. The 
decision not to develop capabilities in wind power development was 
complemented by an institutional engagement strategy that opposed this emerging 
market. Various channels of influence were used by the utilities to limit the 
expansion of new wind farms, with judicial court challenges, technical hold-ups in 
grid connection and direct political lobbying all documented as strategies to 
overturn the institutional basis for the German wind power boom in the 1990s. 
Figure 3 illustrates the key mechanisms from the German case study in the 
context of the analytical framework. Here, the existing capabilities and routines 
together with the negative experience in wind power development (1) lead 
companies not to develop technological capabilities at the time of the introduction 
of the first feed-in tariffs (2). This is coupled with a defensive political strategy to 
limit the institutional niche for renewable energy (3), which is re-enforced by the 
rise of independent wind developers and their increasing impact on grid 
operations by the incumbent utilities. Continuous absence from the market closes 
the window of opportunity to profit from wind energy, which furthermore re- 
enforces the defensive political lobbying approach. 
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By 1998, two factors had changed that led to an overhaul of the 
incumbents' strategy. Firstly, after having exhausted various channels of 
corporate political activity, the supportive environment for wind power still 
remained largely intact in Germany. While the utilities achieved a slow down in 
the annual installation rate of wind power between 1995 and 1998, ultimately no 
measure was successful in reversing the upward trajectory of installations and the 
growing network of independent wind development companies. Secondly, the 
newly elected `red-green' government had staked part of their election programme 
on the expansion of renewable energy technologies. This meant that the 
institutional environment for wind power was likely to stabilise even further. 
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Figure 29: Key features of the analytical framework in Germany 
197 
Taken together, these two factors created the conditions in which 
incumbent utilities gradually adapted their strategy. As the institutional 
foundations of the wind industry's success were not changeable, their core 
business would be exposed to increasing amounts of institutionally-prioritised 
wind energy. Furthermore, the lack of any own capabilities in this area meant that 
incumbents still lacked the experience to enter the onshore wind-market in a 
meaningful way. 
In this context, the emerging offshore wind market opened the prospect of 
large-scale production of wind power, thus offering the opportunity to enter a new 
market which matched the incumbents' scale and investment appetite and 
provided significant growth prospects. This strategic shift interacted with an 
adaptation of the institutional engagement strategy, which shifted from outright 
opposition to a targeted approach of policy change and increasing support for 
offshore wind. 
Spain 
Finally, the Spanish case study stood out as being both successful in 
integrating significant amounts of wind energy at the national level, becoming the 
second largest market globally, while also inducing sizeable investment by 
incumbent utility companies (>50% of total wind investments). 
The incumbent utility companies responded to the first institutional niches 
for wind power with the development of new technological capabilities in this 
area. These companies were rooted in regional monopolies which allowed them to 
extend their local relationships in the area of wind power. 
Furthermore, as in the 
case of Endesa and Made and Iberdrola and Gamesa, they were able to 
leverage 
their diversification in related industries to build a competitive market position 
in 
wind energy. Furthermore, their political activities 
involved lobbying local 
autonomous regions to develop regional wind power plans 
that simplified the 
planning regime. With this understanding of 
the requirements for the wind 
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business, incumbent utilities were able to expand nationally with the stabilisation 
of the subsidy regime under the Royal Decree 2818/1998 and the subsequent wind 
power target of 13,000MW by 2010. 
Profiting from the subsequent boom in wind power, the incumbent 
utilities' lobbying approach subsequently shifted to the national stage where a 
new lobbying group - `Asociacion Eolica Empresarial' (AEE) - was created to 
engage with government, the market regulator and the grid operator to overcome 
the most significant barriers to further expansion of wind power. By 2002, Spain 
experienced significant grid constraints that threatened the continuity of the 
market expansion and thus the opportunities for the Spanish incumbents. 
Consequently, AEE's lobbying focused primarily on the area of market 
integration, better wind forecasting systems, establishing new grid codes and 
increasing the government target for wind power. These issues were all addressed 
in the subsequent Royal Decree 436/2004, which led to a renewed boom in wind 
developments, with a newly increased government target of 20,000MW of wind 
power by 2010. 
At the company-level, the new institutional framework led to the 
development of further technological capabilities to better integrate wind farms 
with the conventional generation portfolio of the utilities, thus establishing remote 
monitoring and control centres to centralise data collection and exchange between 
companies and the market. This was also underpinned by new incentives for wind 
farms providing grid support functions, with existing wind farms being upgraded 
technically. 
Finally, Spanish utilities increasingly used their knowledge in these areas 
to base their foreign expansion plans on wind power, with EDP purchasing US 
wind developer `Horizon Wind' for ¬l. 6bn in March 2007 and Iberdrola acquiring 
US wind developer `CPV Wind' for ¬1.5bn in April 2007. 
Figure 30 illustrates the key aspects of the analytical framework in Spain. 
Here locally-rooted, diversified utilities (1) were able to take full advantage of the 
opportunities that the feed-in tariffs provided (2). 
Especially, these allowed the 
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use of their local relationships to lobby regional government for planning support 
(3), while building up technological capabilities, partly leveraging their own 
industrial base (3). Building on the success of this strategy, institutional 
engagement was increasingly shifting to the national level, to ensure continuous 
government support for wind energy and better integration into electricity markets 
(4). The expansion of government policy in this respect allowed companies to 
further develop their technological capabilities and become the leading integrators 
of wind energy in Europe. 
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Figure 30: Key features of the analytical framework in Spain 
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5.1.2. Similarities and Differences between the three 
Countries 
The diffusion pattern in Germany and Spain is similar in terms of the wind 
capacity installed per capita, although the share of wind power in total electricity 
generation is still smaller in Germany than in Spain. Yet, with 18,000MW and 
10,000MW of total installed capacity in 2005, the two countries are the leading 
wind developers in the world. Diffusion is driven by government subsidy schemes 
that offer similar institutional opportunities. Importantly, the institutional set-up 
has very low barriers to entry, guaranteeing grid connection to every wind 
developer and a fixed payment for every kWh of electricity produced during the 
lifetime of the plant. Furthermore, the feed-in tariffs provide no upper limit to 
installed capacity as long as profitable sites can be found. 
An important difference emerges between Spain and Germany with regard 
to the strategic approaches of the incumbent utility companies. In Germany, wind 
development was driven almost entirely by new independent wind development 
companies, with German utilities barely operating 1% of the total installed 
capacity by 2005. Conversely, Spanish utility companies were involved in nearly 
three fifths (57%) of the total installed capacity in 2005 and posted investment 
plans worth at least ¬8.75bn for the coming years for their wind energy 
subsidiaries. 
The main difference between the wind energy market in the UK and the 
two other countries is the low level of diffusion, both in terms of total installed 
capacity and on a per capita basis of wind power. The institutional environment in 
the UK led to a market outcome where more than four fifths of the wind power 
installations are today owned by the six large utility companies. Furthermore, the 
regulatory framework only mandates an annual increase of about 1% in the 
installed capacity of all renewables, thus limiting the development in the UK to 
levels which can be considered marginal in comparison to the situation in Spain 
and the Germany. 
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When comparing UK and Spain, it is apparent that incumbents have been 
active in both markets. However, the motivations for engaging in the market were 
markedly different in both instances. Given the market set-up in the UK, the 
technology never provided a fundamental threat to the core businesses of the 
incumbent utility companies. Throughout the NFFO-period, the regulatory 
framework conceived the renewable energy market as a niche activity, which is 
substantially different to the situation created by the feed-in laws in Germany and 
Spain. Furthermore, the framework favoured the existing development capabilities 
of large utilities in terms of absorbing financial and development risks. This led to 
a squeeze out of smaller independent development firms. In this context, the RO 
solidified a market structure dominated by the big utilities, engaging in activity 
compliant with the regulatory mandated growth rate for renewables. Government 
regulation did not reward companies for going beyond mere compliance and in 
the context of industry consolidation and the absence of a competitive threat from 
alternative wind developers, utilities did not actively engage in shaping a more 
favourable policy environment. 
In contrast to the UK situation, Spanish utilities did not merely comply 
with but actively drove the development of the regulatory framework. Wind 
power development occurred in an environment of intense competition with 
several regional based independent developers. In lifting the initial government 
target for wind power and lobbying for the better integration of wind into the 
wholesale market, Spanish utilities worked proactively to overcome the most 
pertinent barriers to its diffusion. This process of co-evolution of firm capabilities 
and the institutional environment led to high-levels of diffusion in Spain, coupled 
with high levels of adoption at the utility company level. 
Conversely, in the UK's case, diffusion remained subdued at the national 
level, albeit with high levels of activity among utilities in the remaining market. 
With lack of competition and regulatory pressure, no incentives existed to initiate 
such virtuous co-evolutionary cycles, as in the Spanish case. An indication of this 
different standing in the wind industry was the recent take-over of Scottish Power 
by Iberdrola, which was at least partly based on Iberdrola's strategic focus on 
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wind power in its expansion plans and hence its ability to integrate and expand the 
wind power arm of Scottish Power (Mulligan & Burnett 2006). 
Lastly, in Germany, high levels of diffusion at the global level are coupled 
with marginal levels of adoption at the incumbent utility level. While the overall 
level of technology diffusion is high, this was almost exclusively driven by new 
entrants into the wind energy development field. However, the antagonistic 
relationship between independent wind power developers and the incumbent 
utility firms did not give either one of these groups the incentive to further 
integrate wind power into the wholesale market, thus stifling the development of 
advanced technical capabilities compared to the Spanish case. 
In order to classify the developments in the three countries, a matrix is 
developed in Table 22, below, that shows the adaptation of companies with regard 
to their lobbying effort and their capability development to a change in policy. 
This builds on the analytical framework of Oliver and Holzinger (2008) to 
integrate the dynamic capabilities framework with the literature on corporate 
political activities. The goal of Oliver and Holzinger's (2008) paper was to 
explore how and why firms drive institutional change. They categorize the 
multitude of different corporate political activities along the dichotomy of 
"compliance vs. influence". Political compliance strategies are defined as firm- 
level actions undertaken in conformity with political requirements and 
expectations. Political influence strategies are firm-level actions undertaken for 
purposes of mobilizing support for the firm's interests. 
Oliver and Holzinger's framework only provides a static viewpoint of 
trade-offs, however, and does not consider the evolution of strategy over time. 
Complementing this typology of corporate political strategies, another dimension 
is thus added in Table 22 that distinguishes between firms that adapt their internal 
resource base to develop new technological capabilities or not. Hence, building on 
the original typology and the added dimension of capability development, four 
types of firm responses can be identified: They can be defensive (external 
influence towards regulatory regime, but no internal development of capabilities), 
reactive (external compliance, no development of capabilities) anticipatory 
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(external compliance, internal development of capabilities), or proactive (external 
influence and internal development of capabilities). 
Table 22: A categorization of firm responses with regard to internal development of 
capabilities and corporate political activities 
Corporate Political Activities 
Influence Compliance 
Internal 
development 
of capabilities 
Yes 
No 
Proactive Anticipatory 
Defensive Reactive 
Based on this matrix, we can observe the co-evolutionary patterns of 
incumbent utilities' strategy and their systemic environment in the three case 
study countries. In the UK, utilities developed new technological capabilities in 
the wind power field. However, comparing the UK situation with Spanish and 
German developments, the absence of a competitive threat led the incumbent 
utilities to passively comply with government regulation, while not seeking to go 
beyond it or change it radically. As the UK institutional environment subdued 
independent developers, no alternative lobbying platform emerged that could have 
altered the policy landscape. Hence, capability development only followed a path 
from reaction to anticipation of policy. 
Conversely, German utilities did not develop new technological 
capabilities in wind energy but focused their strategic resources on a sustained 
defensive campaign of corporate political activity to undermine the institutional 
basis of wind. Wind power development was almost entirely carried out 
by new 
entrants into the industry. These companies, furthermore supported 
by a domestic 
manufacturing base, formed the antithesis to the 
incumbents' institutional 
lobbying approach, organising their own activities to counter the 
incumbents' 
activities. As the institutional basis 
for the wind power boom solidified, utilities 
reverted back to the original position and 
belatedly started to develop their own 
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technological capabilities, especially in the emerging offshore wind sector, and 
attempted to work within the existing institutional framework. 
Finally, in the Spanish case, we can observe early pro-active development 
of technical capabilities and institutional engagement among the incumbents, 
driving both technology diffusion and the regulatory framework for wind power 
integration. This created self-reinforcing feedback loops leading to 'virtuous 
cycles' of high levels of wind power diffusion on the industry level and high 
adoption rates among utilities at the firm level. Table 23 below summarizes these 
developments. 
Table 23: Incumbent utility responses to renewable energy in Spain, Germany and the UK. 
Corporate Political Activities 
Influence Compliance 
Internal 
development 
of capabilities 
Yes 
No 
5.2. 
Proactive Anticipatory 
Spain 
UK 
Defensive Germany Reactive 
Discussion - Co-evolution of Institutions, 
Technology and Organizations 
In the three case-study countries considered, the corporate strategies of the 
incumbent utility companies co-evolved with the institutional environment and 
technological development. In this respect, the previous sections outlined the 
mechanism, through the alignment of corporate strategy with regard to 
technological capabilities and institutional engagement, in which organizations 
interact with their systemic environment. This section will now consider the 
broader implications for an analytical framework in which the three dimensions, 
`organizations', `institutions' and `technology' are considered to co-evolve. 
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As argued in section 2.3.4 and 3.1.4, it is important for co-evolutionary 
research to establish mechanisms that link causally the different dimensions of the 
analytical framework. The previous sections have described in detail the co- 
evolutionary interaction between institutions and corporate strategy. Most 
noticeable was the fact that the introduction of an institutional niche to allow the 
market entry of renewable energy under protected conditions provided the catalyst 
for incumbents' engagement with wind power in all three countries - whether pro- 
actively or defensively. Hence, rather than the technological opportunity as such, 
the institutional space created provided the initial spark by altering the selection 
criteria of the electricity market to accommodate a new technology. To some 
extent, this is expected from the literature, which considers incumbents to be less 
able strategically to integrate new technologies, at least initially, in their existing 
portfolio (Tushman & Anderson 1986; Christensen 1997). Rather, in such complex 
and highly regulated industries as the electricity sector, the threats to existing 
businesses of incumbents will come from institutional pressures through 
government policy (Hughes 1987). Consequently, incumbent utilities are prone to 
respond faster to new institutional requirements on their businesses rather than to 
slow moving technological developments (Frankenberger 2006). 
Beyond the initial role of policy as a catalyst, however, institutions and 
organizations exhibited divergent co-evolutionary pathways in the three countries 
considered. The altered selection criteria led companies to develop different 
capabilities and to engage with divergent corporate political strategies and 
objectives in the institutional process. 
So far, the analysis has pointed to a co-evolutionary relationship of 
institutions and technologies, moderated by organizational engagement and 
adaptation. At this point, the co-evolutionary analysis can be extended to include 
technological development. As outlined in section 4.2.2, three aspects of wind 
technology development entered the present analysis: Supplier-demander 
relationships, wind development capabilities and the technical and commercial 
integration of wind power in existing power grids. The development of supplier- 
demander relationships with turbine suppliers exhibited few features to 
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distinguish the companies in the three countries. All companies engaged in a 
learning process to understand the requirements of turbine manufacturers and the 
most important aspects for the development of standard contracts in the industry. 
In the area of wind farm development, the most important aspect proved to 
be an understanding and intimate knowledge of the regional and local context in 
which wind farms were planned. Here differences emerged between the countries, 
with Spanish and German developers being able to leverage their local 
involvement to enhance their subsequent strategic positioning. UK wind farms 
were long hampered by local and regional planning laws. Yet, the institutional 
framework also subdued the emergence of a local wind development industry, 
providing an additional explanation for the low diffusion rates in the UK. 
In the area of technical and market integration of wind power, the 
juxtaposition of the Spanish and German case is especially instructive. Spanish 
utilities continuously lobbied for further integration of wind power into the 
mainstream electricity market. As the Spanish feed-in law provided a top-up 
premium on wholesale market prices, even non-utility wind investors were able to 
profit from a development path that integrated wind power into the wholesale 
market while guaranteeing a premium of the plant's lifetime. Furthermore, the 
Spanish government widened the institutional opportunity space to make 
investments in wind forecasting, monitoring and integration centres attractive by 
shaping the institutional environment to give specific incentives 
for companies to 
invest in market integration tools,. This not only allowed firms to run their wind 
farms more efficiently, but created an interface with the Spanish Pool 
Market that 
allowed for a more advanced technical and commercial 
integration with the 
conventional power system. 
In contrast, the antagonistic development in Germany 
between the 
incumbent utilities, who owned and operated the grid, and the 
independent wind 
developers who were given priority grid access for their wind 
farms, led to a 
different pathway. While the German utility companies 
did invest in wind 
forecasting systems to integrate wind power, this was 
driven primarily by their 
remit as grid operators to provide 
high levels of network stability' and minimise 
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outages. Hence, in the absence of any wind power developments by the 
incumbents, the rationale for developing wind forecasts was based solely on 
technical considerations. Simultaneously, independent wind developers were 
disconnected from the wholesale market through the feed-in law, which 
guaranteed a simple, stable income stream. Given the dominance of the incumbent 
utilities in the wholesale market, they had no incentive to move beyond this 
institutional niche as this would imply competing with the incumbents without the 
stability of the FIL. Hence, no positive feedback loop emerged in the German 
market for a more efficient technological and commercial integration of wind 
power, as neither side had an incentive to move beyond their entrenched position. 
5.3. Policy implications of the analytical 
framework 
Based on the evidence from the case studies and the co-evolutionary 
analysis, this section derives implications for renewable energy policy and policy- 
making. Differences in the diffusion patterns of wind power were explained by 
different patterns of co-evolutionary adaptation of incumbent utilities to different 
forms of systemic change. Specifically, this divergence is explained by 
differences in firms' strategies of coordinating their development of their 
technological capabilities and corporate political activities to shape the regulatory 
environment. Such dissimilar strategies were shown to lead to different dynamics 
in the interactions between firms and their systemic environment, which in turn 
resulted in different technology diffusion and adoption pathways 
It was shown that it is possible for firms to drive regulatory change to fit 
their capability base. Yet, firms only started to invest in wind power when they 
were in a strategic position to reap the benefits from a changing regulatory and 
technological environment. It is these case where firms pro-actively shaped, rather 
than passively complied with, regulation that highlight the importance of 
coordinated internally and externally focused strategies of firms. Specifically, in 
the Spanish case, virtuous cycles of capability development and regulatory change 
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allowed utility firms to gain sustainable competitive advantages in the global wind 
power industry. Neither in the UK nor the German case, did firms encounter the 
supportive environment and develop the respective strategies to initiate such a 
virtuous cycle. 
The existence of such virtuous cycles as in the Spanish case complements 
existing analytical approaches to the role of incumbent utilities in the 
transformation of energy systems. As argued in chapters 2 and 3, contributions in 
the systemic innovation literature (Johnson & Jacobsson 2003; Jacobsson & 
Bergek 2004; Tsoutsos & Stamboulis 2005; Jacobsson & Lauber 2006) see the role 
of incumbent utilities primarily in defending their established structural and 
functional position in the conventional electricity system, while hindering the 
introduction of renewable energy technologies. Certainly, the cases of Germany 
and the UK point to evidence of such behaviour. However, the Spanish case study 
highlights that incumbents can be drivers of transformations of the energy system 
both in terms of technological development and institutional adaptation. This 
underlines the need for an analytical framework that takes specific note of 
strategic firm action within changing systemic environments. Thus, 
complementing the systemic innovation approach, the analytical framework 
introduced in this thesis focuses specifically on the configuration of firms' 
strategies to develop technological capabilities and associated corporate political 
activities. Focusing on these components was central in explaining the differential 
outcome in the three case studies and especially the proactive role of the Spanish 
utilities in the development of the technical and regulatory environment 
for wind 
power. 
Some implications for policy-making have already been reflected in the 
analysis so far. Importantly, policy change was the 
initial spark for wind power 
developments in all three case study countries, thus confirming the 
key role that 
policy plays in technology diffusion. Yet, policy as such was a necessary, 
but not 
a sufficient condition to ensure widespread wind power 
deployment and diffusion. 
Important differences emerged in policy design, and consequently 
in policy 
impact on the electricity system. The precise capability 
development of incumbent 
utilities was dependent on situational context and 
specific policy incentives. 
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Hence, this section aims to summarise the policy implications from the analysis 
above in two main points, discussed in the next two sub-sections. 
5.3.1. Interaction of business and political strategies 
- Scope for co-opting incumbent companies 
The case studies illustrated the influence that incumbent utilities can have 
on the diffusion pathways of new technologies. It is proposed that the first lesson 
to be drawn from the case studies is that when developing policies for new 
technologies, policy-makers need to take the capability base of firms into account. 
Policies are not created in a political vacuum and incumbents will react where 
their core business is affected, as they align their business and political strategies. 
However, whether they will engage pro-actively or re-actively depends on the 
degree to which they expect to benefit from future polices. Importantly, firms only 
started to invest when they were able to build dedicated strategies around 
investments into wind power, thus reaping the benefits from a changing regulatory 
and technological environment. Policy that provides for an environment in which 
companies can strategically position themselves and actively shape the future 
development path attracts a diverse set of actors, a process which fosters 
competition and innovation. 
This point is furthermore underpinned by the path-dependent nature of co- 
evolutionary interactions. Initial differences in policy affected initial alignments 
of political and business strategies among the incumbents and thus impacted on 
the subsequent technology adoption and diffusion paths. Once firms had decided 
on their strategies, path-dependent developments led to positive as well as 
negative feedback loops. In the German case, incumbent utilities were entrenched 
in institutional skirmishes over the feed-in law long after its inception, while their 
Spanish counterparts were actively engaged in enhancing their domestic feed-in 
law further -a decade after its 
first introduction. Thus, the initial policy design 
had consequences beyond the immediate market creation as 
it shaped the strategic 
approach by the incumbent utilities. Better understanding 
the motivations for 
firms' involvement in the policy-making process could thus allow policy-makers 
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to avoid setting off re-active feedback loops that slow down new technology 
diffusion. This is furthermore supported by analysis in the political-science 
literature on the increasing-returns properties of institutions and the resultant 
implications for path-dependency (Pierson 2000). 
In the UK, policy provided no strategic rationale for new market entry and 
long-term investment, thus subduing innovative activity. In the German case, 
incumbent utilities did not develop a wind energy capability base and thus 
developed no strategic rationale for investment. Yet, in the Spanish case, initial 
policy provided a strategic rationale for investment that led to virtuous cycles of 
capability development and regulatory evolution which allowed high levels of 
technology diffusion and market integration. 
5.3.2. Conditions for creating virtuous cycles 
through Policy 
Despite the limited scope of this study, it is still possible to flesh out some 
of the pillars for an innovation policy that co-opts incumbent utilities. Most 
importantly, despite the concerns above for understanding firms' strategic 
position, this is not to argue that policy-makers should simply adhere to the wish- 
list of incumbent utilities. Building on the comparison of the three case study 
countries, two important features are highlighted which appear necessary (though 
probably not sufficient) ingredients for creating virtuous cycles as in the Spanish 
case. 
At the outset, policy-makers need to remember that renewable energy 
markets are government induced and investors want to avoid being trapped with 
investments in markets that change with the political weather, a case of `moral 
hazard' and `time inconsistency' of policy making (Helm, Hepburn, & Mash 
2003; Neuhoff 2005; Neuhoff & Sellers 2006). Hence, policy needs to create a 
market framework that provides both a long-term, stable investment horizon and 
low entry barriers for new market entrants, as well as an exit strategy that prevents 
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over-compensation for mature or unsuccessful technologies (Stenzel, Foxon, & 
Gross 2003). 
Low entry barriers allow for a diverse industry population to induce 
competition and innovation in the emergent industry while keeping potential 
inertia by incumbents in check. Yet, because new entrants will only come forward 
if companies can build a clear strategy around their investments, policy needs to 
provide a sufficiently long-term and stable investment horizon. This is all the 
more important in the electricity industry where structural barriers to entry lie 
beyond the immediate business of developing wind farms (European Commission 
2007). 
In the UK, the erratic and limited policy design of the NFFO did not 
provide the institutional foundations on which new entrants could have built a 
sustainable long-term business strategy. Consequently, incumbents quickly 
dominated the industry and were able to squeeze out their independent 
competitors, even though wind power in itself remained a small fraction of their 
overall business. Even under the RO, barriers to entry remained as small-scale 
developers face disproportional transaction costs to benefit from the policy and 
incumbent utilities present the only counterparty for the sale of ROCs. 
In Germany, independent wind developers were able to enter the emergent 
wind energy market on a wide scale due to the low entry barriers and stable 
institutional framework. Consequently, they developed the institutional clout to 
preserve the policy foundations of the high wind diffusion rates in the face of 
pressure from the incumbent utilities. In Spain, incumbent utilities competed 
directly with new entrants into the market for the best sites, thus creating a 
sustained boom in wind installations while simultaneously 
fostering pro-active 
institutional engagement to enhance the institutional pillars of the boom. 
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5.3.3. Implications 
making 
for renewable energy policy 
Having outlined the policy implications above, this section will now 
examine what lessons can be drawn for EU energy policy. As highlighted in 
section 5.2., policy was the major institutional driver for investments into 
renewables in the three countries studied. Yet, detailed policy formulation 
remained within the domain and context of national energy policy. However, 
during the recent German (July 2007 - December 2007), Slovenian (January 2008 
- June 2008) and French (July 2008 - present) presidencies of the EU council, a 
concern for a common EU energy and climate policy remained on the top of each 
presidencies' work agenda (See "Europe - succeeding together" - German 
Presidency Programme; "Si. nergy for Europe" - Slovenian Presidency 
Programme; "Europe taking action to meet today's challenges" - French 
Presidency Programme). 
This section will discuss three issues which follow from the case studies 
presented in this thesis: EU competition policy, a common EU renewable energy 
policy and a common EU electricity market. Each of these three issues follows 
from the analysis of the co-evolutionary development in the three case studies and 
is considered to be inextricably linked to the other two. 
With regard to competition policy, both the UK and German case study 
showed elements of how developments in the area of competition policy can also 
have an effect on renewable energy technology diffusion. In the UK, the 
introduction of the NFFO followed pressure from the EU Competition directorate 
as the initial policy proposal was conceived to benefit exclusively the nuclear 
power industry. 
In the case of the German feed-in law, a clearly defined institutional niche 
with guaranteed grid connection and remuneration rules shielded new technology 
diffusion from defensive political activity by the incumbents. The German feed-in 
tariff was challenged by incumbent utilities on the grounds of alleged breaches of 
? 13 
EU competition policy. However, the EU Courts of Justice ruled in favour of the 
feed-in law arguing that no discrimination was applied between different 
competitors and that priority access to the grid for renewable energy was justified 
on competitive as well as environmental grounds under EU rules (Jacobsson & 
Lauber 2006). Here, from an EU perspective, it can be argued that pro-active 
competition policy is an important complement to specific technology-support 
policies. 
A further element from the German case epitomizes the inter-linked nature 
of EU competition policy and the drive towards a common EU electricity market 
and renewable energy policy. This is the question of ownership and operation of 
the member states' electricity grids. In Germany, the utilities own and operate the 
transmission system, while in the Spanish and British case this is the remit of an 
independent national operator. Hence, the German utilities directly controlled 
access to the grid vis-a-vis third parties in the absence of a regulatory authority, 
which was only introduced in 2005 (Glachant, Dubois, & Perez 2003). 
This question applies on two different levels. Firstly, it is a question of 
direct grid access for third-party electricity providers, and secondly, it is a 
question of arrangements for balancing electricity supply from intermittent 
sources and the incentives embedded within such institutional arrangements. 
Section 4.4.1 already noted that few new entrants were successful in the 
German wholesale electricity market (as opposed to the emerging wind market), 
both in the electricity generation and supply segment. This has been attributed by 
several authors to the market dominance of the utility companies (Bower, Bunn, 
& Wattendrup 2001; Glachant, Dubois, & Perez 2003; Brunekreeft & Twelemann 
2005). Where utilities operated their own electricity generating stations as well as 
the electricity grids, incentives exist to charge competitors arbitrarily high 
transmission charges and/or "game" the short- and long-term power markets to 
disadvantage competitors (Newbery & McDaniel 2003). In this context, it could 
be argued that specific measures to guarantee grid access for renewable energy, at 
least for a certain period of time, is acceptable in order to circumvent the market 
power of incumbents and signal the introduction of competition in this field. 
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A further aspect to this argument is the question of the optimal balancing 
of electricity grids with increasing amounts of intermittent generation sources 
such as wind. In previous work, it was highlighted that adding large amounts of 
wind power to the electricity grid entails additional costs and risks for the 
operation of the transmission system (lEA 2005e; Stenzel & Gul 2006). However, 
balancing of grids can be optimized the more and deeper grids are interconnected. 
The larger the balancing area, the more technologies are dispersed and the more 
flexible operators can react to specific balancing problems. 
While this thesis did not investigate explicitly any direct link between the 
ownership structure of the transmission system and the strategic approach to wind 
energy, it can be speculated whether the defensive strategies of the German 
utilities (as opposed to the Spanish and UK utilities) were motivated in part by 
their ownership of and control over the transmission infrastructure. In IEA (2005), 
it is noted that the German balancing system quoted the highest costs for 
integrating wind power relative to its international peers and that it was estimated 
that costs could be cut by up to 80% if the four current balancing zones (each 
operated by one of the four incumbent utilities) were combined into one and the 
rules made more transparent. 
In this context, two lines of arguments could be taken. Firstly, it is noted 
that German utilities were required by law to accept all electricity from renewable 
sources and provide the necessary balancing services. The costs of these balancing 
services were allowed to be passed on to the consumer through the transmission 
tariff. However, the rules for the operation of the balancing market did not come 
under regulatory scrutiny before the establishment of the German grid agency in 
2005. Hence, in the period 1990 - 2000 the utilities were able to quote high costs 
of balancing intermittent wind power as an argument in their corporate political 
activities (and as a reason to refuse new connections - see Windpower Monthly 
1997), while simultaneously profiting from the charges they could pass on to 
consumers. In this way, they were able to profit from the wind power boom in 
Germany, without actually having to build any capacities on their own. 
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However, while this argument mirrors developments in the early period of 
wind power development in Germany, it only takes into account a short-term view 
of policy development. Once the installed wind power base achieved a critical 
mass, it would increasingly displace the utilities' own conventional generation 
base. Furthermore, with the hardening of the institutional environment, such a 
strategy would run into diminishing returns, as the balancing regimes come under 
closer scrutiny and the losses from curtailing own generation outweigh the gains 
from transmission charges. This would consequently be reflective of the second 
phase of German wind power development following the period from about 1999 
to today. 
In summary, if incumbents' strategies were indeed motivated in part by 
their ability to strategically lever their existing asset base, the ownership structure 
of the transmission system would become a key determinant of the incumbents' 
reaction to the introduction of renewable energy. This would imply that the inertia 
of an existing energy system is in part governed by its ownership structure and the 
institutional rules over grid access and balancing costs, i. e. the distribution of risks 
and costs and benefits with respect to the diffusion of new technologies. The 
European Commission has recently concluded that the unbundling of generation 
and transmission assets is an important step toward a common European energy 
market (EU COM(2007) 1). In the EU Commissions proposal, two options are 
considered. Either, this could be achieved through an independent system 
operator, leaving incumbents as the owner of the assets but not responsible for 
their operation maintenance or development. This could incrementally include 
common trans-boundary operation of transmission systems in the EU. The 
alternative option would be a full ownership unbundling, as has already been 
achieved in the UK and Spain among other EU member countries. 
Previous arguments over the efficiency and efficacy of different policy 
instruments (e. g. feed-in tariffs vs quota-based instruments) have often centred on 
abstract questions of market design and efficiency under rational behaviour 
(Meyer 2003). However, they have not yet addressed the question of their impact 
on incumbent utilities in imperfectly regulated markets. Given the 
incumbent 
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utilities' still powerful position in many markets, this question becomes an 
important factor in the deployment of renewable technologies. 
As this thesis outlined, feed-in tariffs can, under certain conditions, create 
a strategic market opportunity large-enough to be of interest for incumbent utility 
companies and new entrants alike. Feed-in tariff rules with regard to remuneration 
and grid access can circumvent issues of market power and restriction of 
competition when simultaneously providing utility companies the same 
investment rights and benefits as new entrants. In this way, feed-in tariffs can be 
considered a transitory policy instrument that creates competition both between 
new and established technologies and companies alike. 
Currently, there are 16 EU countries with some form of domestic feed-in 
tariff, varying in their details by level of remuneration, lengths of contracts and 
technologies covered (Reiche 2005). A first step could be to harmonise those 
feed-in tariffs, possibly adjusting by renewable resource availability and historic 
levels of penetration. In its latest draft for a new Directive on Renewable Energy 
(2008/0016 (COD)), the EU focuses on individual country targets and guarantees 
of origins but remains flexible with regard to specific policies that individual 
countries implement to meet their targets. Nevertheless, the clear policy signal 
given by the EU's 20% renewable energy target by 2020 could lead to changes in 
incumbents' strategies towards investments in renewables, provided that these are 
integrated into national energy policies in a clear and credible way. 
An initiative by the 16 countries with feed-in tariffs could set a precedent 
for others to follow. Already, Germany, Spain and Slovenia have created a "feed- 
in co-operation" to lobby for the expansion of feed-in tariffs at the European level 
and have proposed a model for cost-sharing among all EU member states 
(Ragwitz, Resch, & Klessmann 2008). This could consequently put pressure on 
the other EU countries to join this group of countries, especially on those 
countries that are currently lagging behind on their targets, such as the UK. 
Utilising the framework presented in this thesis underpins arguments for 
the introduction of a carefully designed European-wide feed-in tariff system, both 
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as a measure to promote the diffusion of renewables and to spur the drive towards 
a common EU energy market. Furthermore, it could become an important 
complement to competition policy, which is mainly concerned with specific cases 
of market abuse and structural market power per se. 
5.4. Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the research presented in chapter 4 in the light 
of research aim 3 of this thesis. It sought to answer two main objectives: 
9 To identify common patterns among the leading and lagging 
countries and to analyse the main factors that led to the adoption of 
pro-active strategies among incumbent utilities. 
9 To specifically examine the role of government policy and its 
success in contributing to pro-active incumbents' behaviour. 
With regard to the first objective, it was noted that the co-evolutionary 
development in each country followed a unique pathway. Hence, although both 
Germany and Spain have the highest wind energy diffusion rates worldwide, the 
development of their wind industry took very different routes. Furthermore, even 
when considering the relatively high participation rates of incumbent utilities in 
Spain and the UK, they were the result of different motivations and rationales in 
the two countries. Thus, no overall commonality among the diffusion patterns 
emerged. 
Yet, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about some of the key 
factors that led to the adoption of pro-active strategies among the incumbent 
utilities. Section 5.1 outlined the co-evolutionary mechanism that led to the 
differential outcome in technology adoption and diffusion in the three countries 
studied. Companies responded to initial renewable energy policy 
frameworks with 
strategic re-alignments of their internal capabilities and approach to 
institutional 
engagement. Consequently, different corporate strategies emerged among 
the 
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companies to engage with the new wind energy market, which subsequently led to 
the different development paths in each country. 
With respect to the second objective, it was noted that in all three 
countries, policy provided the initial spark for companies to consider renewable 
energy technologies. Consequently, policy-makers should take the interaction 
between companies and their systemic environment into account when designing 
policy. Companies will react if their core business areas are affected. Whether 
they engage pro-actively or defensively, however, depends on the precise 
institutional environment and the degree to which they can strategically position 
themselves in a new technology niche. Policy design with low entry barriers for 
potential new entrants into the industry as well as a long-term policy horizon to 
provide a strategic horizon both for incumbents and new entrants was successful 
in fostering both competition from new entrants as well as pro-active policy 
engagement by the incumbents. Hence, it is argued that carefully designed 
feed-in 
tariffs would provide a positive input into the current debate on the harmonization 
of EU energy policy in fostering renewable energy deployment as well as 
supporting the move towards a common EU electricity market. 
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6. Reflections on understanding co- 
evolutionary dynamics using the 
analytical framework 
This chapter aims to broaden the analysis from the previous chapter and, 
in addressing the final aim of this thesis, discuss the extent to which the analytical 
framework deployed in this research complements and extends existing 
approaches in the `systemic innovation' literature. 
It is argued in this chapter, that the main strength of the analytical 
framework was the ability to account for context specific factors that influenced 
decision-making both on the company as well as the policy level. Section 6.1 will 
discuss the different foci of the analytical framework in each country and show 
how the analysis was able to extend existing understanding of the co-evolutionary 
pathways. Subsequently, section 6.2 extends this analysis to consider the 
contribution of the analytical framework to the systemic innovation literature. 
Here, it is argued that the analytical framework connects well with existing 
theoretical approaches to innovation in the literature and addresses 
methodological concern about demonstrating the causal linkage between two 
interacting variables in co-evolutionary research. Hence, for example, it widens 
the understanding of `functions' in technological innovation systems by 
considering not just whether a function is working at the systemic level but also 
why (or why not) it is functioning well. 
6.1. Explaining co-evolutionary dynamics in the 
three case study countries 
The central tenet of the analytical framework was the interrelationship 
between developments at the company level with developments at the systems' 
level. At the company-level, it was proposed that corporate strategy could usefully 
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be conceptualised to analyse the companies' interaction with its systemic 
environment. Here, the framework proposed two different avenues to analyse this 
interrelationship: Firstly, through the interaction of corporate political activity 
(CPA) with the wider institutional environment, and secondly, through the 
companies' development of technological capabilities and their wider impact on 
technology diffusion in the market place. 
The three countries exhibited examples of these relationships at different 
levels and different degrees of complexity. Hence, the focus of the analytical 
framework was adapted to the particular technology transition trajectory and 
company-specific context in each country. Indeed, it is argued that one of the 
main benefits of applying the analytical framework used in this thesis is the ability 
to consider specific institutional and organizational contexts and consequently to 
emphasize the different impact of these variables in individual countries. 
One of the key findings that came out of the UK case study was the lack of 
strategic market opportunity when incumbent utilities had to consider whether to 
invest further in their emerging wind energy niche businesses in the mid-1990s. 
While this fact on its own would not have been pivotal for the wider diffusion of 
wind power, if a wider market opportunity for new entrants were in place, it 
proved to be an important bottleneck for the wider development of wind power in 
the UK. Lack of strategic market opportunity for new entrants, coupled with 
incoherent and erratic renewables policy and a lack of alternative lobbying 
networks led to a subdued UK wind industry that was growing at a speed far 
below its theoretical economic potential. Using the analytical framework to focus 
on the interaction of company strategy formulation and the wider systemic 
environment provided a more detailed picture of the causal relationships that 
stifled the diffusion of wind power in the UK. 
Conversely, in the German case, the main focus was on the repeated 
attempts by the German incumbent utilities' to use corporate political activity to 
limit the institutional niche for wind power. In this case, using the analytical 
framework allowed exploring the reasons behind this reactive stance in the first 
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place, and subsequently why it was ultimately not successful to limit the diffusion 
of wind power at the national level. 
Finally, the Spanish case study offered an insight into how incumbent 
utilities can be co-opted into the process of developing renewable energy. 
Importantly, in this case, the incumbent utilities actively lobbied for 
improvements to the renewables policy, once wind power became a strategic 
business activity for the companies. Hence, using the analytical framework, it was 
possible in this case to trace the sources of the positive feedback loops that drove 
continuous innovation and through policy adaptation and company investments to 
make Spain the second largest wind power market in the world with equal shares 
of installations among incumbents and new entrants. 
6.2. Contribution of the analytical framework to 
research on innovation and transitions and its 
applicability in further research 
The theoretical basis for the analytical framework is rooted in an 
evolutionary economic theory and its application in the domains of technology 
and corporate strategy. These approaches allow for an understanding of strategy 
and technology development that is based on bounded rationality, reflexive 
learning and experimentation. Yet, these notions are all rooted in practices that 
occur as much at the level of the firm or even the individual, rather than just at the 
level of the system. 
Hence, this thesis extended existing systemic innovation frameworks by 
integrating a firm-level analysis of strategic alignment of internal capabilities and 
political strategies with wider systemic developments. In this way, it has been 
embracing a wider family of co-evolutionary approaches to the analysis of 
technological change (Nelson 1998; Geels 2002; Murmann 2003). 
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The focus on individual agency in co-evolutionary contexts has recently 
received more attention. As discussed in chapter 2.3.3, systemic innovation 
approaches were criticised for suffering from "institutional determinism" and a 
lack of explanation for the "actions of the entrepreneur" (Hekkert et al. 2006), 
while Smith et al. (2005: 1492) objected to the "... tendency to treat regime 
transformation as a monolithic process dominated by rational action and 
neglecting important differences in context". 
Murmann (2003: 23) argued that it is central for co-evolutionary research 
to establish "the bidirectional causality linking the two parties in the 
relationship... The key challenge for such arguments is to establish that causal 
processes indeed do connect the two partners in a co-evolutionary relationship. " 
In linking corporate strategy to wider co-evolutionary developments, this 
thesis provides a novel theoretical contribution that complements existing 
analyses in the literature. For example, Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) use a 
systemic innovation framework to trace the renewable energy diffusion path in 
Germany. Yet, they do not provide a firm-level explanation for the incumbents' 
obstructive behaviour, instead using structural explanations such as their dominant 
position in the electricity system. As argued throughout this thesis, generalising 
on the basis of a company's structural position in an innovation system neglects 
important differences in context, as evidenced by the differential technology 
adoption paths in Germany and Spain. Hence, Jacobsson and Lauber's (2006) 
analysis does not extend to the field of differential corporate strategy. Thus, for 
example, it would fail to address the recent strategic change among German 
incumbent utilities towards renewable energy, in the way that this thesis has tried 
to do. As argued in section 5.1 and 5.3, where new technologies acquire strategic 
importance for an incumbent company, these companies can adapt their strategies 
towards a more pro-active and supportive approach. 
A second contribution of this thesis in relation to the work by Jacobsson et 
al. are policy recommendations that can be made on the basis of systemic 
innovation research (Jacobsson & Bergek 2004). In the innovation systems 
approach, recent research has focused on functions that technological 
innovation 
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systems (TIS) need to fulfil in order for new technologies to be self-sustaining in 
the market place. 
As outlined in chapter 2.3.2, functions are used as a benchmark to assess 
the performance of TIS. Where functions are well-developed, firms have 
sufficient resources to invest in new technologies and are well-connected, which 
aids the development and diffusion of innovations into broader markets. Where 
functions are not developed, specific policies and measures can be targeted to 
overcoming potential obstacles (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004). 
Yet, Jacobsson and Bergek (2004: 819) acknowledge that "... there is no 
reason to expect a particular system structure to be related to the performance of a 
technological system in a clear and unambiguous way. " However, in their 
analysis, incumbent utility companies are unambiguously seen as blocking the 
formation of functions in a renewable energy innovation system. Here, as argued 
in chapter 2.3, insufficient attention is paid to the heterogeneity of approaches 
within the same structural class of actors, in this case incumbent utility 
companies. 
The analytical framework used in this thesis aimed to consider the specific 
context in which firms set their strategy, linking the firms' external environment 
to firm-level decision-making processes and the resultant feedback to the wider 
environment. Hence, the cases from Germany and Spain show how wind energy 
developed with widely different approaches to technological and institutional 
engagement by the incumbent utility companies. Although in 
both countries new 
market entrants played an important role in wind power diffusion, electric utilities 
were much more closely engaged in Spain than in Germany. 
Consequently, the integration of a strategic dimension into co-evolutionary 
analysis provides an important qualification of the 
functional view. While recent 
contributions in the literature have 
focused on finding proxy variables for the 
measurement of functions (Negro, 
Hekkert, & Smits 2007), it is contended here 
that note should also be taken of the motivations 
for actors to perform certain 
functions. As an illustration, two functions are considered 
in the context of the 
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German and Spanish case studies: (1) Supply of resources and (2) creation of 
markets (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004). 
In the German case, incumbent utilities did not start to invest significant 
resources in the wind energy field until about the year 2000. Furthermore, their 
lobbying approach used various routes to obstruct the market creation for this new 
technology. Thus, in the absence of investment activity by incumbent utilities, 
small-scale investors were able to develop the emerging market based on the 
resources provided through government-subsidised mutual funds, grants and the 
feed-in law. In consequence, knowledge and market creation was distributed 
among many small-scale development and engineering companies. However, the 
antagonistic discussion over the feed-in law in Germany and the increasing 
market dominance of the incumbent utility companies in the conventional 
electricity market meant that knowledge creation never extended into the market 
integration of wind energy and the associated capabilities this would require. 
In Spain, both functions were addressed by the incumbent utility 
companies at various levels, complementing the activity of the new entrants in the 
wind industry. While activity was still distributed over a variety of actors, 
incumbent utilities were one of the main drivers for the provision of resources for 
investments as well as knowledge creation in the industry. Moreover, Iberdrola 
was a central driving force for the market integration of wind energy and helped 
to open up the institutional and technological space in this direction. 
Consequently, it is argued here that integrating a strategy-perspective on 
the development of a system's functions could provide a complementary and 
deeper analysis of their (mal-)performance. Complementing existing approaches 
to functional analysis, it would allow policy-makers to obtain a more precise 
picture of the present state of a system's evolution and the potential requirements 
for policy intervention. Functions of innovation systems arise out of 
the specific 
strategies chosen by individual actors. 
These, in turn, arise out of the specific 
context in which individual actors 
have to operate in. Hence, it could be argued 
that they are higher-level aggregations of 
individual actions and thus emergent 
properties of an innovation system. 
Cataloguing proxy variables for individual 
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functions to assess their performance (as for example in Hekkert et al. (2006)) is a 
useful tool to identify weaknesses in a technology's development. However, it is 
contended here that a strategic analysis as developed in this thesis would allow the 
development of a better understanding of why weaknesses occur and what might 
be the motivations of individual actors to refrain from contributing to a particular 
function. 
As outlined in section 2.3.3, it was argued that methodologically, co- 
evolutionary research needed to demonstrate the precise causal mechanisms that 
link two co-evolving populations. Integrating strategy analysis into systemic 
research provided a micro-level explanation for the organizational adaptation of 
the utilities in the three countries studied. Methodologically, this is important as it 
allows the researcher to identify the underlying rationale for differential individual 
agency among companies. This consequently allows the separation of what is 
labelled by Murmann (2003) as `sequential adaptation' and `causally linked co- 
evolutionary processes'. Taking both aspects together, the analytical framework 
developed in this research could thus be employed to develop deeper arguments 
about the nature of co-evolutionary processes by identifying differential causal 
mechanisms underpinning the observed development pathways. 
An important methodological consideration for such research has been a 
deep understanding of the field of study on the part of the researchers involved 
and especially a close analysis of the individual actors and the particular contexts 
in which they operate. For the research presented in this thesis, three countries, 
thirteen companies and almost twenty years of development have been analysed. 
Yet, co-evolutionary arguments, by their very nature, are based on the established 
routines and networks in the respective institutional frameworks of each country. 
Consequently, historical analyses, identifying established approaches among 
individual companies and networks in the institutional and technological sphere, 
are necessary pre-conditions to build arguments relating 
individual company 
strategies to systemic developments. 
As already highlighted in section 5.3, extending systemic 
innovation 
research with a detailed analysis of corporate strategy also aids 
the development 
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of policy-relevant arguments. By specifically considering the range of strategies 
available to companies in response to policy proposals, such a research approach 
acknowledges explicitly the interaction between companies and their policy 
environment. This addresses existing criticisms, as outlined in section 2.3.3, that 
systemic innovation research often assumes policy-making to occur in a `vacuum' 
without company intervention (Smith et al. 2005). Secondly, it allows a better 
understanding of the impact of policies on individual companies as well as on the 
shape of an entire industry. This could offer policy-makers a better understanding 
of the competitive implications of new policies and their effect on the co- 
evolutionary pathways of new technologies. 
Beyond the application in the energy industry, it is contended that the 
analytical framework could be used in other industry contexts as well. Corporate 
strategy, as conceptualised in this thesis, is especially fruitful in complementing 
co-evolutionary analysis in highly regulated industries. The importance of formal 
market rules for the electricity industry's business model made their inclusion 
particularly relevant to this study. Yet, in industries with less stringent regulatory 
requirements, it might be appropriate to widen the definition of `institutions' to 
include less formal institutions such as patent laws, university and education 
systems or the nature of contractual relationships when analysing specific 
strategies (Alston, Eggertsson, & North 1996) and to consider corporate strategy 
with regard to these dimensions. 
6.3. Summary 
This chapter argued that the main advantage of the analytical framework 
was its integrated analysis of changes at the company level and the institutional 
and technological level. This allowed a context-specific analysis of the 
factors 
leading to the technology paths in each country. Consequently, it was argued that 
the analytical framework could more generally 
be used to enhance the 
understanding of individual agency vis-ä-vis systemic changes. 
This argument has 
two dimensions: Firstly, it addresses existing criticisms of systems approaches 
that have focused primarily on structural and 
functional arguments to explain 
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actions of individual companies. Rather, strategy analysis as presented in this 
thesis allows a better understanding of the rationale behind differential individual 
agency. For example, it extends the understanding of `functions' in the 
technological innovation system literature by providing a firm-level explanation 
of why individual functions might be supported or obstructed by incumbent 
companies. This secondly echoes methodological concerns about the arguments 
that are advanced to describe co-evolutionary developments. By providing a 
detailed link between activities at the company level and at the systemic level, this 
thesis has advanced a methodology to open up the black box of co-evolutionary 
change and to analyse in more detail its key contributing factors. 
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to analyse the role of incumbent electric utility 
companies in the diffusion of renewable energy technologies. It had two 
overarching research questions: What are the main factors influencing incumbent 
companies' strategy when changes occur at the systemic level in the electricity 
industry? To what extent do corporate strategy and the electricity system interact 
and influence each others' evolution? 
This chapter will draw together the main results from the research and 
reflect on how they contributed to addressing these two questions. Consequently, 
it will discuss both the strengths of and the limits to the present research and will 
suggest areas where further research is needed. 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that existing approaches to the 
study of technological change are insufficient on their own to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of the role of incumbent utility companies in the 
diffusion of new RETs. In the literature review in chapter 2, two separate 
approaches to the role of incumbents in the diffusion of RETs were critically 
examined. In this respect, it is important to notice that not only do the strategic- 
management and the systemic-innovation literature provide different frameworks, 
they also ask different questions. 
The strategic-management literature is primarily concerned with the short- 
run positioning of companies, inquiring about the sources of competitive 
advantage and the nature of organizational strategic change. In contrast, systemic 
innovation studies take a longer-term view and inquire about the interrelationship 
of several dimensions of a socio-economic system whose evolution can 
be 
sketched over time to trace the co-evolutionary pathways of technological change. 
As has been argued in section 2.3.3, in this bigger picture there is often less 
explanatory power for the individual agency of 
firms that develop varying 
strategies in the face of a changing systemic 
landscape (Geels 2002). 
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Yet, sections 2.2.1,2.2.2 and 2.3.1 outlined how the theoretical 
foundations of parts of the strategic-management literature and systemic 
innovation frameworks are interrelated. Arguments about the bounded ly-rational 
firm environment, the context-specific transmission of tacit knowledge and the 
establishments of firm routines recur in both literatures and hence provided a 
starting-point for establishing a novel analytical framework, the first aim of this 
thesis, that combines both an explicit analysis of individual agency, as well as the 
linkage of individual companies' actions into system-wide changes. This in turn 
provided the basis for answering the set of questions for the specific research 
angle adopted in this thesis, in inquiring about a company-level explanation for 
the different adoption strategies of one group of organizations, incumbent utility 
companies, in the face of system-wide change in the electricity industry through 
the introduction of RETs. 
Positioned within the literature on co-evolutionary research, the aim of this 
thesis was to develop an analytical framework that was both dynamic and 
interactive, thus allowing the researcher to trace technology diffusion pathways 
over time and in the context of differential evolutionary adaptations among 
companies. In developing the analytical framework, this sought to address two 
important critiques of co-evolutionary and systemic research approaches that were 
also highlighted in section 2.3.3. Firstly, by integrating corporate strategy into a 
systemic framework, it provided an explicit model of individual agency vis-a-vis 
systemic change, going beyond structural and functional explanations of company 
behaviour that is found in some of the existing literature (Smith, Stirling, & 
Berkhout 2005). Secondly, by tracing the adaptation of corporate strategy to 
changes at the systems level, it outlined in detail a causal mechanism that links 
co-evolutionary feedback between the different dimensions of organizations, 
institutions and technology. This addresses methodological criticisms of the level 
of analytical detail co-evolutionary studies provide in their arguments about 
precise co-evolutionary links (Murmann 2003). 
Having established a novel analytical framework in chapter 3, the second 
aim of this thesis was to utilize this 
framework in a concrete research setting and 
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to generate novel empirical and theoretical insights. Chapter 4 discusses in detail 
the three case studies in the UK, Germany and Spain and consequently highlights 
the different RET adoption strategies among the utilities in the three countries. As 
outlined in the introduction in chapter 1, this thesis was motivated both by the 
desire to develop a theoretically richer framework for analysing renewable energy 
diffusion, as well as contributing to the ongoing policy debate in this area. 
Consequently, aims 3 and 4 sought to explore the novel findings that this thesis 
contributes to the theoretical and empirical debate around renewable energy 
technology diffusion. 
Main findings 
Chapter 5 outlines in detail the co-evolutionary argument derived from the 
application of the analytical framework in the three case studies. Using the matrix 
established in table 22 in section 5.1, different adoption strategies among the 
utilities in the three countries were identified. Spanish utilities were shown to 
have proactively driven the development of their regulatory framework to 
overcome the most pertinent barriers to wind power diffusion. Hence, the co- 
evolution of firm capabilities, technology and the institutional environment led to 
high-levels of diffusion in Spain, coupled with high levels of adoption at the 
utility company level. This continuous co-evolution of firm capabilities and the 
institutional environment was labelled as a "virtuous cycle". Conversely, in the 
case of the UK, diffusion of wind power remained subdued at the national level, 
albeit with high levels of activity among utilities in the residual market. Lack of 
competition and regulatory pressure led utilities merely to comply with regulation 
without initiating virtuous cycles as in the Spanish case. Lastly, in Germany, high 
levels of diffusion at the global level are coupled with marginal levels of adoption 
among the utilities. Initially, German utilities did not develop technological 
capabilities and used defensive CPAs, such as legal, political and regulatory 
instruments to limit the diffusion of wind power. However, none of them proved 
ultimately successful and the German utilities eventually changed their stance 
once the institutional environment solidified and technological developments 
opened new niches in the field of offshore wind. 
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The differences in the diffusion patterns of wind power generation in the 
three markets are explained by different co-evolutionary patterns of regulation, 
technology and respective strategic company responses. Specifically, this 
divergence is explained by differences in firms' strategies to coordinate 
development of technological capabilities and corporate political activities to 
shape their regulatory environment. Such dissimilar strategies were shown to lead 
to different dynamics in the interactions between firms and their institutional and 
technological environment that consequently result in different co-evolutionary 
development pathways and thus in different patterns of adoption and 
implementation of wind power. 
An important finding was that in all three countries regulatory change 
provided the initial stimulus for investments into wind power. However, the 
subsequent reaction of the utilities and their strategic adaptation to the regulatory 
environment exhibited divergent patterns, with the pro-active activity of the 
Spanish utilities contrasting with actions by the German utilities to defend their 
status quo. This highlights the importance of coordinated strategies of firms in 
terms of their corporate political activities (CPA) and associated development of 
technological capabilities, as witnessed in the Spanish wind power market. 
Virtuous cycles of the development of firm capabilities and regulatory change led 
the Spanish utilities to become mayor players in the global wind power industry. 
Neither in the UK nor the German case, did firms encounter the supportive 
environment and develop the respective strategy to initiate and reinforce such a 
virtuous cycle. 
It is argued, that the existence of such virtuous cycles as in the Spanish 
case support the argument for utilizing analytical approaches that focus on 
individual agency when exploring the role of incumbent utilities in the 
transformation of energy systems. Contributions in the innovation systems 
literature (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Johnson and 
Jacobsson, 2003; Tsoutsos and Stamboulis, 2005) see the role of incumbent 
utilities primarily in defending the established electricity industry structure and 
hindering the introduction of renewable energy technologies. While, the cases of 
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Germany and the UK do give examples of such behaviour, the Spanish case study 
highlights that incumbents can drive transformations of the energy system both in 
terms of technological development and regulatory adaptation. This underlines the 
need for analytical frameworks that take specific note of strategic firm action 
within changing regulatory and technological environments. 
Complementing the innovation systems approach, this thesis introduced an 
analytical framework that focuses specifically on the configuration of firms' 
resource bases and the resultant corporate political activities. Focusing on these 
components was central in explaining the differential outcome in the three case 
studies and especially the proactive role of the Spanish utilities in the 
development of the technical and regulatory environment for wind power. This 
underlines the complementarity of utilizing a research framework that combines 
the analysis of both the company strategy level with the evolution of the systems 
level. Each on its own would not have been sufficient to explain the observed 
changes, while together they allow the researcher to trace in detail the co- 
evolutionary pathway of development. 
Implications for policy-making 
Having highlighted the merits of introducing the focus on firm activities 
for the transformation of energy systems, three lessons for policy-making were 
drawn from the case studies and presented in chapter 5.3. Firstly, when 
developing policies for new technologies, the capability base of firms needs to be 
taken into account. Policies are not created in a political vacuum and incumbents 
will react where their core business is affected, as they align their business and 
political strategies. Whether they will engage re-actively or pro-actively, however, 
depends on the degree to which they can benefit from future polices. As 
evidenced in the Spanish case, co-opting incumbents into the policy process can 
lead to virtuous circles of technology diffusion and capability development. 
However, further research is needed to understand the conditions in which such 
virtuous circles can emerge. 
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Secondly, there is a need to understand policy-making as a process that 
will have firm involvement whether desired or not. As the case studies showed, 
co-evolutionary processes will occur between firms, their technological strategies 
and their regulatory environment. Once firms have decided their strategy, path- 
dependent developments can lead to positive as well as negative feedback loops. 
Thus, the initial policy design has consequences beyond the immediate market 
impact which shape the market approach by the incumbent utilities and their 
reaction. Thus, understanding the motivations that drive firms' involvement in the 
policy-making process potentially allows policy-makers to avoid setting off 
defensive political activities by firms that can slow down new technology 
diffusion. This is not to say, however, that policy-makers should simply adhere to 
the wish-list of incumbent utilities. 
Finally, policies need to provide both a long-term, stable investment 
horizon and low barriers for new market entrants to induce competition in an 
emergent industry. Policy-makers need to appreciate that because renewable 
energy markets are to a considerable extent government induced, investors worry 
about being stranded with investments in markets that change with the political 
weather, a case of `moral hazard' and `time inconsistency' of policy making 
(Helm, Hepburn, & Mash 2003; Neuhoff 2005; Neuhoff & Sellers 2006). Hence, 
providing low entry barriers and a durable investment framework encourages a 
diverse industry population that keeps potential inertia by incumbents in check 
whilst inducing the long-term investments required for 
developing the novel 
market. 
Section 5.3.3 argued that a well-designed feed-in tariff scheme could 
be 
used across the EU to address the above-mentioned policy 
implications. It address 
both competition as well as environmental objectives of 
EU policy making and 
would provide a strategic market incentive 
large enough to attract new entrants as 
well as incumbents into the renewable energy sector. 
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Outlook and future research 
Having outlined a novel analytical framework for the analysis of 
incumbents' responses to technological change, a major challenge now would be 
to transpose its application into the specific contexts of other industries and 
research settings. 
Furthermore, given the simultaneous longitudinal and cross-sectional 
research approach across countries and time in this study, it has not been possible 
to investigate in sufficient detail the precise conditions and mechanisms inside 
individual companies that lead to virtuous cycles of technology diffusion. As 
argued above, strategy analysis on its own might be insufficient to garner a 
detailed understanding of co-evolutionary developments in the energy system. 
However, in the context of the co-evolutionary framework proposed here, strategy 
analysis could fruitfully be applied as a complementary analysis. This could focus 
on specific company case studies to analyse in depth at an organizational level 
how strategic alignment processes are transmitted inside organizational 
hierarchies, how search heuristics (Geels 2002) are adapted and what individual 
actors are involved. Similarly important research questions relate to how different 
policy designs impact on a company's strategy-making processes and what might 
be necessary the conditions for pro-active organizational engagement. 
In an extension to this point, existing research has argued that established 
routines within companies have led to inabilities to adopt technologies that lie 
outside established `search heuristics' of the affected employees (Dosi 1982, 
Geels 2002). The results from the research find contradictory evidence in this 
respect. On the one hand, Spanish utilities were well-established in conventional 
electricity generation technologies, operating coal, nuclear, hydro and natural gas 
power stations. Nevertheless, they were able to identify the opportunities of 
renewable energy technologies and build dedicated strategies around them. On the 
other hand, German utility companies appeared unable to build strategies around 
the small wind turbines available in the early 1990s, declaring 
in one case that 
'6 ... this 
[did] not fit our business model, we [were] not set up for that kind of 
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task. " Hence, more detailed research at this level could uncover the mechanisms 
that led some companies to adapt positive expectations and strategies around 
renewable energy technologies, while leaving other companies within existing 
`search heuristics'. 
Taking this analysis forward, it is furthermore observed that adding large 
amounts of wind power to the electricity grid can entail additional costs and risks 
for the operation of the transmission system (IEA, 2005; Stenzel and Gill, 2005). 
In Germany, the utilities own and operate the transmission system, while in the 
Spanish and British case this is the remit of an independent national operator. 
Hence, the German utilities were directly exposed to the operational risks and 
costs associated with the diffusion of wind power. While this thesis did not 
investigate explicitly the direct linkage between the ownership structure of the 
transmission system and the strategic approach to wind energy, it is speculated 
whether the defensive strategies of the German utilities were motivated in part by 
concerns over their existing transmission assets. If this were the case, the 
ownership structure of the transmission system would become a key determinant 
of the incumbents' reaction to the introduction of renewable energy. In summary, 
this would imply that the inertia of an existing energy system is in part governed 
by its ownership structure and consequently the institutionally-determined 
distribution of risks and costs with respect to the diffusion of new technologies. 
Approaching the subject from the policy perspective, the literature on 
`national policy styles' (Jänicke 2005) highlights the different regulatory cultures 
among different countries, which influence a country's ability to support 
sustainable innovations. Thus, Blazecjzak et al. (2000) argue that 
"it is generally 
agreed that a culture of dialogue and consensus 
is an important condition for 
successful environmental policy. This seems especially 
important for the creation 
of a broad coalition for ecological modernization. 
An innovation oriented 
environmental policy needs networking and communication of 
all kinds" 
(Blazecjzak & Jänicke 2000: 137). In this context, analysis of corporate strategies 
could focus on the extent to which they were conditioned 
by the regulatory culture 
in the respective domestic institutional environment and 
the degree to which for 
example the Spanish policy style supported 
the development of virtuous cycles in 
2 36 
the wind industry. More generally, the research has pointed to the positive impacts 
such a regulatory environment can have on industry population and technology 
diffusion, yet more research is needed to understand the precise design of policy 
that stimulates such pro-active firm reactions. 
Reflecting on research design and methodology, a useful extension to the 
results presented in this thesis could have been to link the company-specific 
analysis not just to the diffusion of wind power but also to corporate performance 
measures such as return-on-capital-employed, revenue per employee and capital- 
expenditure-to-sales ratios. These variables are often used in company-internal 
performance measurements and as such an important decision variable in internal 
strategy discussions. These themes were discussed unprompted in several 
interviews, but they were not systematically collected across all companies and 
time periods considered in order to evaluate them in the context of the other 
research findings. Yet, they would have allowed a first approximation to the 
company-internal issues outlined in the paragraph above. 
A second extension to the research design, if time and resources would 
have been available, could have been to include further countries and companies 
in the case studies in order to obtain a larger sample size for the comparative 
analysis. Specifically, a fourth country which uses a renewable energy certificate 
trading scheme like in the UK, but has a "pool market" electricity market 
framework such as in Spain could have rounded off the analysis on the key 
matrices of renewables policy and electricity market design. Italy would have 
been the closest candidate for this but in fact no country was identified that 
closely matched these requirements in Europe. 
It is hoped that with the results from this research, further attempts are 
made to integrate company-specific perspectives into the systemic 
innovation 
research agenda. It became clear during the research that a co-evolutionary 
framework provides a more comprehensive approach to understanding the 
transformation of such a complex system as the electricity 
industry. The diffusion 
of renewable energy technologies 
is not merely achieved by the substitution of 
one technology by another, but 
by a complex institutional, organisational and 
Z) 
technological reconfiguration that has already been on-going for the best part of 
the last century and that will continue. Incumbent utilities are an important piece 
in that jigsaw and the more intelligently policy can be designed towards them, the 
more thorough the next energy transformation can become. 
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Appendix 1- Interview Guidelines for Semi- 
Structured Interviews 
Central question: 
What are the main drivers for the corporate strategy of incumbent 
companies when changes occur at the systems level? To what extent do corporate 
strategy and systems interact and drive each others' evolution? 
Underlying lines of inquirL. 
What strategic role did RETs play in the leading companies as compared 
to laggards? What factors influenced the strategic position of RETs in the utility 
companies? 
Introduction: 
Short introduction of ICEPT and previous work in this area (DTI 
renewables innovation review); Introduction of personal background and past 
experience. 
Thesis: bridge to PhD project and the core of the thesis, focus on strategic 
integration of renewables among utilities 
Method: Explanation of method and choice of interview partners; 
reiteration of anonymity of interviewee in data processing; offer of transcript to 
correct interview results. 
Start into discussion by asking about personal background of interviewee 
and current job profile. 
254 
1St Topic - Company structure and environment 
Objective/Content: Assessment of the company's perception of its 
competitive environment; clarification of past evolution of company's vision and 
objectives; Positioning renewables within the overall company; Allows to 
prioritise subsequent questions and provides context for the answers given: 
0 Description of current company structure, evolution of this structure over 
time (How did important events, such as ownership changes affect the 
structure? ) 
" What is the overall vision of the company, what are its strategic priorities? 
" Where does the company see itself today in relation to its competitors? 
" How would is the overall profile/structure of the company described? 
2nd topic - Position of renewables within company; technology awareness 
Objective/Content: Identifying the strategic role of RETs within the 
resource allocation process of the company; identifying company-specific 
processes that influence investment decisions on renewables 
" How is the overall technology mix of the company decided and who 
makes this decision? 
" What are the main criteria for investment projects? 
" How are resources allocated among different investment projects? 
" What was the rationale for the last five wind projects? 
" How important is own-build vs investing into 3rd-party projects/ 
renewables certificates? 
" How do you compare your own activity in the renewables market relative 
to your competitors? 
0 How is technology appraisal carried out in your company? 
" Who is involved in technology appraisal, how important are direct 
interactions with suppliers? Is it an ad-hoc process or ongoing? 
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3rd To is - Strate is Role of renewables within overall company strategy 
Objective/Content: Position of renewables within overall company 
strategy; factors contributing to the assessment of renewables 
" What role do renewables play in the overall company portfolio? 
" In what direction do you see RETs (especially on- and offshore wind) 
evolving over the next 10/20 years? What are the biggest hurdles, what are 
the biggest opportunities? 
9 In your view, how does the current technology mix of your company 
match current and anticipated regulatory requirements? 
9 How do you expect the future evolution of 
o C02 prices and trading mechanisms 
o Green certificates 
o Electricity prices 
o Demand for Green Power 
o General regulatory environment 
9 Which of the above do you see as the most important drivers of RETs? 
" What role do investments into renewables play in the context of your 
overall investment plans? 
9 What technology mix do you expect for your company in the next 10/20 
years? 
What technology mix do you expect for the industry in the next 10/20 
years? 
euý. 
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